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The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is a UN Treaty body with the mandate to 
assess the State parties’ adherence to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This 
assessment is carried out in a periodic reporting process, where the CRC receives information 
about the states’ adherence from the State parties themselves, as well as from national civil 
society organizations (CSOs). The periodic reporting process is finalized when the CRC 
submits its concluding observations to the State party – a political document both measuring 
and affecting how states interpret the Convention. CSOs are recognized for enhancing the 
transparency of international processes such as the one in question, and to make them 
accessible to the wider public. Hence, the CRC and its reporting process makes for a good 
case to investigate CSO-influence and -participation. The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it 
analyzes how and to what extent CSOs can influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations, which is demonstrated by way of CSOs from Norway, Finland and Spain. 
Secondly, and given the implications the concluding observations have for a nation state, this 
thesis also seeks to critically analyze the legitimacy of the CSOs’ role in the periodic 
reporting process. The findings stem from conducted interviews with a series of CRC and 
CSO members, and representatives of the UN Secretariat and Child Rights Connect. 
Furthermore, a linguistically rooted content analysis has been undertaken of the CSOs’ 
alternative reports in relation to the CRC’s concluding observations. Four power theories and 
deliberative-normative theory have been employed to analyze the findings. The study 
identifies means outside and during the reporting process by which the CSOs can influence 
the CRC and its concluding observations. Moreover, the study demonstrates that 21-54% of 
the content of the CSOs’ alternative reports have been taken up by the CRC in its concluding 
observations. Finally, the study concludes that the role of the CSOs in the reporting process 
may be considered legitimate, yet certain issues fall short of meeting with the deliberative-
normative theory in full.  
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CSOs – civil society organizations. 
 
CRC – the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
 
The Convention – The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
Reporting process – The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s periodic review of 
states’ adherence to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
Concluding observations – The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s final remarks of 
its review of states’ adherence to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 
concluding observations is a political document both measuring and affecting how states 
interpret the Convention.  
 
Alternative reports – Reports from civil society organizations containing information on how 
the State parties adhere to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
Pre-session – A step in the reporting process where the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child meets with civil society organizations. 
 
NGO-coalition – A group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) cooperation on writing 
and submitting an alternative report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
 
NHRIs – National Human rights Institutions. 
 
Child Rights Connect – Formerly the NGO Ad Hoc Group which participated in the drafting 
of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. Now the NGO is considered a leading 
expert on the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s work as it supports national CSOs’ 
engagement in the reporting process, through guidelines on how to report, as well as 
providing assistance to national CSOs prior to and during the pre-session. Child Rights 
Connect is not part of the formal UN system. 
 







This thesis is a study of the interaction between the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) and civil society organizations (CSOs) during the periodic reporting process. This 
process is an evaluation procedure where the CRC assesses how the states that have ratified 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child comply with its articles. This is the most 
ratified convention in the UN system (OHCHR 2016a) and is also considered to be the UN 
Treaty that allows most strongly for CSO participation (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 34).  
The reporting process starts with the submission of reports from the State parties on 
their implementation of the Convention. Thereupon, the CRC also receives alternative reports 
containing information from national CSOs, operating as children’s stakeholders. These 
alternative reports praise those of the State party’s initiatives which are improving the rights 
of the child, but they also offer a critical view of the State party’s report, and point out issues 
in need of improvement (Child Rights Connect 2016a). Based on the information received 
from both the State party as well as national CSOs, the CRC finalizes the reporting process by 
submitting the concluding observations to the State parties. This final document highlights 
improvements made by the state on child rights issues at the same as it presents critical 
concerns regarding the State’s efforts to implement the Convention. Further, the concluding 
observations offer recommendations on how States can better implement the articles of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Child Rights Connect 2016a). 
 The states that have ratified the Convention are obliged by article 44 to send such 
periodic reports to the CRC. However, the CRC is not an international human rights court; 
hence it does not have a punishing role, nor procedures to follow when states violate the 
Convention. Yet, the CRC’s declarations provided in the concluding observations are 
considered “soft law”, i.e. “nonbonding rules or instruments that interpret or inform our 
understanding of binding legal rules or represent promises that in turn create expectation 
about future conduct” (Guzman and Meyer 2010: 174). In other words, although the 
concluding observations are not binding for the states in the strictest sense, the document is 
nonetheless an important tool, or source of law that influences how states interpret the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Søvig 2009: 35; Arnesen og Steinvik 2009: 92). Since 
such a document is given essential weight in the legal interpretations of the Convention, it is 
therefore of particular interest to examine on what grounds the concluding observations are 
drafted. The important role of the concluding observations indicates that international 





While existing literature suggests that CSOs have a limited impact factor on agenda-
setting and decision-making processes on the UN system1 – then based on the proposition that 
the UN Treaty in question is most allowing for CSO participation in the UN system – it is 
therefore significant to examine whether and how the CSOs can influence the CRC and have 
an impact on the concluding observations. CSOs are at any rate recognized as being able to 
impact discursive positions by persuading international organizations to influence domestic 
policy-making (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 98), yet this needs concrete investigation based on 
wider empirical evidence. 
 
1.1 The scope and the research questions 
While CSOs are given an important role in the monitoring process of the most ratified UN 
Treaty (OHCHR 2016a), and are recognized to have some influence in international regimes, 
one may wonder about the extent to which CSOs’ can influence the final and law-interpreting 
concluding observations submitted to the national State parties, which in turn may have a 
discernible effect on the lives of citizens – and children in particular. Since little knowledge 
exists regarding CSOs’ concrete influence on the CRC it is therefore of the utmost importance 
to obtain precise knowledge in this matter. Moreover, as national CSOs are stakeholders, or 
spokespersons for children, it is also of interest to address the legitimacy of their role in the 
reporting process. 
 While there exists a limited research in this particular field, yet there is one research 
article by Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012) which studies aspects similar to those that this 
thesis intends to address. Just like the present work sets out to do, the mentioned article 
examines whether CSOs may impact the concluding observations. However, its exercise is 
explorative in nature, and the conclusions drawn are uncertain. I will build upon this article, 
both in theory and in methodology, in order to seek to expand the knowledge platform in the 
field, and contribute with more in-depth insight and firmer conclusions. The field in which 
this thesis is situated seems ripe for further critical and productive questioning, which stems 
from power theories and deliberative theory: The power theories as well as a critical theory 
based on deliberative-normative points of reference employed as theoretical frameworks in 
this thesis appear as fruitful analytical tools to help critically explain the UN Committee on 
                                                
 
 





the Rights of the Child’s interaction with CSOs in the reporting process, and at the same time 
provide solid ground to understand it. The raised research questions for this thesis are: 
 
How and to what extent can civil society organizations influence the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child and its concluding observations? Is the CSOs’ role in the reporting 
process legitimate? 
  
As the research questions entails, the aim of this thesis is twofold: First, to analyze how and to 
what extent CSOs can influence the CRC and its concluding observations. This analysis will 
be explained and understood in view of the theoretical framework of four power theories, 
including Dahl’s2 direct power dimension, Bachrach and Baratz’3 agenda-setting power, 
Lukes’4 power dimension on ‘preference shaping’, and the Habermasian communicative 
power theory5. The selection of employed power theories is rooted in the obvious fact that in 
order for CSOs to influence the CRC and its concluding observations, CSOs must possess 
power. Secondly, and subordinate to the first research question, is the analysis of the 
legitimacy of the CSOs’ role in the reporting process. This research question will be analyzed 
by using four deliberative-normative criteria offered by Nanz and Steffek (2005), which are 
based on Habermas’ deliberative theory. The normative criteria will be a fruitful analytical 
tool to critically explain and understand how citizens’ concerns are fed into the policy-making 
process, and taken into account when important decisions, such as the concluding 
observations, are made.  
 While understanding the CRC and its concluding observations as the dependent 
variables in this study of the CRC’s interactions with CSOs, the research questions will be 
sought answered by examining how three CSOs from Norway, two CSOs from Finland and 
one from Spain, as independent variables, influence the CRC’s work during the reporting 
process and its concluding observations. The research question will further be answered by 
method triangulation including qualitative interviews with CRC members, and members from 
its supportive network, i.e. the Secretariat and Child Rights Connect, in addition to interviews 











with national CSOs from Norway and Finland.6 These interviews will provide answers to the 
first part of the first and twofold research question (“how”). Furthermore, and to answer the 
second part of the first and twofold research question (“to what extent”), I will also conduct a 
linguistically rooted quantitative content analysis of the relevant documents to examine the 
extent to which CSOs may influence the CRC’s concluding observations. The analysis is 
based on alternative reports from the six above-mentioned CSOs and the CRC’s concluding 
observations for Norway, Finland, and Spain’s latest reporting rounds (2009, 2010 and 2010, 
respectively). Since the three countries have during the last months submitted or will shortly 
submit a new periodic state report to the CRC, the findings deriving from this thesis may at 
the very least provide some reasonable grounds to understand the dynamics of and possibly 
some tendencies that might be expected to be found in the forthcoming concluding 
observations from the new reporting rounds. Finally, the critical analysis of legitimacy will 
utilize empirical data from the above-mentioned methods and data collection processes.  
Below I present four assumptions about what this study can find, and which will later 
be tested through the empirical data material. These assumptions are rooted in theory and in 
existing research:  
 
A1: Civil society organizations (CSOs) can influence the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) through means by which they exceed their formal role in the reporting process.   
 
This assumption is rooted in CSOs’ role in agenda-setting – not just in national and 
international processes – but by means such as provoking debates, receiving media attention, 
holding public meetings and by attending state hearings (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 98).7 As 
CSOs have been significant for value-laden debates regarding e.g. human rights and the 
environment (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 91), the CSOs participating in the CRC’s work in the 
reporting process, will also have informal means by which they may influence the CRC and 
its concluding observations.  
 
                                                
 
 
6	  The only Spanish CSO participating in the reporting process in 2010, Plataforma de Infancia, did not wish to 
participate with interviews in this study.	  
7	  Keck and Sikkink (1999) use the term “transnational advocacy networks”, however the definition includes 





A2: Civil society organizations (CSOs) manifest their impact on the concluding observations 
by submitting alternative reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
 
This assumption is based on how CSOs have had a manifest impact on similar processes such 
as on Supreme Court decisions. CSOs and interest groups may influence decision-making 
processes in Supreme Court practices through Amicus Curiae briefs, or friend-of the-court 
briefs. Findings show how such Amicus briefs can contribute with valuable information and 
assistance to court deliberations (Kearney and Merrill 2000: 744-5). Research indicates that 
Supreme Court-decisions quote arguments originating from Amicus briefs, which 
demonstrates a manifestation of influence (Kearney and Merrill 2000: 758). Although the 
CRC is not a human rights court, the second assumption is nevertheless based on the 
argument that if CSOs may influence Supreme Court decisions by submitting reports, CSOs 
participating in the CRC’s reporting process may also – through alternative reports – manifest 
impact on the concluding observations.  
 
A3: Civil society organizations (CSOs) from Norway and Finland can, to a greater extent 
than CSOs from Spain, influence the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
 
This assumption is rooted in the theoretical clusters proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990 in 
Archambault 2009) about the third sector in Europe, including non-governmental 
organizations. Both Norway and Finland pertain to the “Nordic and socio-democrat cluster” 
where organizations are active in advocating for peace, human rights and conflict resolution 
(Archambault 2009: 10). Spain, on the other hand, is categorized into the “Mediterranean or 
emerging cluster”, where the third sector is emerging and not yet at the “Nordic level”, since 
the Spanish’ third sector is considered less developed than the Nordic cluster (Archambault 
2009: 11). Hence, the assumption is that both Norway and Finland will have greater impact 
on the CRC than Spain due to their more active third sector.  
 
 
1.2 Study plan 
In this study, I employ three analytical levels, namely the CSO level, the CRC level and the 
supra-national level. Each of the following chapters are divided into said levels, and I will 
hence answer the raised research questions in relation to each one of them. The CSO level 





reporting process. The CRC level will address the means in which the CSOs can influence the 
CRC and its concluding observations during the reporting process. The supra-national level 
includes the analysis of the legitimacy of the CSOs’ role in the reporting process. 
 In the following chapters, I will first provide an outline of the context and a 
development of the theoretical framework and methodology for how the research questions 
will be studied, followed by the State of the Art, which will demonstrate how this thesis both 
can build on existing research, but also contribute with important knowledge to the field. In 
chapter 3.0 I will present and discuss the chosen theoretical framework for this thesis, 
including the four power dimensions and the deliberative normative points of reference. The 
presentation of each power dimension and deliberative-normative criteria will be followed by 
an operationalization linking the theoretical approach to the phenomena under examination. 
Furthermore, chapter 4.0 will present this study’s methodological approach, its research 
design, and the above-mentioned methods, which have been employed to gather empirical 
data material. The chapter also discusses the thesis’ analytical approach and the quality of the 
data collected. Chapter 5.0 presents the findings stemming from the collected data, and is 
followed by chapter 6.0 which analyzes and discusses the findings in light of the raised 
research questions, the assumptions, and the theoretical framework. Finally, chapter 7.0 
provides a recapitulation of the most important findings and analytical results, and provides a 
conclusion to the study and its objective.  
 
2.0 Developing a theoretical framework and methodology for the 
study 
While the context of this thesis is wide, I have attempted to delimit the scope to the most 
significant matters for my research. Furthermore, the relevance of a development of a 
theoretical framework and a methodological approach is to gain a thorough overview of the 
scope and ensure that this study may both build upon and contribute to the existing, yet 
limited, research field. Simultaneously, this chapter will provide a contextualization to better 
understand the research questions, the findings and the forthcoming analysis.  
This chapter is threefold. First, to contextualize the analytical level called the CSO 
level, which will be of importance throughout this thesis, I will define the concepts of civil 
society and CSOs. Secondly, and to get a better comprehension of the analytical level called 
the CRC level, a presentation of the role of CSOs in the UN system in general will be 





the Rights of the Child, the CRC, and the reporting process, a description which also will be 
vital for the analytical level called the supra-national level. Finally, I will actualize existing 
research to the objective of this thesis, and discuss how my research can both relate but also 
contribute to it.  
 
2.1 Civil society and civil society organizations  
To get a comprehension of how CSOs work, and how the analytical level called the CSO level 
comes into play, it is necessary to provide a definition of the concepts civil society and civil 
society organizations. The original sense of the concept civil society refers to a political 
community “living within a framework of law and exhibiting a common allegiance to a state” 
(Heywood 2004: 41). However, theorists such as Hegel and Marx drew a clearer distinction 
between the society on the one hand, and the state on the other. This placed civil society 
outside the sphere of the state, and confined it to a realm of autonomous associations and 
groups, shaped by individuals as private citizens acting in their own capacity (Heywood 2004: 
41). Hegel ([1821] 1942) further distinguished the notion from the concept of family. Against 
this background, the definition of civil society will be understood in line with the modern 
concept of the notion, as a sphere outside the state, yet distinguished from the family. 
Moreover, civil society can be viewed as a reflection of interests, values and ideologies which 
exist in society at large (Trägårdh 2007 in Selle 2008: 616), and an organized civil society can 
have the capacity to transport new issues, concerns and interests from (local) stakeholders to 
national and even global arrangements (Nanz and Steffek 2013: 62).  
Furthermore, the term civil society organizations (CSOs) is often used interchangeably 
with the term non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Martens 2014: 45). However, for 
reasons that will soon become clear, I restrain myself from using the term NGO as in fact not 
all CSOs can rightfully be linked to the term. In this study, the concept of CSOs is confined to 
an organized civil society, including “all non-market and non-state organizations outside of 
the family in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public 
domain” (OECD 2010). Furthermore, CSOs can take many forms and may be both 
international and national. However, of most importance to the scope of this thesis, the 
definition used includes national organizations and institutions which are independent or act 
independently from the state, working with children’s rights, and which have submitted 
alternative reports to the CRC. Of particular interest are NGOs, including NGO-coalitions, 





Children’s Ombudsmen arguably are not entirely independent from the state and may be 
viewed as an extension of the state apparatus, both in terms of employment and administrative 
area, the official role of Children’s Ombudsmen in the reporting process is nevertheless 
independent from the State party’s (Barneombudet 2017a). 
 Before outlining the role of CSOs in the CRC process, an appropriate framework of 
the context of CSO involvement in the UN system is needed to be able to meaningfully 
discuss CSOs’ influence and participation at the CRC and supra-national level, respectively. 
Hence, in the following I provide a contextual background for the role of CSOs in the UN 
system in general.  
 
2.2 CSOs’ interactions with the UN system 
To get a comprehension of CSOs’ involvement in the UN, and to provide an understanding of 
the framework for the analytical levels, the CRC and supra-natonal level, I will first give an 
outline of CSOs in the UN system: In Article 71, chapter 10 of the United Nations Charter it 
is evident that the founders of the United Nations envisioned that CSOs were to play an active 
and central role: 
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation 
with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its 
competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations, and 
where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Members of 
the United Nations (United Nations (UN) 1969). 
 
Since 1945, CSOs have been crucial participants in the UN system. CSOs have been allowed 
access to international meetings, they can present written declarations, give speeches and 
lobby for specific resolutions (Willets 2006: 305). One of the main purposes for consulting 
with CSOs is that both the states and the UN Treaty bodies can benefit from their expertise. 
Another important purpose is to create the necessary connection between governments’ 
abstract deliberations and the people’s wishes within each nation state (Cohen 1990: 138). 
The CSOs operate as agents for local stakeholders and voice their concerns to international 
regimes (Nanz and Steffek 2013: 65-6). Furthermore, the consensus understanding of how 
CSOs work in international regimes such as the UN, suggests that CSOs make international 
decision-making processes more transparent to the wider public and enhance legitimacy 
through their inputs on behalf of the stakeholders they represent (Nanz and Steffek 2013; 
Martens 2014). The CSOs are hence perceived as intermediary agents between political 
institutions and the wider public (Nanz and Steffek 2013: 65). While it is thus clear that CSOs 





had an extraordinary role both during the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, but also, and more importantly for this thesis, during the CRC’s reporting process. 
 
2.3 CSOs interaction with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the UN’s General Assembly 
in 1989. Today 196 countries have ratified the Convention (OHCHR 2016a; FN 2016). In 
addition to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, three Optional Protocols have been 
established, namely on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and the Communication Procedure 
(OHCHR 2016b).  
 While the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been recognized as the only 
Treaty body acknowledging cooperation with CSOs (a relationship in fact stipulated in Article 
45 of the Convention) (UNCRC 1989), it is clear that civil society actors have been present 
both during the drafting of the Convention and the drafting of the Optional protocols 
(OHCHR 1978). An informal NGO group, called the NGO Ad Hoc Group, came about during 
the drafting of the Convention as it represented stakeholders who wanted to influence the 
process. The NGO Ad Hoc Group was hence given a distinct position to influence through 
means of networking and lobbying with the actors, including State parties, during the drafting 
phase (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 40). This involvement led to a prominent shift in the 
repertoires of CSO participation in the UN, and has demonstrated how CSOs have had 
substantial impact on the Convention (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 40). Today the NGO 
Ad Hoc Group is called Child Rights Connect, and this NGO continues to seek to advance 
child rights through a combination of activities such as supporting national CSOs in their 
engagement with the CRC’s reporting process (Child Rights Connect 2013a), however, the 
NGO is not a UN body, nor part of the formal UN system. 
 
2.4 The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the reporting process 
The CRC was adopted in 1991 and holds 18 elected, independent experts who remain in 
office for a four-year term (OHCHR 2016b). The CRC members are elected by the State 
parties and represent different geographical regions, as well as the principal legal systems 
(UNCRC 1989). The members serve in their personal capacity, and are “independent experts 
who are persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human 





As opposed to the UN International Court of Justice and the European Human Rights 
Council, the CRC does, as mentioned, not have authority to punish a state if it breaches with 
the Convention, the Optional Protocols, or any remarks from the CRC. Thus, the CRC’s 
initial role is an advisory one, rather than a ruling one when it comes to individual complaints 
(Lile 2013: 55), like in the above-mentioned court systems.8 Nonetheless, the “advisory role” 
is of importance for national legal interpretation. The CRC’s advisory role is expressed by its 
main purpose, namely to monitor the State parties’ compliance with the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which is stipulated in Article 43 (1) of the Convention:  
For the purpose of examining the progress made by State Parties in achieving the 
realization of the obligations undertaken in the present Convention, there shall be 
established a Committee on the Rights of the Child (OHCHR 1989). 
 
After having ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the initial report of the 
member states is due two years later. Thereafter, the State parties must submit a periodic 
report, which is due every five years – as the process may last that long (UNCRC 2016; 
UNCRC 2015 § 44). When a country enters a new reporting round, two Country Rapporteurs 
or a task force of 3-4 CRC members are appointed to lead the assessment of the given state 
(Child Rights Connect 2013c).9   
The CRC receives information from both the State party’s periodic report and the 
CSOs’ alternative reports, which demonstrates that the CRC is the vanguard of involving 
CSOs in its work. During the reporting process CSOs are treated as UN agencies with expert 
information (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 45-6), indicating that the CRC unequivocally 
gives the CSOs an institutionalized role in monitoring the implementation of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child in each nation state (OHCHR 1993: 111). Against the background 
of the information received throughout the reporting process, the CRC members meet to draft 
the concluding observations, which are submitted to the State party (Child Rights Connect 
2016a). The reporting process has, however, been criticized for its inefficiency due to the 
CRC’s heavy workload. The workload has led to procedural backlogs within the current 
                                                
 
 
8	  Although there has been a prominent shift after the drafting of the third Optional Protocol “A Communication 
Procedure” which arguably has affected the CRC’s mandate and authority (see e.g. Lile 2013).	  	  
9	  The course of the CRC reporting process bears resemblance to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) also a 






system, which has sometimes made the CRC members carry out the process in two chambers 
(Essary and Theisner 2013: 318), however, this is beside the scope of this thesis.  
Figure 2.4 below provides an overview of the steps of the reporting process. First, the 
circle surrounding the CRC indicates the steps of the reporting procedure, starting with the 
submission of the State party report and ending with the concluding observations. Secondly, 
the arrows pointing towards the CRC indicate the sources from which the CRC receives 
information, which is the basis for the concluding observations. The orange arrows indicate 
information from the State party, while the black arrows indicate information from the CSOs. 
The green arrows mark the communication between the State party and the CRC, where the 
CRC submits requests for more information, and submits the final remarks in the concluding 
observations. A more detailed description is provided below. 
 




















2.4.1 Submission of state party report and alternative report 
The reporting process starts when national governments submit the State party reports on how 
they have implemented their children’s rights obligations to the CRC (Child Rights Connect 
2016a). The State reports are public documents which are uploaded to the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) when submitted, and there is public access to the 
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the Convention based on a preset list of clusters10 and the Optional Protocols (UNCRC 2015). 
While bearing fully in mind that CSOs in fact may influence the State party report through 
lobbying and networking with respective national Ministries or State Departments, yet I am 
delimited in time and resources from being concerned with CSO influence on the State party 
report. Besides, the periodic state reports will be given limited attention in this thesis, as the 
objective of the raised research questions is to examine the CRC’s interaction with CSOs, not 
the State parties.   
 Six months after the State party report is submitted, children’s rights defenders that are 
independent from their respective national government may submit alternative reports (Child 
Rights Connect 2016a). These organizations include non-governmental actors such as 
children, NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), and Ombudsmen, which are 
entitled to send written information to the CRC (OHCHR 2016c). The information that they 
provide in the alternative reports consists of comments on the State party report and additional 
information highlighting good practices, and areas where the state report is incomplete, 
incorrect or misleading (Child Rights Connect 2014). 
CSOs are encouraged to submit written information to the CRC as their reports are 
highly valued by the CRC members (Child Rights Connect 2013). The NGO Child Rights 
Connect (previously the NGO Ad Hoc Group) has provided guidelines for how NGOs and 
NHRIs should write their alternative reports, suggesting a preferred format (i.e. structured 
around the same Convention clusters as the State party report), and including how the content 
should be presented. The NGO Child Rights Connect also recommends CSOs to write joint 
supplementary reports, i.e. to report as an NGO-coalition as this facilitates an overall 
understanding of the situation of children in the respective country (Child Rights Connect 
2014:9). The alternative reports are to be submitted electronically to Child Rights Connect 
(OHCHR 2016c). The CSOs that submit alternative reports can choose whether their reports 
and the name of their organizations will be held confidential (Child Rights Connect 2016a) in 
order to ensure that the CSOs can express themselves freely and prevent any event of reprisals 
against those who provide the CRC with sensitive information. This entails that the State 
                                                
 
 
10	  The clusters include General Measures of Implementation, Definition of the Child, General Principles, Civil 
Rights and Freedoms, Violence Against Children, Family Environment and Alternative Care, Disability, Basic 





parties will not have knowledge of the precise source of the information coming from the 
national civil societies.  
 
2.4.2 The pre-session 
The next step of the reporting process is the pre-session where the CRC invites competent 
bodies to provide the CRC members with expert advice and information regarding the 
implementation of the Convention (Child Rights Connect 2014). The meeting’s objective is to 
prepare for the country session with the State party (Child Rights Connect 2016a). The 
meeting is confidential, and no observers are allowed access to it,11 because the CRC wants to 
ensure that the invited participants can speak freely about children’s rights issues in their 
respective countries (OHCHR 1993).  
 The pre-session lasts for 2.5 hours, and CSOs are given the maximum of 15 minutes of 
short introductory remarks. Then the CRC members, starting with the Country Rapporteur, 
may ask up to 90 questions for clarifications on the alternative reports (Child Rights Connect 
2016a).  
 The CRC bases its decision on whom to invite to the pre-session on its evaluation of 
the alternative reports received (Child Rights Connect 2016a). However, if the CSOs wish to 
attend the pre-session they must write a written request and submit it with the alternative 
report to Child Rights Connect (Child Rights Connect 2013). When the CRC has decided, it 
will issue a written invitation to the selected CSOs to participate in the pre-session (Child 
Rights Connect 2013). The formally prioritized CSOs are those who have “submitted 
information within the requested time-frame, who are working [in the country of] the State 
party and who can provide first-hand information that is complementary to information 
already available to the CRC” (Child Rights Connect 2013). CSOs that are usually included 
are those that provide more comprehensive information, such as NGO-coalitions, 
Ombudsmen for children and NHRIs (Child Rights Connect 2016).  
 
2.4.3 The List of Issues (LOI) and responses to it 
Based on the information received during the previous steps of the process, the CRC writes a 
list of questions on selected issues (LOI) to the State parties, requesting information including 
                                                
 
 
11	  Consequently, my application for an observer’s status during the CRC pre-session held in Geneva in October 





data and statistics, updates on new laws, programs and policies from the State party (Child 
Rights Connect 2016a). The State party is required to respond to the LOI. Once received, the 
LOI and the State parties’ responses are accessible on the OHCHR website. Although this 
step concerns communication primarily between the CRC and the respective state, CSOs can 
provide comments to the LOI by raising additional concerns that are not included in the 
State’s response. While such CSO comments are an obvious means to influence the CRC and 
its concluding observations, I have not found nor gained access to the CSOs’ comments to the 
LOI for the countries in question. Moreover, the task to include also these documents in the 
content analysis was considered to be too comprehensive as this study is a mere master’s 
thesis. 
 
2.4.4 The session 
The session is a public meeting between the State parties that are up for review and the CRC, 
and it takes place in Geneva (Child Rights Connect 2016a). The objective is to discuss how 
each state fulfills its obligation to children’s rights based on the information that has been 
provided to the CRC through the previous steps of the process. The dialogues between the 
CRC members and the State parties have an interactive format with questions and answers. 
Any actor, including CSOs and the media, can attend as observers, but only the State party 
may participate actively alongside the CRC (Child Rights Connect 2016a).  
 
2.4.5 The concluding observations 
Based on the information received from the State party and the CSOs during the CRC’s 
assessment, the CRC drafts its concluding observations (Child Rights Connect 2016a). The 
content of the concluding observations is adopted during a secluded meeting for the CRC 
members alone. The concluding observations is an important document which includes the 
CRC’s recommendations for how the State party can improve its “shortcomings” as regards 
its compliance with the Convention. Although the concluding observations are instructive in 
nature and not binding for the State in the strictest sense, it is nevertheless important as it is 
given substantial weight in court cases and in interpreting the Convention, as has happened 
before the Norwegian Supreme Court, e.g.12 Moreover, the concluding observations also 
                                                
 
 





serve as leverage for CSOs at a national level (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 50). By using 
this quasi-legal document, CSOs may provide pressure on governments to support their 
positive action to better implement the Convention in practice (Türkelli and Vandenhole 
2012: 50).  
By exploring the raised research questions, this thesis will attempt to contribute by 
eliciting new knowledge of CSOs’ role in the reporting processes as outlined above, and 
examine how and to what extent CSOs may influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations, as well as the legitimacy of the latter in view of the process involving CSOs.  
 
2.5 State of the art  
An important objective in conducting a survey over existing literature is to obtain an overview 
of studies that have been conducted on the topic, their theoretical and methodological 
approaches, and the results that the research has produced. This section is of the utmost 
importance as it has contributed to forming the research questions as well as to suggesting 
fruitful theoretical perspectives and methodical approaches for my own research strategy. 
There is an obvious overweight of legal studies in this field, some of which are outside the 
scope of this thesis. Within the social science disciplines, there has been a prominent focus on 
NGOs’ role in the UN system on a general basis. Only a few studies have been conducted on 
CSOs in relation to the CRC. Based on the assessment of existing research I have categorized 
important contributions to the field, which my research may both build upon and by its own 
merits engage critically with in the search for new paths toward contributing to and enhancing 
knowledge. There are two features that my study shares with existing scholarship in the field, 
namely the theoretical approach to power, influence and agenda-setting, and a 
methodological approach to content analysis of reports.  
 
2.5.1 Theoretical approach 
A common feature in the studies that are relevant for this thesis is that they have employed 
theories of power and agenda-setting. The article “The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil 
Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, 
Human Rights and Women” (1998) by Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler, has truly been 
important for this field. Through collective action and social movement theory the authors 
examine which “tools” NGOs use to influence agenda-setting and decision-making processes 





procedures. These include lobbying and networking. The article also addresses the quality of 
the NGOs’ impact on UN conferences, and whether CSOs may have an impact on the 
participants’ (including State parties) beliefs regarding solutions to contested issues (Clark, 
Friedman and Hochstetler 1998: 5). The conclusions drawn suggest that NGOs do not have a 
high impact on the State parties because the States are the dominating actors, not the NGOs. 
Two common component as regards my thesis are here evident: First, Clark, Friedman and 
Hochstetler examined the “tools” NGOs used to influence decisions at the UN level, and, 
secondly, the authors assessed to what extent NGOs can change agendas and understandings 
through participation in the UN system. Although their focus was particularly on the power to 
influence state parties, my thesis may nonetheless contribute by enhancing their findings as it 
may discover means in which NGOs (or in my case, CSOs) can influence. 
 Another contribution to the field, and which also has components similar to this thesis 
is the article “The Conscience of the World: The influence of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the U.N. System” (1996) by Peter Willets. His study focuses on how NGOs 
can influence the political agenda and policy-making in the UN system. Willets identifies 
several factors of NGOs’ political behavior when participating in the UN system, a behavior 
which is often restricted because NGOs never possess perfect information, as opposed to the 
State parties participating (Willetts 1998:7). Willetts identifies several features where NGOs 
may influence UN forums. Amongst those are agenda-setting and policy formulation, where 
the former concerns influencing the public debate in news media, and the latter concerns 
influencing the formal agenda of issues under consideration by UN decision-making bodies. 
In the UN system NGOs often conduct committee work and lobbying where they may seek to 
influence UN delegations (Willetts 1996:10). Willets employs a theoretical framework of 
strategic means to influence – a crucial aspect in my study as well. His findings suggest that 
NGOs can influence through means outside formal UN procedures, however, the author 
makes reservations as to NGOs’ opportunities to influence UN processes due to certain 
information restrictions. 
 A final and important contribution to this field, also similar to the chosen theoretical 
framework for this thesis, is Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s work on “Transnational 
Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics” (1999). The term transnational 
advocacy networks includes NGOs and other civil society actors. Their findings confirm that 
advocacy networks may influence international politics through agenda-setting and through 





1999: 98). The authors argue that the prototypical language of advocacy networks has to do 
with “rights” as governments are the de facto guarantors of rights, yet also their primary 
violators. When advocacy networks seek to influence arenas such as the UN it is to affect the 
behavior of states (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 93). Hence domestic NGOs may reach out to 
international allies to attempt to put pressure on the states from outside. The pattern of 
influence is called “the boomerang pattern”, which is most commonly seen in human rights 
campaigns, human rights questions also being the case in my master’s thesis. While the 
authors address the same issue as the first part of my first and twofold research question (how 
CSOs can influence), they also offer an explanation, i.e. the boomerang pattern, as to why 
advocacy networks or CSOs are involved in international processes.  
 
2.5.2 Methodological approach 
As to the methodological approach, two studies are of importance. The first article bearing 
resemblance to my methodological approach investigates how CSOs as non-parties can 
influence Courts’ decision-making processes through submissions of Amicus Curiae briefs. 
Although such research largely pertains to legal studies, the article “Influence of Amicus 
Briefs” (2000) by Kearney and Merrill show traits that are similar to my methodological 
approach, i.e. my linguistically rooted content analysis of alternative reports submitted by 
CSOs and the CRC’s concluding observations. Kearney and Merrill’s approach in their 
content analysis was to search for Supreme Court cases that referred to “amicus”, “amici” or 
“friend(s) of the court”. The authors searched for any reference by the Court to the arguments 
or information provided by amicus briefs (Kearney and Merrill 2000:844). The authors found 
an escalation of Supreme Court-decisions with Amicus brief-references from 1986-1995, 
which even quoted the Amicus briefs. (Kearney and Merrill 2000: 857-50). While the authors’ 
findings derive from a word search, my content analysis will be rooted in a more in-depth 
approach. However, Kearney and Merrill’s and my content analysis bear nonetheless some 
resemblance. 
 Finally, the study that lies closest to mine is the article written by Türkelli and 
Vandenhole (2012). It examines whether NGOs’ alternative reports form the basis of the 
CRC’s work, by conducting a content analysis (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 49). While 
their theoretical framework is similar to mine, i.e. agenda- and norm-setting theory, the 
authors carry out merely an exploratory exercise of NGO reports, LOIs, and concluding 





and Afghanistan. The conclusion drawn is that the CRC uses 60-70% of the NGOs’ 
recommendations, leaving 30-40% of the recommendations unaddressed (Türkelli and 
Vandenhole 2012: 64). However, they argue that their study has a variety of methodological 
challenges and that they are tentative at best (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 53). In 
conclusion, the authors propose factors that also can determine impact on the CRC such as 
“the CRC members’ attitudes, the quality of information provided, physical presence, 
opportunities for informal discussion, and whether NGOs act individually or jointly” (Türkelli 
and Vandenhole 2012: 64). The two obvious common components in their article and my 
thesis is first, the theoretical framework of influence and agenda-setting power. Secondly, it is 
the content analysis of alternative reports and concluding observations. My analysis of the 
reports will, however, be based on a different set of criteria, rooted in a linguistic approach. 
My thesis will seek to contribute to Türkelli and Vandenholes research by picking up where 
these authors have stopped short. Hence the objectives for analyzing how CSOs may 
influence the CRC and its concluding observations will be based on these authors’ suggested 
impact factors above. 
 In the assessment of the existing research in the field I have shown that it has two 
features in common with my thesis, namely a theoretical approach to influence and agenda-
setting. The second feature is content analysis of CSO/NGO reports. The aim is thus to build 
upon existing research and contribute to the field with new knowledge by exploring suggested 
power factors which are believed to impact the CRC. Yet in this thesis it is a study based on a 
comprehensive and at the same time focused, systematically elicited in-depth empirical 
material considering three countries and a limited period of time.  
 
3.0 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter I will account for the choice of the theoretical framework used in this thesis, 
and provide motivations for linking the theories and the empirical case material. The 
theoretical framework will function as an analytical tool to critically explain and understand 
the CRC’s interaction with CSOs. The case context is one of both politics and power 
relations, since CSOs function as vehicles of communicative-power and political exchanges 
(Keck and Sikkink 1999: 100). Moreover, CSOs gain influence in international politics by 
serving as alternative sources of information (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 95), which 
demonstrates how both politics and power relations are crucial concepts for the case and for 





intricately intertwined: While politics are concerned with the distribution, exercise, and 
consequence of power, a political analysis draws attention to power relations implicated in 
social relations (Hay 2002: 3). In other words, actions and processes that take place in social 
relations, and which include the component of power, are political. Therefore, the here 
selected power theories to understand, explain and analyze the CSOs’ influence on the CRC 
are the three-dimensional power model and the Habermasian thinking of communicative 
power, whose uses are justified below. 
 Power is an essentially contested concept, a concept where no neutral definition can be 
developed and where competing versions of the notion can be equally valid (W.B. Gallie 
1955-1956, in Heywood 2004). Hence, renowned scholars have disagreed on how to perceive 
it, and the meanings and uses of this political concept vary considerably across disciplines 
(Lucas and Baxter 2012: 50). Against this background, I must provide a delimited and 
thorough understanding of how the concept of power will be used as an analytical tool, based 
in a discussion of concept variants, and of observable influences exerted on agendas and 
decision. Even though merely one theory arguably might suffice for the analysis, I do 
however, believe that using different theoretical perspectives of relevance, will make for a 
comprehensive yet manageable layout to explain and understand the roles of the CSOs in the 
CRC reporting process. The selected power dimensions for the analysis will reciprocally 
complement each other: one power dimension might not exhaust all applications of power. 
Consequently, by employing different dimensions one may extract different power 
applications from the empiricism in the analysis. The four power dimensions will provide an 
analytical framework that will focus on CSOs’ power to influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations, both on the CSO and the CRC level.  
Furthermore, on the supra-national level a deliberative-normative approach, a 
redevelopment of Habermas’ theory on “the ideal speech situation”, will be used to provide a 
framework in which to capture and perspectivize the crucial question of legitimacy in the 
reporting process.  
    
3.1 Applicable power dimensions 
Power and influence have seemingly often been viewed as the same thing, or two parts of the 
same process. Power may be viewed as “the capacity to make formal decisions which are in 
some way binding upon others”, whereas influence can be seen as “the ability to affect the 





Against this background, the CSOs’ actions may be understood as an external pressure that 
has the ability to affect the CRC, and they possess the power to do so.  
As previously stated, power is a concept with multiple takes – colloquially and in 
academic literature. In research, then, one has to balance a dilemma. The necessary attempt to 
resolve the controversy the best way possible to provide theoretical support for practical, 
analytical work, at the same time is and should be to accept the notion that the term is an 
essentially contested concept. This is important to underline because it appears that different 
forms of power are present in the actions involved in the CRC reporting process. Thus, my 
argument is, as mentioned above, that only one definition cannot exhaust all existing 
dimensions of applied power observed. Besides, research access to the topic of this thesis is 
sometimes cumbersome as the nature of the topic is caught between official and publicly 
available, and confidential information. This aspect can make the data collection process a 
challenging task. I therefore acknowledge that there may exist other power applications that 
the uncoming data collection process and the analysis of them cannot capture. 
However, in order to capture and perspectivize the power dimensions I indeed can 
identify, I will employ Engelstad’s (2010) suggested power paradigm inspired by Max Weber. 
In this paradigm, the execution of power consists of four elements: a relation between the 
actor influencing the other, an intention behind the influence, an action, where the actor 
exercises influence over the other, and lastly, the result which is (at least to some extent) in 
accordance with the intention (Engelstad 2010: 15-6). In the upcoming analysis of power 
dimensions, I will seek to identify these four elements as a means to emphasize and 
summarize how the CSOs may influence the CRC and its concluding observations. 
In building upon the limited research on influence and impact available in my concrete 
field of study, I hope to contribute further not least by probing the existing knowledge against 
my investigation of a considerably wider and more comprehensive empirical material than 
before, and so to secure more reliable findings. The upcoming operationalization will proceed 
from the impact factors by Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012), and the objective will be to 
confirm or disprove their presumptions. Their suggested impact factors are: CRC members’ 
attitudes,13 quality of information provided, physical presence, opportunities for informal 
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discussion, and whether CSOs14 act individually or jointly. In the following sections I will 
motivate these factors in accordance with the chosen theory. 
 
3.1.2 The first dimension of power: Direct power 
The first power dimension, dating back to Hobbes, similar to Weber’s definition (1922), and 
elaborated by Robert Dahl, describes a classic power definition: “A has power over B if A can 
make B do something B otherwise would not have done” (Dahl 1957: 201). Dahl has gathered 
empirical evidence supporting this definition in the study published in his book Who 
Governs? (1961). Dahl sought to examine power relations in decision-making processes in 
New Haven. This power definition is often called the “pluralist” view of power, and it 
involves a focus on behavior in the decision-making process on issues over which there is a 
visible and overt conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as expressed policy preferences, 
revealed by participation in the political realm (Lukes 1974: 11, 15). By this definition, the 
power is understood in terms of its effect. It means that if the behavior of an actor does not 
affect another, a power relation does not exist. This indicates that power is also understood as 
behavioral, it is exercised in the relation between two or more individuals. Furthermore, 
power is also associated with domination over others, meaning that the power is unproductive 
or zero-sum (Heywood 2004: 124). However, Dahl’s definition of power was originally not 
zero-sum (Read 2012: 9). It nevertheless became zero-sum when operationalized for purposes 
of research (Read 2012: 9). This is grounded in the fact that if A has the power to get B to do 
something B wouldn’t otherwise do, it does not necessarily mean that B acts contrary to 
his/her desired preference or interests. It merely entails that B acts differently than if the 
power expressed by A had not been exercised (Read 2012: 9).  
In order to utilize this theory as an analytical tool, there are three underlying causes 
that must be identified: First, that there exist a conflict of interest, values or action between A 
and B. Secondly, that B complies with A’s wishes, and finally, that B complies because 
he/she is fearful that he/she will be deprived of values that is treasured more highly than what 
can be achieved by non-compliance (Bachrach and Baratz 1963). 
Although attractive in its methodological simplicity, this power definition has been 
criticized for being what the nomer simplicity entails, one dimensional. The critique is rooted 
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  Türkelli and Vandenhole’s focus is solely on NGOs. In this thesis, the perspective has been broadened, and 





in the ground that the one-dimensionality overlooks other power dimensions, such as how 
issues may be excluded from the decision-making process, which will be presented in section 
3.1.3. 
 
3.1.2.1 Identifying conflict of interests and behavioral changes 
Against the background of this theory’s rationale, I will in the upcoming analysis of the 
empirical data material need to identify who has the power to alter whose behavior, and 
whether there exists any conflict of interests. As the CSOs are considered sources with 
alternative information, I expect that there exist certain actors that can regulate the behavior 
of CSOs and how they may contribute as bearers of alternative information. However, I 
assume that it will be a difficult task to identify this power dimension during the pre-session 
due to access restriction: In my role as a researcher I was denied access to the pre-session, 
hence the upcoming empirical data collection process might not capture certain power 
dimensions due to this restriction.  
 
3.1.3 The second dimension of power: Agenda-setting power 
The second power dimension is often referred to as non-decision-making power or agenda 
setting power. It was published as an extensive critique on the one-dimensional view. This 
view does not reject the first dimension of power; however, it suggests that it does not capture 
all feasible applications of power (Lukes 1970: 18). The most pronounced critique of the 
pluralist view on power expressed by Bachrach and Baratz, is that there is no objective way to 
distinguish key/important and routine/unimportant issues from one another. These authors 
further criticized the theory for ignoring the fact that not all issues may arrive at the decision-
making table (Bachrach and Baratz 1970: 7). Their concern with the pluralist approach 
contributed to the emphasis on nondecision-making power or agenda-setting power. This 
approach understands nondecisions as means that can be suffocated before they are even 
voiced, or kept covert before gaining access to the decision-making arena (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1970: 44). Simply put, when the grievances or issues of an actor never become part of 
the official political agenda, power is exercised.  
Power is reflected in the decision-making process however it is exercised when “a 
person or a group – consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public 
airing of policy conflicts” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, in Heywood 2004: 125). “Some issues 





Heywood 2004: 125). This dimension brings the crucially important idea of mobilization of 
bias into the discussion of power (Lukes 1970: 17). Organizations may have the potential to 
favor one group over another. Organizational structure thus influences the opportunities and 
conditions for the actors participating in it (Schattshneider 1969: 71).  
Furthermore, a powerful actor can influence the values and practices of the social 
environment, in order to block the issues that the powerful actor is uncertain of winning 
(Lukes 1970: 18). Consequently, the powerful actor avoids losing a decision. The 
nondecision-making power is relational, and conflicts of interests, values, or preferred 
outcomes between the actors involved are imperative for enabling the exercise of this power 
(Lukes 1970: 18). Non-decision thus highlights the significance of political organization in 
order to exclude the participation of groups and their particular opinions (Heywood 
2004:126).  
The second power dimension has often been explained by demonstrating how one or 
more political parties block decisions on an issue by ignoring it. This approach has often led 
to an elitist view on power – contrary to the previously mentioned “pluralist” one. The elitist 
view suggest that power is held by privileged groups (Heywood 2004: 45). However, the 
elitist approach has in fact been challenged by examples of popular pressures that have 
overcome the interest of the privileged and powerful. If the opposition consists of enough 
“powerless” actors, they may challenge the privileged groups by questioning the norms that 
lie behind their hegemony (Heywood 2004: 45). 
A critique of the theory of the agenda-setting power is that it is – in effect – seeking to 
study the absence of something. In comparison with the pluralist view, it is not as easily 
studied as it is less direct and visible. However, Bachrach and Baratz oppose this criticism 
while they think the approach can be fruitful because it goes beyond an examination of what 
is measurable (Bachrach and Barazt 1962: 952). No one should reject the immeasurable as 
unreal. Nonetheless, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) have stipulated a way of empirically 
documenting non-decision-making, starting by identifying the actors in it, and the 
mobilization of bias present. They further look at who is disadvantaged by this bias, and 
examine the extent to which the disfavored interests are expressed in the political agenda. 
 
3.1.3.1 How to capture the absence of something 
According to Bachrach and Baratz, the agenda-setting power exists in decision-making 





power dimension can be identified during the CSOs processes of writing the alternative 
reports, as – according to Bachrach and Baratz’ approach – one may expect in any agenda-
setting and decision-making process. Furthermore, yet another expectation as regards the 
principles of this power dimension is that the pre-session functions as an agenda-setting 
process and that the agenda-setting power also will be present at the CRC level.  
 
3.1.4 The third dimension of power: Preference shaping 
In Power – A Radical View (1974) Steven Lukes criticizes but does not reject the other two 
power dimensions. Lukes argues that the first two power dimensions are insufficient in that 
they do not take into account institutionalized actions that – overtly or covertly – seek to 
change or preserve conditions, behavioral patterns, structures or outcomes in a system, hence 
preventing conflict of interests to arise (Falkum 2008: 62). Therefore, he developed a third 
power dimension, in order to redress the fact that the non-decision-dimension may not include 
all possibilities in which actors can be dominated. Lukes suggests that there exist situations 
where conflicts are neither conspicuous nor visible, yet where it is still likely that someone is 
being dominated (Lukes 1974:22-3). Lukes suggests that: 
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he 
also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. 
Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the 
desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their 
thoughts or desires? (Lukes 1974: 23) 
 
This third-dimensional view on power is often called preference shaping or power by thought 
control, and is similar to Foucault’s regime of truth (Clegg 2006). If applied, one need not 
study behavior, an overt conflict of interest, or grievance among the actors. Conflicts may be 
latent between the interests of the dominating and the real interests of those they exclude 
(Lukes 1974: 24-5). According to Lukes, an issue that the first two power-dimensions fail to 
address is the fact that an actor cannot free him- or herself from the influence of others. Both 
Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz assume that actors are rational and autonomous (Heywood 
2004: 127). However, one can easily demonstrate situations in which an actor is influenced by 
another, e.g. in family, schools, media etc.  
Lukes’ power-approach can be seen in relation to Foucault’s work (especially with 
regard to the idea of a “discourse of power”) on the thought systems and power: While 





postmodernist thinkers on the other hand, come close to understanding power as “ubiquitous, 
all systems of knowledge being viewed as manifestations of power” (Heywood 2004: 128).  
In the work Power and the Powerless (1980), Lukes’ doctoral student, Gaventa, 
further suggests that symbols can play a crucial part in how people interpret society. By 
pointing to the manipulation of social myths and linguistic symbols, he analyzes how it can be 
possible to shape the societal consciousness: 
“Power influences, shapes or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities, 
and strategies of challenge in situations of latent conflict. This may include the study 
of […] language, and symbols, and how they are shaped or manipulated in power 
processes. It may involve the study of communication of information – both of what is 
communicated and how it is done. It may involve a focus upon the means by which 
social legitimations are developed around the dominant, and instilled as beliefs or 
roles in the dominated (Gaventa 1980: 15-6; brackets added). 
 
For Lukes, the concept of power is value-dependent. This is due to his view that both the 
definition and any uses of the concept, once defined, are inextricably tied to value-
assumptions, which predetermine the range of the empirical application of the power-concept 
(Lukes 1974: 26). This has been viewed as problematic for scientific and scholarly research 
due to the fact that the basis of the research under circumstances that Luks describes will 
invariably be someone’s subjective values. Dowding (2006), however, has suggested a 
resolution to this analytical issue by employing an “intentional stance” as a requisite for the 
use of this theoretical approach, meaning that an intention to exercise the power must be 
present in order for any power to exist. By applying the use of this requisite, one avoids the 
minefield of overanalyzing or giving too much importance to the interest of another actor 
(Dowding 2006: 143). In other words, B is being subject to power or domination if A 
intentionally influences him or her, or if A should be aware that he or she is doing so. 
 
3.1.4.1 Understanding how preferences are shaped 
Based on the rationale of Lukes’ theory, and the established notion of CSOs as vehicles for 
political exchange which gain influence by serving as alternative sources of information 
(Keck and Sikkink 1999: 95, 100), an expectation as to what the data material will be able to 
identify is that CSOs as providers of “alternative information” can impact the CRC’s 








3.1.5 Communicative power 
Communicative power is valuable to use as an alternate political power definition, which is 
distinct from the three above-presented dimensions. Habermas (1981), followed-up in his 
work Faktizität und Geltung (1992), provides a systematic presentation of a concept of 
political power, which can be seen as different yet complementary to the above-mentioned 
approaches.15 Communicative power is considered a normative resource for countering 
normlessly steering media of administrative power (Flynn 2004: 434): “[Communicatively 
generated legitimate power] can have an effect on the political system insofar as it assumes 
responsibility for the pool of reasons from which administrative decisions must draw their 
rationale” (Habermas 1996: 484; brackets added).  
Communicative power is expressed through mutual communicative norms that have 
been accepted voluntarily by all actors involved (Høibraaten 1999: 226). According to 
Habermas and the theory’s principles (1990), it is the argument and the argument’s rationale 
that changes another actor’s position, point of view, or action. Hence, it is the communicative 
rationality that explains the deliberative transformative ability. In other words, the power to 
change the behavior of another actor (Habermas 1990: 89-90). Actors may thus strategically 
make use of moral arguments in a rhetorical interaction where the parties involved seek to 
persuade the addressee(s) that their respective point of view is better grounded in rationality 
than that of others. The decisions that are made are therefore based on the force of the 
arguments rather than the votes or the status of the deliberator (Eriksen and Weigård 1999: 
54-5). In Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality the focus lies on how language has 
the ability to coordinate action in a cooperative or consensus-based manner, contrary to the 
instrumentalist rationality which may also make use of strategic thinking, power, force, 
manipulation, or deception (Habermas 1983: 137) as seen in the power variants discussed 
above. 
 
3.1.5.1 Identifying the deliberative transformative ability  
Based on the principles of the Habermasian communicative power, some expectations, yet also 
reservations as to what the empirical data material will show and help us identify comes to 
mind. Firstly, one may expect that throughout the course of the reporting process CSOs will 
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have the ability to clearly change the position of the CRC members by way of mutually accepted 
norms and by rational arguments. Secondly, however, due to the previously mentioned access 
restrictions to the pre-session, I must take into account that it may be hard to identify the 
deliberative transformative ability at work in the pre-session proper; still, it may be identifiable 
outside or adjacent to the pre-session itself. 
 
3.1.6 Model of operationalization 
Below, then, I present a summarizing overview of the four theoretical power dimensions that 
will be used as analytical tools to explain and understand the first and twofold research 
question of “how” and “to what extent” CSOs may influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations. Furthermore, the table also presents some expectations as to what findings the 
data-collection process may extract. 
 
Table 3.1.6 Model of operationalization 
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Now, after having established the theoretical points of reference to explain and understand the 
empirical material in seeking to analyze the CSOs’ power to influence the CRC and its 
concluding observations, I am in need of an applicable reference in order to critically discuss 
and analyze the legitimacy of the CSOs’ role in the process. Although a Weberian approach as 
theoretical point of reference for the aspects of both influence and legitimacy would serve as 
rewarding for the upcoming analysis, I nevertheless choose to rely on the deliberative 
democratic approach, while it seems that the democratic legitimation of decisions deriving 
from international governmental organizations is a highly indirect one stemming from the 





2005: 368). My argument is thus based on deliberative normative criteria, that are generally 
regarded as ideals for institutional reform.  
 
3.2 The deliberative approach: Legitimizing processes 
Based on the importance of the concluding observations, the deliberative democratic theory 
will function as an analytical tool to analyze the legitimacy of the CSOs’ role in the reporting 
process at the final analytical level, namely the supra-national level. The deliberative 
democratic theory is a normative theory that focuses on how decision-making processes 
should be organized to ensure that the binding decisions deriving from such processes are 
legitimate. Deliberative democracy is when conditions of equality, inclusiveness and 
transparency, and a communicative process based on reason can transform and/or transcend 
individual preferences and reach decisions for the public good (della Porta 2005: 340). To 
most deliberative theorists, at the core of all deliberative approaches lays the requirement of 
reason-giving:  
Citizens and their representatives are expected to justify the laws they would impose 
on one another by giving reasons for their political claims and responding to others’ 
reasons in return (Thompson 2008: 498). 
 
In contrast to the aggregative democratic model in contemporary political theory, the 
deliberative democratic model focuses on the idea of public reasoning: The goal is to reach 
political decisions through a deliberative process where the actors involved scrutinize 
heterogeneous interests and values, and justify their positions in the view of the common 
good (Nanz and Steffek 2005).  
Before outlining the model of deliberative democracy that will serve as a normative 
point of reference for the critical analysis, one needs to address the issue that is paramount to 
the theory, namely the insurance that citizens’ concerns are taken into account when it comes 
to decisions on binding rules, and that the results, in principle, can be supported by citizens in 
a free and open debate. In Habermas’ proceduralist theory, the public sphere, in this case the 
civil society, plays an important role. The public sphere is perceived as a discursive network 
where the citizens, tied together by the means of mass communication, shape flows of 
opinions in seeking how to best solve common problems (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 320-1). 
While it may be difficult for a single citizen to voice his or her concerns in a global 
governance regime, one may nevertheless view an organized civil society that participates 





their constituency (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 321). By allowing for this view, one may further 
argue that CSOs can give voice to citizens’ concerns by channeling them into policy 
processes that are dominated by government officials, diplomats or the like (Nanz and Steffek 
2005: 371). When allowing for CSO-participations, CSOs can thus make the decision-making 
processes more transparent and accessible to the wider public, and thereby contribute to the 
establishment of transnational political deliberation (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 371). However, 
one should not blindly accept that CSOs-participation will automatically achieve more 
transparency and stronger participatory processes. Although international governmental 
organizations may consult with CSOs, this does not immediately result in CSOs having either 
access to political deliberations, or a de facto influence in them (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 371), 
as the existing research presented in section 2.5 on the State of the Art, has demonstrated. 
This means that the mere fact that CSOs are able to interact with international governmental 
regimes, does not necessarily mean that the CSOs as actors have access to the political 
deliberations and/or the forums where crucial decisions are prepared (Khor 1999 in Nanz and 
Steffek 2004: 67) or that they in any way can influence the course of the deliberations (Risse 
2002 in Nanz and Steffek 2004: 67).  
 
3.2.1 A normative point of reference for legitimacy 
Most deliberative theorists agree on the essential criteria for a legitimate decision, which all 
seem to derive from Habermas’ (1990) ideal speech situation,16 which is a critical standard to 
measure transparency in social theory, and which can only exist when the deliberation is 
governed by basic, agreed-upon rules. While of course acknowledging both Habermas’ 
original critical standards and other deliberative theorists’ revisions of them,17 a pragmatic 
choice regarding the analysis for this thesis is to look to the set of theory-guided criteria 
offered by Nanz and Steffek (2005), since my empirical cases lie closer to their empiricism 
and their respective analysis of it. Their work revolves around global governance and the role 
of civil society from a deliberative theoretical point of view, and their research has focused on 
the participation of civil society in international governmental regimes such as, amongst 
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  Habermas, together with Niklas Luhmann later discovered that the approach and its claim for transparency 
were too demanding and thus not applicable in a social context (Holberprisen 2005), hence the revision of the 
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others, WTO, IMF and the UN.  The standards are: access to deliberation, transparency and 
access to information, responsiveness to stakeholder concern, and inclusion of all voices.  
Hence, in order for decisions stemming from international governmental regimes to have 
a discernible effect of improvement for the nation states’ citizens (and here, not least for 
children), there needs to be an insurance that citizens’ concerns are taken into account when 
decisions, such as the concluding observations, are made.   
 
3.2.1.1 Criterion 1: Access to deliberation 
As previously established, stakeholders’ access can be difficult to effectuate literally in an 
intergovernmental regime, therefore stakeholders rely on CSOs to promote their views and 
concerns. The first criterion will seek to reveal whether or not CSOs have institutionalized 
access to the deliberative settings, and whether the CSOs can ensure that their stakeholders’ 
arguments can be voiced (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 374). Against this background, the focus 
will be to examine if (1) all CSOs may send an alternative report, and (2) all CSOs may 
attend the pre-session in Geneva.  
 
3.2.1.2 Criterion 2: Transparency and access to information 
As the focus of this thesis lies on the legitimacy of the CSOs’ involvement in the process and 
that of the resulting concluding observations, the second criterion help uncover whether the 
CSOs involved in the CRC-reporting process can access the same information as the State 
parties. However, to analyze the legitimacy of their role in this process, one need also to 
examine whether the State parties have access to the same information as the CSOs. If the 
information availability proves unbalanced, this may raise critical questions about the 
legitimacy of the informational flow, according to the deliberative theory. Thus, this criterion 
will support the exploration of (1) whether the CSOs have access to the same information as 
the State parties, and (2) whether the State parties have access to the same information as the 
CSOs – and if these two are proven unbalanced, the criterion will foster support for an 
analytical assessment of possible reasons why. 
 
3.2.1.3 Criterion 3: Responsiveness to stakeholder concerns 
This criterion will support a search to reveal whether the arguments presented by the 
stakeholders are adequately reflected in the deliberation. Here I will follow Nanz and 





adjustment, knowledge of which will be extracted from the content analysis of relevant 
reports. I will analyze if there has been an observable transformation of actors’ articulated 
positions (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 376). A strong proof of responsiveness to concerns voiced 
by civil society would be if the analysis reveals that the CSOs’ recommendations in fact are 
articulated and reflected in the concluding observations.  
 
3.2.1.4 Criterion 4: Inclusion 
The criterion of inclusion implies that the arguments and concerns raised by the stakeholders 
possibly affected by the decisions should be included into the process of decision-making. 
Due to the fact that I am unable (while not authorized) to observe the pre-session for the 
selected reporting rounds, i.e. 2009, 2010 and 2010, or any for that matter, I am prevented 
from studying the extent of inclusion of individuals in the pre-session. The objective will 
therefore be to seek to reveal whether there exists any form of appropriate arrangements such 
as economic resources or other facilitation mechanisms to support the inclusion of more 
disadvantaged stakeholders and the CSOs representing them – this, to ensure the voiced 
inclusion of arguments form all actors involved.  
 I have now presented the selected theoretical framework for this thesis, and outlined 
how the different theories are to be understood in the context of my research project. 
Furthermore, certain expectations as to what the data-collection process may find have also 
been provided. As expressed the upcoming analysis will primarily be devoted to the analysis 
of how and to what extent CSOs can influence the CRC and its concluding observations, 
however, it will also be supplemented with a critical analysis of the CSOs’ role on the 
reporting process. As this thesis is deductive in nature, a factor further elaborated below, the 
theoretical framework will function as the starting point for the upcoming data collection 
process and the ensuing establishment of findings and the analysis of these. 
 
4.0 Research strategy, methods and data material  
The raised research questions seek to examine how and to what extent CSOs can influence the 
CRC and its concluding observations, and whether the CSOs’ role in the reporting process is 
legitimate. In this chapter I will justify the reason for the methodological choices, the methods 
and the data material which will answer the research questions. The outline of this chapter is 
threefold: First, I will outline the inherent methodological approaches set for this thesis. 





present and justify the selected independent variables – i.e. CSOs – to explain this interaction. 
Finally, I will provide an outline of the two types of methods used to extract the empirical 
data material, and which tools I have utilized to do so. Included is an account of the quality of 
the data material. 
 Due to the necessity to limit the scope of considerations in a master’s thesis, I will in 
this chapter not address research ethics in-depth. However, to ensure that all ethical 
considerations have been met, I have, through the entire process, received guidance from the 
Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). 
 
4.1 Methodological approach 
Within the social sciences there exist a variety of methodological approaches. The two most 
prominent paradigms are called the positivist and the constructivist approaches. The positivist 
stance is a philosophical approach seeking to gain knowledge through observable and 
measurable facts. Based on theories, the purpose is to formulate hypotheses which may be 
tested through an objective data collection process and analyses (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 
8). Constructivism entails a view of reality as socially constructed, and constructivists argue 
that the real world is influenced by the researchers’ own interpretation of the context of the 
study (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 9). The two approaches are typically associated with 
different research methods: as the aim of positivist research is to uncover universal truths, 
positivists often prefer standardized instruments that are believed to be precise in extracting 
facts from a single reality (Rubin and Rubin 2012: 15-6). As such, experiments and 
quantitative methods are usually favored by researchers applying a positivist approach. 
Constructivists, on the other hand, typically prefer qualitative methods such as interviews that 
allow for a more in-depth understanding of a social phenomenon, rather than breadth (Rubin 
and Rubin 2012: 15-6).  
 Upholding that the two methodological approaches can complement each other rather 
than being mutually exclusive, this research project has elements from both. From the 
positivist stance, the project seeks to obtain objective knowledge from a quantitative analysis 
of the alternative reports and the concluding observations. The tenet is that my study will 
uncover the reality about to what extent the CSOs under investigation can influence the CRC. 
However, this study also has an approach rooted in the constructivist perspective. In the 
qualitative interviews with relevant actors in the field, I acknowledge, in line with the 





by my own perceptions. The empirical data from the interviews are based on my 
methodological choices throughout the research process, as well as my own interpretation of 
the social action.  
 
4.2 Research design: Case study 
The chosen research design for this thesis is a case study of the CRC’s interaction with CSOs. 
The CRC and its concluding observations are the dependent variables, which the CSOs – i.e. 
the independent variables – seek to influence. There is no universal definition of the concept 
case study, nor as to when, why, and how to use it (George and Bennett 2005: 17), however, 
arguably the most central hallmark of the design is the intensive study of a few cases with the 
purpose to shed light on a larger phenomenon (Ragin 1992: 5; in Thomas 2011: 512; Gerring 
2006: 19). The reason for employing this research design is rooted in the limited knowledge 
available about this particular process: An intensive study of certain independent variables, 
i.e. CSOs from Norway, Finland and Spain, and how they influence the dependent variables, 
is likely to contribute with enhanced knowledge on “how” and “to what extent” CSOs can 
influence the CRC and its concluding observations. Furthermore, the nature of a case study – 
providing in-depth knowledge of a larger phenomenon – will also foster grounds to examine 
the legitimacy of the CSOs’ influence in the process. 
 
4.3 Selection of independent variables  
As opposed to Türkelli and Vandenhole’s randomized selection strategy of NGOs from 
Belgium, Turkey, Kenya, and Afghanistan, the independent variables in this study are 
selected based on pragmatic and strategic factors. First, focusing on the CSOs’ countries of 
origin: Each country’s social and institutional construction is in this thesis regarded as 
conditions for how influence can be exercised, and the selected CSOs’ countries of origin are 
Norway, Finland and Spain. This selection has been pragmatic in the sense that all their 
respective national CSOs’ reports are accessible, and have not been held confidential. 
Furthermore, I hold bachelor degree in Spanish and Latin American Studies from the Faculty 
of Humanities at the University of Bergen, which has provided me with linguistic and cultural 
competence in the field, and this has given me the opportunity to include also CSOs from 
Spain – a country that rarely is embraced in English-based comparative studies.  
 The CSOs’ countries of origin are also strategically selected. The three countries are 





two Nordic countries, are located geographically closer to each other than to Spain). The three 
countries have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and have more than twice 
been assessed by the CRC in the reporting process. One may thus assume that the national 
CSOs are familiar with the reporting process and know how to influence the CRC. Their 
reporting rounds examined here, also coalesce relatively in time (2009 and 2010). This can 
indicate certain amount of stability in the CRC procedure. Furthermore, the three countries 
are legally bound to the European Human Rights Convention, and they rank among top ten in 
KidsRights Index – an international index ranking the adherence to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (KidsRights Index 2017).  
However, the two Nordic countries differ from Spain within three specific and 
interesting parameters. First, “permanence of democracy”: both Norway and Finland have 
been democratic states longer than Spain (Mardal 2017; Julsrud and Giverholt 2016; Javier 
2011). Secondly, “the third sector”, i.e. the activities of non-governmental and –profit 
organizations, show differences; the two Nordic countries pertain to the “Nordic and socio-
democrat cluster” with an active civil society, while Spain pertains to “the Mediterranean or 
emerging cluster”, a third sector not as engaged as the Nordic one (Archambault 2009: 10-1). 
Finally, Spain is different from the two Nordic countries also when it comes to welfare 
systems: Spain’s welfare systems is classified as “sub-protective” with high levels of social 
differences, and socio-economic inequalities (Gallie and Paugam 2000: 5), and the Spanish 
child welfare system is categorized as “service-oriented” (Barn et al. 2015: 2). Norway and 
Finland on the other hand, have “universalistic” welfare systems with high levels of financial 
support, low level of poverty, and a focus on individualizations of rights. Their child welfare 
systems are also service oriented; however, they are also child centric, meaning that children 
are regarded as individuals with their own rights and needs (Barn et al. 2015: 2). These 
differences may suggest that the cultural child perspectives of Norway and Finland are 
different from those of Spain. 
 Secondly, after having selected the three countries, I made a strategic selection of the 
independent variables: While 13 CSOs submitted reports to the CRC during the respective 
reporting rounds, and the length of alternative reports vary from 34-85 pages, and the 
concluding observations are of 15 pages, I have been prevented from focusing on all the 
variety of different CSOs. Hence, the selection of CSOs was rooted in a strategic sample 
selection which was built on a systematic assessment of which independent variables were 





analytical objective. The strategic factors that drove the selection were Child Rights 
Connect’s guidelines which indicate that NGO-coalitions, Ombudsmen and NHRIs are most 
likely to be invited to the pre-session (yet beware: not all CSOs can attend) (Child Rights 
Connect 2014). Furthermore, as one of the suggested impact factors is physical presence, it is 
of importance to study CSOs that have attended the pre-session. While it was unknown who 
attended the pre-session during the respective reporting rounds (this is not official 
knowledge), Child Rights Connect provides an understanding of who are most likely to be 
invited. Hence, the independent variables selected for the analysis are NGO-coalitions, 
Children’s Ombudsmen and NHRIs. Below I provide a country description and a presentation 
of each CSO under examination. 
 
4.3.1 Country description: Norway 
The Norwegian State party signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child in January 1990 
and ratified it a year later (UN Treaty Collection 2017). Norway ranks at number one in the 
annual global index, KidsRights Index (KidsRights Index 2017). Furthermore, the Norwegian 
State party has reported to and been assessed by the CRC four times. The two CSOs, the 
Ombudsman for Children and Forum for Barnekonvesjonen (FFB), have reported to the CRC 
since 1998 and are consequently the CSOs that have been involved in the Norwegian 
reporting processes the longest. The national Human Rights Institution, Norwegian Centre for 
Human Rights (NCHR), submitted its first report in 2009 (Barneombudet 2017a). However, 
the reporting round which started in 2009 included also reports from Gruppen til Familiens 
Selvstendige Rett, Redd Våre Barn, and Barnas Rett, furthermore, Child Helpline 
International and Kors på halsen Red Cross Helpline, and, finally, a report from the Global 
Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children. The CRC submitted its concluding 
observations to the Norwegian State party on March 3, 2010. On October 6, 2016, the 
Norwegian State party submitted its newest periodic report to the CRC, and has now entered 
the fifth round of periodic reporting (OHCHR 2017a). The Norwegian CSOs selected for this 
thesis are the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children, Forum for barnekonvensjonen and 
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights.  
 
4.3.1.1 CSO description: Norwegian Ombudsman for Children  
The Norwegian Ombudsman for Children functions as the spokesperson for children in 





heard and that their rights are followed. Furthermore, the Ombudsman monitors that the 
Norwegian State party complies with the Convention. As previously mention, the Children’s 
Ombudsman is independent from the state, though formally appointed by the government 
(Barneombudet 2017b). 
 
4.3.1.2 CSO description: Forum for barnekonvensjonen (FFB) 
FFB was established in 1994 and is an NGO-coalition including organizations, institutions 
and individuals concerned with children’s rights. Today FFB holds 50 members. FFB works 
on providing information about children and has been an important fellow-player in the 
incorporation of the Convention into Norwegian Law. The FFB’s Secretariat is led by Save 
the Children (FFB 2017). 
 
4.3.1.3 CSO description: Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) 
During the reporting process in 2009, the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights reported to the 
CRC as a national human rights institution, and was a part of the University of Oslo. 
However, due to considerations regarding the critique of the institutions independency, it was 
seceded from the university and is now called “Norges nasjonale institusjon for 
menneskerettigheter” (NNIM). NNIM’s activities then and now include a holistic and 
systematic monitoring of human rights in Norway and provides the Norwegian State party 
with recommendations on how to better implement human rights (NNIM 2017).  
 
4.3.2 Country description: Finland 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child came into force in 1991 (CUCW 2017) and has 
since then been part of Finnish legislation. Finland ranks number nine at KidRights Index 
(KidsRights Index 2017). The Finnish State party has submitted periodic State reports to the 
CRC four times, last time in 2010. The CSO, Central Union for Child Welfare (CUCW), has 
delivered an alternative report since the first reporting round in 1996. The Finnish 
Ombudsman for Children submitted its first report in 2011 (CRIN 2017a). The reporting 
round in 2010 also included reports from the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Infant 
and Young Child Feeding in Finland, as well as the International Disability Alliance (CRIN 
2017a.). The most recent concluding observations were submitted to the Finish State party on 





the CRC is July 19, 2017 (OHCHR 2017b). The Finnish CSOs selected are the Finnish 
Ombudsman for Children and Central Union for Child Welfare. 
 
4.3.2.1 CSO description: The Finnish Ombudsman for Children  
The primary role of the Finnish Ombudsman for Children is to monitor the welfare of 
children in Finland as well as the implementation of their rights. Furthermore, the Children’s 
Ombudsman seeks to let children’s viewpoints come to the fore in all decisions concerning 
them. The Finnish Ombudsman for Children reports annually to the Finnish government on 
the situation for children’s rights, highlighting shortcomings in legislation and the 
development of child welfare. It also carries out lobbying work (Lapsiasia 2017). 
 
4.3.2.2 CSO description: Central Union for Child Welfare (CUCW) 
The CUCW, founded in 1937, is an NGO-coalition that actively works to promote children’s 
rights issues on a National and European level. Its aims are to ensure that children’s rights are 
a priority in decision-making concerning their lives, and that the Convention is implemented 
to the full. The organization’s mission is to develop child welfare and cooperation among 
NGOs, municipalities and state authorities. The CUCW holds 92 organizational members and 
39 members of municipalities. The Board, which is assisted by the executive Committee, has 
the main responsibility concerning operations and decision-making (Lski 2017). 
 
4.3.3 Country description: Spain 
Spain signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child in January 1990, and it came into 
force the same year (UN Treaty Collection 2017). Spain is ranked as number four in 
KidRights Index (KidsRights Index 2017), and started reporting to the CRC in the early 2000s 
(CRIN 2017b). The previous reporting round for the Spanish State party started in 2010, and 
this was the third time that the government submitted a state report for CRC assessment. La 
Plataforma de Infancia (PI) reported to the CRC for the first time in 2000, and for the second, 
and most recent time, in 2010. The CSOs that submitted an alternative report to the CRC for 
the 2010 reporting round were the Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of 
Children and Child Helpline International. The concluding observations were delivered to the 
State party on November 2, 2010. On March 8, 2017, the Spanish State party submitted its 
most recent periodic report, entering a new periodic reporting round (OHCHR 2017c). As PI 
was the only national CSO participating in 2010, it is the only CSO included in the analysis 







4.3.3.1 CSO description: Plataforma de Infancia España (PI) 
PI was founded in 1997 as an NGO-coalition with the objective to coordinate, defend, 
promote and protect children’s rights in Spain. The organization consists of 59 members, and 
the basis for PI’s work is the Convention. PI monitors the Spanish state party’s compliance 
with the Convention, and works to promote child participation (PI 2017a). Furthermore, the 
organization seeks to inform civil society about children’s organizations. It is PI’s Secretariat 
and its members that together are the decision-makers in the organization (PI 2017b). 
 
4.4 Justification of chosen methods 
The main objective of this study is – through the four presented power dimensions – to 
explain and understand how and to what extent CSOs can influence the CRC and its 
concluding observations.  Furthermore, based on the legal and political importance the 
concluding observations have, this study also seeks to examine whether the CSOs’ role in the 
reporting process is legitimate. To answer the raised research questions, I have conducted 
semi-structured interviews with six CRC members and three representatives from the 
Secretariat and Child Rights Connect. I have also conducted focus group interviews with three 
CSOs, and carried out a content analysis of six alternative reports and three concluding 
observations.  
The analytical approach to answer the first and twofold research question is both 
descriptive and causal, entailing both a qualitative and quantitative methodic approaches. The 
analytical approach of the second research question is normatively rooted as it seeks to 
critically analyze the legitimacy of the role of the CSOs in the reporting process. While 
explorative in nature, and due to the limited knowledge in the field, the research approach is 
nevertheless deductive as it is rooted in four power dimensions, and in deliberative normative 
criteria. 
In the literature, there is a prominent distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
data. This categorization refers to the empiricism collected through methodical tools. Simply 
put: quantitative data concerns numbers and terms of quantity, whereas qualitative data on the 
other hand, are expressed through text and pictures (Grønmo 2004:33). As the aim of this 
study is to obtain new knowledge in a field which is limited in scope, it has been of 





a critical explanation and understanding of the raised research questions. As seen, the existing 
research has focused mainly on quantitative content analysis because researchers, observers, 
and of the like do not gain access to such processes. Due to the nature of my research 
questions (being descriptive, causal and normative), I wish to ensure even more rich, robust, 
and well-developed data than what content analyses can extract alone. To answer the raised 
research questions and help ensure that I can contribute to and expand the knowledge in the 
field, I have chosen both qualitative and quantitative methods: I have chosen the in-depth 
methodic approaches of qualitative interviews to gain personal insight and experience of the 
CSOs’ influence in the reporting process. Furthermore, I have selected content analyses of the 
alternative reports and the concluding observations as these offer themselves as the only 
opportunity to measure the extent to which CSOs can influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations. Hence, I am employing method triangulation – a pragmatic and fruitful tool in 
the sense that it may elicit comprehensive knowledge of the phenomena under investigation 
(Grønmo 2004: 56). As the State of the Art suggests, none of the existing research articles 
have conducted qualitative interviews, and so my study may contribute with a (somewhat) 
new methodical approach to this particular field.  
However, observations of the pre-session itself would be a fruitful approach to obtain 
data which could answer the raised research questions, and while this was my initial strategy, 
my application for status as an observer of the pre-session in October 2016, was denied due to 
confidentiality measures. 
Below I present the four phases of the data collection process. Phase 1-3 entails the 
collection of the data (through qualitative interviews and a quantitative content analysis). The 
“final phase” is not a data collection process per se but uses the findings collected from the 
prior phases, supplemented with information from relevant websites to analyze the second 













Figure 4.4 The four phases of the data collection process 
 
 
4.5 Qualitative interviews 
The objective of the qualitative interviews is to obtain knowledge of how the CRC perceives 
the CSOs and their role in and influence on the reporting process. Secondly, it is vital to 
address any strategic means that the CSOs use to influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations. To gain insight into these two factors, and more, the actors themselves were 
interviewed since they arguably can best address these issues. Against this background, I have 
conducted semi-structured interviews with CRC members, and representatives from the 
Secretariat and from Child Rights Connect. Furthermore, I have conducted focus group 
interviews with FFB, the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children, and CUCW.  
 
4.5.1 Semi-structured interviews (Phase 1) 
Semi-structured interviews are conducted by the researcher and the conversation is based on a 
pre-written interview guide (Grønmo: 2004: 161). The interview guide describes how the 
interviews will unfold, and outlines the main features of the interview (Grønmo 2004: 161). 
Semi-structured interviews often start with background information of the respondent. 
Furthermore, it is important that the interviewer acts neutrally and does not steer the 
conversation nor seek to affect the respondent’s answers (Ringdal 2001: 245-6). 
In October 2016, I traveled to Geneva, Switzerland during the pre-sessions to conduct 
semi-structured interviews with the CRC members and representatives from the Secretariat 
and Child Rights Connect. Before leaving, I had scheduled three interviews with two CRC 
members and one representative from Child Rights Connect. Before my stay in Geneva, I 
made a pragmatic assessment as to the number of respondents that I required, however, upon 
• The	  empirical	  data	  material	  derived	  from	  these	  interviews	  will	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  first	  and	  twofold	  research	  
question	  how CSOs	  can	  influence	  the	  CRC	  and	  its	  concluding	  observations.The	   data	  material	  will	  be	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  analysis	  for	  both	  
the	  CSO	  and	  the	  CRC	  level.	  Child	  Rights	  Connect's	   guidelines	  will	  supplement	  some	  of	  the	  findings.
Phase	  1:	  Qualitative	  interviews	  with	  CRC	  members,	  the	  Secretariat	  and	  
Child	  Rights	  Connect	  (CSO	  and	  CRC	  level)
• The	  data	  material	  collected	  from	  phase	  two	  will	  also	  contribute	  to	  answer	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  first	  and	  twofold	  research	  question	  about	  
how CSOs	  can	  influence	  the	  CRC	  and	  its	  concluding	  observations.	  The	  findings	  will	  be	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  CSO	  and	  the	  CRC	  level.
Phase	  2:	  Qualitative	  interviews	  with	  CSO	  members	  (CSO	  and	  CRC	  level)
• The	  empirical	  data	  collected	  during	  this	  phase	  will	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  answering	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  first	  and	  twofold	  research	  
question	  and	  for	  discussion	  of	  to	  what	  extent	  CSOs	  can	  influence	  the	  CRC	  and	  its	  concluding	  observations.	   The	  data	  material	  will	  be	  the	  
basis	  for	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  CRC	  level.
Phase	  3:	  Quantitative	  content	  analysis	  of	  reports	  (CRC	  level)
• The	  findings	  collected	  from	  phase	  1-­‐3,	  as	  well	  as	  information	  from	  relevant	  websites,	  will	  be	  gathered	  and	  analyzed	  	  in	  light	  of the	  
deliberative	  theoretical	  framework	  which	  will	  facilitate	  the	  process	  of	  critically	  understanding	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  CSOs	  role in	  the	  
reporting	  process.	  This	  final	  phase	  will	  thus	  attempt	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  second	  and	  final	  research	  question.	  





arrival it became evident that I could not be in full control of the selection strategy. As I had 
conducted the first semi-structured interviews, the respondents further introduced me to other 
CRC members and members of the Secretariat and Child Rights Connect. This selection 
strategy bears resemblance to what is called a snowball sampling where the first chosen 
respondents are asked to suggest another (Grønmo 2004:100). It was vital for me that the 
sampling selection unfolded like it did, as I immediately obtained a connection to the CRC 
network, a connection that I presumably would not have had if it had not turned out did as it 
did. During the week in Geneva, I interviewed nine respondents (see overview below). 
 
Table 4.5.1 Overview of respondents from Geneva 
Total CRC members The Secretariat Child Rights Connect 
9 6 1 218 
 
The interviews lasted from 12 minutes to 1,5 hours. The pre-planned interview guides were 
rooted in the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3.0. The CRC members and the 
representative of the Secretariat were asked the same questions, which had a clear procedural 
and relational focus on the CSOs and the CRC. The interviews conducted with Child Rights 
Connect representatives had different questions, focusing on their role with CSOs in the 
reporting process. The interviews were recorded on tape. This was highlighted in the consent 
form which was signed before each interview started. One of the respondents did not wish to 
be recorded, however, I could take notes on my computer during the interview. Due to 
anonymity considerations, I have chosen not to distinguish between the two interviewed 
representatives from Child Rights Connect. In Chapter 5.0, their statements are presented as 
“Child Rights Connect 2016” for both respondents. 
 
4.5.2 Focus group interviews (Phase 2) 
Focus group interviews are similar to the semi-structured ones (Grønmo 2004: 159). The main 
difference is that the focus group interview is conducted with more than one respondent 
(Grønm 2004: 159-61). The objective for using such an approach is to gain insight into the 
respondents’ attitudes and understandings of the real world (Ringdal 2001: 247). Advantages 
with focus group interviews are their time-efficiency, and the group dynamic of the 
                                                
 
 
18 One of the interviews with a respondent representing Child Rights Connect was conducted via Skype, as the 





conversation which may provide a broader insight than semi-structured interviews with one 
respondent (Ringdal 2001: 247). However, a disadvantage with focus groups is that they may 
hinder individual standpoints from being voiced. Furthermore, often certain respondents 
dominate the setting. It is therefore vital that the interviewer ensures that all the respondents 
are heard. 
The focus group interviews of phase 2 were aligned with the strategic selection 
strategy presented in section 4.3. From Norway, the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children and 
FFB were contacted. I was notified that a respondent from one of the Norwegian CSOs 
previously participated in the CRC reporting process as a representative from NCHR, thus 
additional NCHR respondents were not contacted. This entails, however, that some of the 
interviewed respondents’ statements are rooted in experiences from his or her employment in 
NCHR. From Finland, the Finnish Ombudsman for Children and CUCW were contacted. 
Finally, from the Spanish country case, PI was contacted as the only national CSO reporting 
in 2010. I, myself, could not completely control the selection of respondents, yet the only 
requirement I posed was that they had experience with the reporting process. Neither the 
Finnish Ombudsman for Children nor PI wished to participate in the interview part of the 
research project. Below is an overview of the respondents. 
 
Table 4.5.2 Overview of CSO-respondents 
Total FFB Norwegian Ombudsman for Children CUCW 
6 2 2 2 
 
As none of the CSOs reside in Bergen, the interviews were conducted via Skype and lasted 
approximately 1-1,5 hours. The interview guide that was utilized was rooted in the theoretical 
framework, with a particular focus on how to influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations. Also, these interviews were recorded, which was highlighted in the consent 
form. Due to the dynamics of the conversations with the respondents, I have chosen to present 
the CSOs’ statements in accordance with the organization they represent. 
The analysis of this data material has been an iterative process, i.e. I have repeated the 
analytical steps, data reduction, data presentation and conclusions, several times. The starting 
point has been the coding of the data material from the interviews. The coding has been 
carried out deductively while the basis for the coding has been the theoretical framework and 
the outlined operationalization. The material has been coded manually to secure an intuitive 








4.6 Quantitative content analysis (Phase 3) 
The third phase of the data collection process, which will provide answers to the second part 
of the first research question, is based on a quantitative content analysis of the CSOs’ 
alternative reports against the CRC’s concluding observation to seek reveal the extent to 
which CSOs can influence the CRC and its concluding observations through the submission 
of reports.  
The motivation for this analysis is the fact that these documents, the alternative 
reports and the concluding observations, are two of the few formal documents that trace the 
entire reporting process, which can extend over five years. While CSOs might influence the 
CRC’s concluding observations in ways and manners that clearly exceed the sheer facts of 
submitting their reports (a focus which is steered by the first part of the twofold research 
question), one cannot solely argue that an alternative report by itself is the only way the 
concluding observations have been influenced. However, seeing that traces from the 
alternative reports are found in the concluding observations, one might uncover to what extent 
the alternative reports have had an impact on the CRC.  
The quantitative content analysis is a tool that extracts replicability and valid 
inferences from a data set to the context (Krippendorf 2012: 21). More precisely, the 
method’s definition may be narrowed down to a method that “summarizes techniques and 
descriptions of the textual content by employing quantitative measures” (Bratberg 2014: 84.). 
It hence analyzes the appearance of determined elements in the text by the quantification of 
these elements. The measures deriving from the text may be used for statistical analysis, and 
the content analysis has an underlying ambition to draw conclusions regarding conditions 
outside of the texts (Krippendorf 2012 in Bratberg 2014: 85). The quantitative content 
analysis method is built on the occurrence of words, formulations or the composition of words 
that may be encoded considering pre-defined categories (Bratberg 2014: 85). Such categories 
help define the characteristics of the text that the researcher aims to measure the occurrence 
of. The pre-defined categories are variables with different values, and the documents in 
question are thus read and encoded in light of them (Bratberg 2014: 85).  
 As previously stated, the conclusions drawn from the content analysis must be valid 
and replicable. It is thus the characteristics of each category that make sure that the data 





analyzed. I will outline the description of the encoded categories, and describe the data 
program and corpus query engine Corpuscle, which I have used to conduct the analysis. 
Presented below is an overview of the reports subject to the quantitative analysis.19  
 
Alternative reports (submitted to the CRC by CSOs) 
-   The Norwegian Forum for the Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Supplementary Report 2009 – To Norway’s fourth Report to the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child. June 2009. 
-   The Ombudsman for Children in Norway: Supplementary Report to the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. August 2009. 
-   The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights: Supplementary report 2009 to Norway’s 
fourth report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. August 2009. 
-   The Central Union for Child Welfare: NGO report, Supplementary Report to 
Finland’s Fourth Periodic Report on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child for the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. October 2010. 
-   Ombudsman for Children in Finland: Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, Supplementary report to Finland’s 4th Periodic Report. January 2011. 
-   Plataforma de Infancia España: Complementary Report to the III and IV Report on 
the Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Spain. March 
2010.  
 
Concluding observations (submitted to the State parties by the CRC) 
-   Consideration of reports submitted by State’s parties under article 44 of the 
Convention – Concluding observations: Norway. March 2010. 
-   Consideration of reports submitted by State’s parties under article 44 of the 
Convention – Concluding observations: Finland. August 2011. 
-   Consideration of reports submitted by State’s parties under article 44 of the 
Convention – Concluding observations: Spain. November 2010. 
 
4.6.1 Delimitation of the data material 
Before conducting the analysis of the reports, a delimitation of the data material has been 
necessary to conduct. While there is a substantial difference in the length of the alternative 
reports and the concluding observations, with word-count limits of 21,000 and 7,000 
respectively, the content analysis will only focus on whether the CSOs recommendations are 
reproduced either as a concern or as a recommendation in the concluding observations.  
                                                
 
 
19 Despite the participatory rejection received from both the Finnish Ombudsman for Children and PI, I have 
nevertheless included their reports in the quantitative analysis. Furthermore, as a respondent from one of the 






A second delimitation of the data material has been to solely focus on the 
recommendations that address the Convention, not the Optional Protocols. Thirdly, while 
most of the recommendations, both by the CSOs and the CRC start with “…the State party”, 
the phrasing may affect the analysis of e.g. the occurrence of specific words. To ensure that 
these words are not included as similarities, they have been excluded from the analysis. 
Finally, the CSOs’ reports that have been analyzed follow the recommended layout offered by 
Child Rights Connect. This is not the case for the Finnish CUCW. CUCW’s report does not 
present any clear recommendations. However, I have identified the recommendations as 
sentences encouraging the state to improve its compliance to the Convention, starting with 
modal auxiliary verbs such as can, should, shall, must etc. The remaining CSOs start each 
recommendation with “Recommendation”, “The Ombudsman Requests that the [CRC] make 
the following recommendation”, or “The [CRC] should make the following 
recommendation”.  
 
4.6.2 Encoded categories in the data material 
The analysis of the alternative reports and the concluding observations have been conducted 
both manually in the previously mentioned data program NVivo,20 however, also with the 
linguistic corpus query engine, Corpuscle. Both data programs have helped categorize the 
data material and both programs provide an overview of the findings. When conducting the 
quantitative content analysis, I have established categories and provided definitions for each 
one. The objective is to make their definitions mutually exclusive from one another. More 
importantly, these categories – each with their clearly stated and mutually exclusive 
definitions – will concatenate the data gathered from these documents, and will help analyze 
my crucial question of to what extent CSOs have an impact on the CRC, and its concluding 
observations. In the categorization, I employ linguistic categories. While it is rooted in both 
methodology, and methods of the social sciences, however, this analytical approach has its 
basis in a linguistic doctrine. The encoded categories for the content analysis are no similarity, 
contextual similarity, semantic similarity, and syntactic similarity.  
 
 
                                                
 
 
20	  The NVivo software supports qualitative and mixed methods research. The structure of the software facilitates 





4.6.2.1 No similarity 
The category no similarity includes recommendations – in the CSOs’ alternative reports, and 
concerns and recommendations in the CRC’s concluding observations – that by no means are 
similar. It is essential to include this category, as its function will help diversify between 
which recommendations that the CRC has not used and used in the concluding observations.  
 
4.6.2.2 Contextual similarity 
The recommendations that fall under the category contextual similarity are recommendations 
in the CSO reports that are contextually similar, i.e. they deal with the same topics and 
Convention article as a concern or recommendation in the concluding observations. The 
recommendations in the concluding observations that are categorized here have few to no 
similar wordings in common with the wording of the recommendations in the CSOs report. 
Yet the most striking similarity here is thus the topic of the recommendations. An example of 
contextually similar recommendations is presented in the table below: 
 
Table 4.6.2.2 Contextual similarity 
Rec 1 The State party should intensify its efforts to educate all parents about the value of 
early education so that a child may complete compulsory schooling. 
Rec 2 The State party should implement efficient measures to counteract pupils dropping 
out of school. 
 
 
4.6.2.3 Semantic similarity 
The category semantic similarity consists of recommendations in the alternative reports and 
the concerns and recommendations in the concluding observations that, first, are contextually 
similar – see the definition provided above, and, secondly, include three or less lexical items 
(however significant to the context). Lexical items are words or phrases that have a meaning 
by standing alone (e.g. child, welfare and right). Lexical items are also known as meaningful 
units of language, for instance the words that one may find in a dictionary (Geeraerts 2010: 
8). Furthermore, the lexical items must prove to be vital for the comprehension and intention 
of the recommendations. The lexical items cannot be determinatives (the, this, that, those, 
which, its, whose), articles (a, an, the), conjunctions (and, or, but) and/or subordinating 
conjunctions (as, because, that, though, when) standing alone, even though they are 
meaningful units of language. This is to exclude non-significant similarities. However, if one 
of the mentioned grammatical components is vital for an expression or belongs to a sentence 





the recommendations or the concerns and recommendations are excessively paraphrased with 
the use of synonyms. A paraphrased sentence is a sentence that expresses the idea of 
something spoken or written by using different words (Oxford Dictionaries 2016). However, 
it is essential for the semantic similarity category that up to three original lexical items, or 
relevant synonyms thereof, stand next to each other (see lexical items above). The concept of 
paraphrasing is strongly connected to the use of synonyms; it is therefore compulsory to 
include this concept as well. The category thus also includes a frequent use of synonyms. 
Synonyms are words that both are pronounced and written differently, however, they do have 
the same or a similar meaning (e.g. child and kid) (Store norske leksikon (SNL) 2009). Since 
there are few words that are completely synonymous (SNL 2009), and that there might be 
disagreements about to what extent a word is synonymous with another, Ordnett21 will be 
employed to control that the words in question in fact are reckoned as the same or similar. 
The example below shows three lexical item, and the structure of the sentences are similar, 
and paraphrased with the use of synonyms. The synonyms are underlined, whereas the similar 
words are written in bold. 
 
Table 4.6.2.3 Semantic similarity 
Rec 1 The State party should make sure that children and adolescents are held 
separately from adults in prison. 
Rec 2 The State party should ensure that no one under the age of 18 years serves 
sentences together with an adult in prison. 
 
 
4.6.2.4 Syntactic similarity 
Syntactic similarity is the collective category for the most similar sentences that are to be 
found in the CSOs’ alternative reports and the CRC’s concluding observations. It includes, 
first, a recommendation in the CSO reports where one or more sentences from the 
recommendation is contextually similar to a concern or recommendation in the CRC report.  
Secondly, this category includes sentences consisting of four or more lexical items that 
appear after each other in a recommendation. Thirdly, the category syntactic similarity 
includes sentences that are paraphrased with synonyms (see semantic similarity).   
 
 
                                                
 
 





Table: 4.6.2.4: Syntactic similarity  
Rec 1 The State party should ensure that age determination procedures are conducted 
in a scientific and fair manner. 
Rec 2 The State party should make sure that age determination procedures are 
regulated by scientific and fair procedures. 
 
4.6.3 Corpuscle – a linguistic tool first time applied in social sciences 
As the encoded categories are linguistically rooted, I analyzed my data material with 
assistance from CLARINO Bergen Centre22 at the University of Bergen, which is a node in 
the European language research infrastructure CLARIN23. Among the services offered by 
CLARINO Bergen Centre is Corpuscle, which is an advanced search engine for making 
refined text searches that take advantage of linguistic features and which can handle large 
corpora (Meurer 2012: 1). The alternative reports and the concluding observations have been 
uploaded to Corpuscle, where the corpus has been made available under a CC-By license and 
documented with metadata (Švrljuga Sætre 2017). The corpus includes the above-mentioned 
alternative reports and the concluding observations.  
 The built-in Web interface for Corpuscle offers a variety of corpus tool functionality 
such as concordances, collocations, word lists, distribution statistics, exporting tools, etc. 
(Meurer 2012: 11). A particular useful feature for my purposes was to search for only parts of 
words, for example a search for “child.*” will return hits on all words starting with child, 
including child itself: child, child’s, children, children’s. To run a query, I have written parts 
of the recommendation in a CSO report, word-by-word, and analyzed whether the concluding 
observations have used the same or similar phrasings by examining the words standing before 
or after the words run in the query. To allow for variations in the affixes, I added “.*” to 
search words as needed, in order to include words with the same stem but different affixes (as 
the “child” example).  









Source: Švrljuga Sætre (2017) 
Having run the query in Corpuscle, the matching corpus positions are displayed as 
concordance lines in the order they are calculated (Meurer 2012:11). The user can then 
choose the attributes to display in the concordance, and the sortation of the results. As shown 
below, all sentences (contexts) including the word, words or phrasings are listed as along with 
the attributes country and document. From here, I can analyze how many lexical items 
appearing in the sentences suggested are alike.24  
 
Source: Švrljuga Sætre (2017) 
 
4.7 Quality of data 
Before presenting the research project’s findings, it is a preeminent concern that I discuss and 
relate the research strategy, the methods, and the empirical data material to two important 
concepts, namely reliability and validity. Both quantitative and qualitative studies need to 
demonstrate credibility. Generally, studies based on logical positivism or quantitative research 
employ quantitative measures to test hypothetical generalizations (Golafshani 2003). The 
terms reliability and validity are mainly grounded in a positivist perspective, and should 
                                                
 
 
24	  NB! This is an example. In chapter 5.0, section 5.2.3.1 I will demonstrate through my analysis how I have 





therefore be redefined for their use in a qualitative constructivist approach. In the following 
discussion of this study’s reliability and validity, I distinguish the terms and how they are 
handled for quantitative and qualitative data.  
 
4.7.1 Reliability 
Reliability entails replicability or repeatability of results (Golafshani 2003: 598). Reliability in 
quantitative research can be identified as stability and equivalence (Grønmo 2004: 222). The 
former part concerns how much of the variation in the data derived through different data 
collection processes in different time periods is due to actual developments within the units of 
analysis, rather than to the research design (Grønmo 2004: 222). Stability might even not be 
of the foremost relevance for this study because the process does not seem to be stable. While 
the CRC has experienced procedural lag, and while the members only sit for four years, these 
factors might make the process, or the phenomenon in question, unstable. It is thus believed to 
be difficult to apply stability as a most indispensable requirement for this research design. 
Equivalence, on the other hand, entails the possibility for comparison and likeness, when 
based on the same research design, between one’s own collected data, and those collected by 
other researchers (Grønmo 2004: 223). A high degree of equivalence also indicates 
conformity between data based on different indicators. This makes the data material 
consistent across the different indicators. To ensure equivalence in the quantitative content 
analysis I have established four mutually exclusive categories, and have conducted and 
encoded the analysis both manually and in Corpuscle and I have achieved the same results, to 
ensure a high degree of equivalence.   
 Reliability within qualitative research designs relates to trustworthiness, yet also 
stability and equivalence (Grønmo 2004: 223). Trustworthiness entails that the empirical data 
material presented is based on data addressing real conditions. Furthermore, it implies that the 
data does not rely on the researcher’s subjective discretion or are results of incidental 
circumstances during the research project. The data material must be collected systematically 
in accordance with established procedures in the research design (Grønmo 2004: 223). A 
potential measurement error to highlight here has to do with languages. As the interviews 
have been conducted in Norwegian, English and Spanish, the data may have fallen victim to 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the respondents’ answers, leading to poor 
translations. To avoid such pitfalls, both my supervisor and I myself have read through the 





Hispanic-speaking countries which the Hispanic-speaking CRC members are from, have read 
through both the transcriptions and my translations from Spanish into English to ensure that 
no misinterpretations have been made. While presenting the findings, I have provided 
extensive quotes, to furnish ample contextualization and transparency of each answer. 
Reliability can also be measured in stability. A test of the data material’s stability 
often entails that the researcher is concentrated on a strategic selection of the data material 
with an emphasis on the data which is either suitable for repetition or is of importance for the 
study. It can be measured by how much variation there is in the data gathered from two 
different time-periods, and whether such differences are a result of the research design, as 
opposed to certain developments in the units of under examination (Grønmo 2004: 223). It 
may be difficult to measure the degree of conformity by repeating the interviews since the 
respondents’ values and attitudes may change over time. However, stability can be measured 
by having another researcher critically assess the transcriptions of the interviews. That has 
been done in this study, and as a further transparency measure, all results will be submitted to 
the Norwegian Centre for Research Data’s archival database (save the sound recordings).   
 
4.7.2 Validity 
Validity for quantitative data refers to the question whether the data material is valid, or 
relevant, for what the study intends to address. There is a distinction between internal and 
external validity (Grønmo 2004: 231). Internal validity concerns the degree to which the 
findings address the issues they are intended to address (Grønmo 2004:233). One of my raised 
research questions concerns the measurement of to what extent the CSOs can influence the 
CRC and its concluding observations. Based on the time and resource frame of this thesis, 
comparing the alternative reports and the concluding observations is arguably the only way to 
measure such impact. This can in turn indicate a high degree of internal validity for this 
research project. External validity (often called generalizability), on the other hand, is an 
indication of the extent to which the results are realistic and generalizable for other units of 
analysis under examination (Grønmo 2004: 233). Although the research strategy for this 
thesis may provide a basis for theoretical generalization, the employed methods, on the other 
hand, are not well suited for generalization (Grønmo 2004: 86). Hence, this study’s external 
validity may be hard to determine, and is presumably low also due to the focus on few 
independent variables (Ringdal 2001: 248). Other factors that can make the external validity 





alternative reports are generated and written; and third, possible differences inherent in the 
CRC’s perception of the CSOs’ information. However, the strategic and theoretically rooted 
selection of the CSOs’ countries of origin, can provide assumptions about to the characteristic 
of influence for CSOs within countries with similar traits. Furthermore, by building upon 
existing research on how CSOs seek to influence international governmental regimes, the 
findings can provide some expectations for how CSOs can exert influence in this and similar 
processes. 
 The form of validity requrements applicable to qualitative data, which I find relevant 
for this study, is face validity – an assessment of whether aspects of the data collection and 
material appear effective in terms of its stated objective (Grønmo 2004: 231). The validity is 
satisfactory if the data is perceived as good and relevant for the intentions of the research. 
Keeping in mind the resources and the time frame available for this master’s thesis, the face 
validity of the respective data material is good. The research questions are both motivated and 
anchored in power theories and in deliberative theories. The interview guides are also 
theoretically anchored. Furthermore, the operationalization of the theoretical framework, 
which builds upon previously conducted research (based on impact factors suggested by 
Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012)), will be used to discuss the raised research questions. 
Moreover, the employment of method triangulation is an attempt to strengthen the study’s 
validity as different methodical strategies seek to address similar aspects.  
In the foregoing sections, I have provided a presentation of the methods employed to 
extract the empirical data material that will provide answers to the first and two-tired and the 
second research questions, and given an outline of how the methods have been used, and how 




This chapter will spell out the collected empirical data material, and make a first step in tying 
these to the theoretical underpinnings for this master’s thesis. The chapter will unfold along 
the three outlined analytical levels, namely the CSO, the CRC and the supra-national level. 
The empirical data material presented below is extracted from the outlined data collection 
processes: the interviews with the CRC members, national CSOs, Child Rights Connect, the 
Secretariat, and the quantitative content analysis of the alternative reports and the concluding 





possess a full insight into the respective processes nor the pre-session and the process of 
writing the concluding observations.  
 
5.1 Findings at the CSO level 
The findings at the CSO level derive from the interviews with the CSOs, Child Rights 
Connect and the CRC members. The empirical evidence extracted from these interviews will 
be tied to the theoretical underpinnings and seek to identify Türkelli and Vandenhole’s (2012) 
suggested impact factors. The empirical evidence’s function will be to provide answers to the 
first part of the first and twofold research question. The objective is therefore to examine how 
national CSOs can influence the CRC and its concluding observations through means outside 
the reporting process in Geneva.  
 
5.1.1 The first power dimension: Power to alter behavior 
The root of the first power dimension is direct, “raw” and visible. Investigations of this power 
dimension often revolves around decision-making processes with the objective to examine 
whose interest gains ground in the decision. While I have not studied a decision-making 
process in its entirety, nonetheless I have been able to study the organizational structure as 
regards submitting the alternative reports. Throughout the data collection process, it has 
become evident that Child Rights Connect has an important role in the reporting process. The 
findings imply that for CSOs to obtain a greater impact, they must conform to the Child 
Rights Connect’s guidelines and comments, as they are believed to provide a greater impact: 
Once ready for submission, alternative reports should be sent by email to Child Rights 
Connect […] Child Rights Connect can provide comments on the format of a draft to 
maximise the impact of the report (Child Rights Connect Guidelines 2014: 15). 
  
As is clear from the guidelines, someone within Child Rights Connect can request alteration 
of the CSOs’alternative report, consequently also altering the behavior of the CSOs’ staff 
members meaning that a CSO staff member in fact proceeds to altering the report before 
resubmitting it. Paramount during the data collection process has been to identify if 
conformity will lead to a greater impact, why and how the power to alter behavior is being 
exercised, and whether there exists any conflict of interest.  
 The statements below demonstrate how staff members of Child Rights Connect have 
the possibility to demand alteration of the alternative reports. The request for alteration is 
produced by Child Rights Connect leafing through the reports and looking at how the content, 





[As a Liaison Officer] we would sort of look through the alternative reports quickly, and if 
there were something they should present a bit differently, or if it sounded like really 
subjective, like they had something personal against the government, we would say: […] we 
need facts, this just sounds like a personal rant, this is not useful (Child Rights Connect 2016; 
brackets added). 
 
If the alternative reports were organized in a strange way or they didn’t have enough, or very 
good recommendations then we would tell them to put more content (Child Rights Connect 
2016). 
 
The statements further indicate that the reason for requesting alteration to the alternative 
report has to do with the quality of the report. If the content is presented subjectively or the 
recommendations are not “good”, the staff members would request that the CSO changes the 
report, indicating a conflict of interest between how the report is written and Child Rights 
Connect’s perception of it.  
 Furthermore, in Child Rights Connect’s guidelines, it is said that conforming to the 
guidelines and the comments (read: alteration requests) provided by Child Rights Connect 
would better the impact chances for the CSOs. This is also expressed by the following 
statements: 
The people who listened to us, who followed our advice, who prepared according to our 
advice, their pre-sessions tended to get much better than those who wanted to do their own 
thing because they didn’t understand the modalities […] sometimes they would write or talk 
about something that was just completely irrelevant […] the CRC would start to get annoyed 
because they were wasting time, and the person belonging to the NGO would walk away 
[from the reporting process] frustrated  (Child Rights Connect 2016; brackets added).  
 
When people don’t follow our advice and guidelines, I think they usually are going from [the 
reporting process] frustrated because our advice was not there to be difficult, but to make the 
process work and it didn’t work if they didn’t listen (Child Rights Connect 2016; brackets 
added).  
 
The statements also show that the CRC members can get annoyed and that the process cannot 
work as intended if the CSOs do not follow Child Rights Connect’s guidelines. This indicates 
that not all CSOs necessarily follow Child Rights Connect’s requests as they presumably do 
not perceive that the requests provided by Child Rights Connect are legitimate. Furthermore, 
if the information is not presented to a satisfactory degree it may lead to repercussions for the 
pre-session, and leave all actors involved in the process frustrated. Therefore, in addition to 
quality and subjectivity, the primary conflict of interest is seemingly also non-conformity – 
i.e. when the CSOs do not comply with the guidelines or comments of Child Rights Connect.  
 Moreover, in addition to requesting alterations to the reports, Child Rights Connect 






We share examples of reports. Because we know, we can identify the good examples […] to 
share, also according to the theme, according to the country, so yes, that’s the advice we can 
give (Child Rights Connect 2016). 
 
Then we would support them throughout the process and send them examples of what is a 
good report (Child Rights Connect 2016). 
 
The findings show that Child Rights Connect has a strong involvement in the reporting 
process. They further demonstrate that conformity to the guidelines is strongly related to 
greater impact and satisfaction for all actors involved.  
 Moreover, the three interviewed CSOs all responded that they build their reports on 
Child Rights Connect’s guidelines. However, as both Norway and Finland (and Spain) have 
experience with reporting, they now possess knowledge and experience from previous 
reporting rounds, and are hence not in as much need of the guidelines, nor the Child Rights 
Connect’s comments. However, apparently CUCW has been in contact with Child Rights 
Connect in relation to their upcoming reporting process. 
Yes, we use a lot of their information. They have good information and good supervisors. I 
have not actually [contacted them this time] due to the fact that it is our fifth time reporting 
(FFB 2017; brackets added).  
 
I think that using their information is useful, but we have not used it so much in later years 
due to our own experience (The Norwegian Ombudsman for Children 2017).  
 
I think [a staff-member] has contacted them quite a few times in relation to the schedule of our 
next reporting process and the time schedule of the CRC and asked whether there [have been] 
any changes to the guideline (CUCW 2017; brackets added).  
 
I have no data that directly confirms or denies whether Spanish PI has been in contact with 
Child Rights Connect, or even used their information. However, it is evident that also PI’s 
report is similar to the other CSO reports that this thesis focuses on, and not least, it is in 
keeping with Child Rights Connect’s guidelines. This will be further discussed in the 
upcoming analysis.  
 
5.1.2 The second power dimension: Agenda-setting power 
The second power dimension is demonstrated by the NGO-coalitions’ agenda-setting 
process25 for the alternative report, as has been rooted in the operationalization in section 
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3.1.6. As NGO-coalitions consist of different member organizations, institutions and actors, 
the focus has been to uncover how the agenda-setting processes proceed, and to find the 
respondents’ experiences with dissenting concerns and opinions during process of writing the 
alternative report, and how the inclusion of recommendations is decided. The overall 
objective is to determine how the coalition members can – through setting the agenda for an 
NGO-coalition’s alternative report – influence the CRC’s concluding observations. This 
section will also seek to find empirical evidence as regard to who or what defines the quality 
of the information in and content of the alternative report, which Türkelli and Vandenhole 
have suggested is an impact factor on the CRC’s work. 
 To obtain an overview of the process, it is necessary to examine the working methods 
of the NGO-coalitions. FFB’s working method consists of working groups organized in the 
different clusters stipulated by the CRC, where the CSO-secretariat leader initiates their work.  
[The work with the alternative report is divided into] working groups, reform groups, writing 
groups […] all the themes in the report, which the CRC have imposed, which is led by [the 
secretariat leader of FFB]. When [the leader] receives contributions to the report, it can ask 
the working group to provide suggestions to the recommendations (FFB 2017; brackets 
added).  
 
As the statement below demonstrates, CUCW’s working method is similar to that of the 
Norwegian coalition, FFB: 
We were organized in thematic groups. Each group works [differently…] Some contribute 
with a lot of text, they made the text completely ready. Others decided that they were only 
going to discuss within the group and prepare information (CUCW 2017; brackets added). 
 
The findings for both NGO-coalitions are threefold. Although partly unlike, the threefold 
factors of the coalitions’ agenda-setting and decision-making processes for what issues to 
include in the alternative reports capture the differences between the two NGO-coalitions, 
which in the analysis will contribute to the comparative analysis.  
 
5.1.2.1 The agenda-setting process in Norwegian FFB 
Three agenda-setting factors have been identified within the FFB’s process of writing the 
alternative report. These aspects are, namely, writing recommendations that are in line with a 
set of criteria, participatory differences, and, finally, how the recommendations are included 
in the alternative report.  
 Focusing on the first factor, FFB has preset criteria for the type of recommendations to 





issue conflicts with the Convention, and whether the issue is UN-level material as opposed to 
issues that can be solved on a national level: 
 
[…] it is important to distinguish between, one, the importance of the issue. How many 
[members] agree that the issue either concerns many children, or that it has big consequences 
for the children concerned? Secondly, does the big organizations that work closely with the 
Convention perceive the issue as conflicting with the [Convention]? This is quite difficult to 
determine. However, the issues that are raised need to be on a UN-level, they must be grave 
problems. This process takes time, and if it is an issue that is solved easily, we can contact the 
State Departments and fix it within two years” (FFB 2017; brackets added).  
 
The statement above points to an important issue: As the reporting process is regarded as 
lengthy, the issues that are raised in the alternative reports need to concern either a larger 
group of children, or be of such nature that the violation of the Convention (if there is one) is 
grave for the children it revolves. If the issue is easily solvable the respondents state that it 
can be handled on a domestic level. Although such criteria may function to perpectivize the 
alternative report, it may also function as a barrier to air certain child rights issues. This 
observation will be further commented in the analysis in section 6.1.2.   
 Secondly, there is apparently a difference between small and large member 
organizations, and active and inactive ones. As the respondents suggest, this may 
consequently affect which issues are included, and which are ruled out:  
The ones that apply to the different working groups that are present during the meetings 
obtain more impact. The case is often that small organizations that work with very narrow 
issues are quite active, if they [are active], they get impact in our alternative report, which will 
benefit the children that they work for. However, in a second round of discussion the 
organizations that work on general issues will wake up (FFB 2017). 
 
When the [larger organizations] didn’t contribute, we were moderate [sic] and included topics 
from small organizations under general clusters to make it a concern for all children (FFB 
2017; brackets added).  
 
These findings may indicate that the norm is that larger organizations obtain more impact on 
the alternative report due to the narrower scope or focus of the smaller member organizations. 
Based on the quotations above, the smaller organizations’ focus is narrow, and thus 
presumably does not always necessarily fulfill the threefold criteria (i.e. that the issue must 
concern a large group of children, that the violence of the Convention is grave for the children 
it revolves, or that the issue is on a UN-level). However, apparently, the larger organizations 
tend to be less active than the smaller ones, and this suggests that smaller organizations also 
have a possibility to impact the alternative reports – however only when the larger ones are 





 In keeping with this, the findings also indicate that the extent of activity will have an 
impact on the agenda-setting process:  
We have many discussion rounds where everyone contributes with issues concerning child 
rights, and the implementation of the Convention. However, the quality of information that we 
get depends on how engaged the organizations are. Some organizations contribute with only 
one sentence without any references, which is quite problematic (FFB 2017).  
 
If members working with Sami children and their rights do not contribute, there is no time for 
other organizations to find in-depth information about them. So, we depend on organizations 
that can provide information regarding Sami children (FFB 2017).  
 
We can provide good information in some areas, but not in all. For example, few people work 
with the cluster “health” – internationally we do it, but not in Norway. Then we are very 
dependent on the organizations that are concerned about health issues, and that they 
contribute with information during the process (FFB 2017).  
 
These statements show that certain issues do not receive attention in the alternative report if 
the organizations with the primary responsibility for it are inactive in the process of writing 
the report. This can as a consequence lead to child rights concerns not being addressed, as 
other coalition members from other working groups do not have time to pay attention to those 
issues. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the quality of the report will be affected when 
coalition members are inactive.  
 The final agenda-setting factor concerns how the decisions for what to include in the 
alternative reports are made. The respondents demonstrate that sometimes conflicts arise 
between the coalition members when they do not agree on what issues to include. If this is the 
case, the issue is solved democratically by letting the different working groups decide whether 
to include the specific child rights concern or not: 
 
If there are conflicts regarding some issues, we are democratic and send the issues out to all 
the working groups and ask how to handle the issue in question. (FFB 2017).  
 
Furthermore, the content of FFB’s alternative reports is apparently rooted in a consensus. If 
90% of the member organizations disagree with a concern or a recommendation, it will not be 
included. Consequently, all coalition members need to back the proposal for it to be included: 
If 90% of our members cannot back a proposed issue, then we don’t have to do anything, well 
we may try to rephrase [the recommendation] so that everyone may back it. If an organization 
disagrees with the proposal, they may write their own report. However, we achieve more 
impact as a coalition (FFB 2017; brackets added).  
 
We take everyone seriously, and we try to treat everyone with respect. Sometimes an 
organization will contribute with an issue that 95% of FFB disagrees with. Then it is hard to 
reach out to the organization and explain that […] the FFB does not believe it conflicts with 






The statements suggest that all, or at least 90% of the coalition members need to agree upon 
all the issues that are included in the alternative report. However, as the following statement 
indicates, whenever the members cannot agree upon whether an issue should be included or 
not, then the NGO-coalition votes. The statement further point to the fact that certain actors 
working on the alternative report cannot vote in such situations: 
In reality everyone can join us in writing a report. However, the problem lies in the situation 
where half of our group disagrees with an issue or how it is put forth […] If we must vote, 
then non-members and single individuals cannot vote (FFB 2017). 
 
5.1.2.2 The agenda-setting process in Finnish CUCW 
The findings regarding the writing of the alternative reports in CUCW are not as in-depth as 
the empirical data material deriving from the interviews with FFB. The reason for this is that 
it was the first time the interviewed respondents from CUCW had ever worked with writing 
the alternative report. However, as with FFB, three factors as regards the agenda-setting 
process could be identified, albeit some of them unlike those detected in the Norwegian 
NGO-coalition above. The three factors are firstly, participatory limitations, secondly, the 
difference between small and large organizations, and finally, who has the formal decision-
making power.  
 The first agenda-setting factor is found in the detection of operative criteria for 
participation in the process. The CUCW consists of NGOs and the public sector where the 
NGOs and the municipalities work together. The participatory requirement is that only 
organizations and institutions that possess relevant expertise within the field may contribute to 
the working process:  
We wanted to collect information quite widely […] so the invitation was open to all. Of 
course, the person who wanted to be part of the process had to [be part of an] organization or 
[have a] background [within the field]. So, no individuals could represent their subjective 
thoughts (CUCW 2017; brackets added).  
 
The participatory requirement seemingly functions as a filter against subjective and irrelevant 
views that do not serve the alternative report. Despite the limitations that exclude some views, 
the participatory scope is arguably large as it is open to “relevant” actors.  
 The second agenda-setting factor is seen in the different weight given to the views of 
small and the large organizations respectively, as was the case for the NGO-coalition FFB 
above. However, the respondents express that they believe that the smaller member 
organizations also will obtain an impact on the alternative report (although arguably to lesser 





It really depends [first] on the topic, on […] the theme we are dealing with. Because there are 
some questions which are very narrow, and only small NGOs are working with those 
questions. Their voices will be heard, probably […] But we have [decided] that we are going 
to collect the feedback from people who were involved in this process, and who still are 
involved, and to ask their experiences and their reviews about how they felt about this process 
and what they think about their position in their final report (CUCW 2017; brackets added).  
 
The respondents express that there will be conducted a survey on how the coalition members 
perceive their role in the agenda-setting process, which may indicate that the members of 
CUCW are able to express any dissenting opinions and to air any grievances which have not 
gained ground in the final alternative report.  
 Finally, we have arrived at identifying the actor possessing the formal decisions-
making-power. The respondents express that even though the working groups include 
different concerns and suggestions in their drafts for the alternative report, it is nevertheless 
the CUCW-board that has the final say in what issues and recommendations to include. The 
statements below demonstrate that even though there may be conflicts of interests, 
disagreements and heated debates among the working groups, at the end of the day it is the 
CUCW-board that commands the power to decide what to include in the report and 
consequently what to exclude.  
 
We have had hot debates as well, but we have tried to […] hear different perspectives and 
hear different voices and eventually it is going to be our board who is going to make the final 
decision to what kind of issues we are going to raise CUCW 2017; brackets added).  
 
When the report is put together, the board members are going to discuss it and […] make the 




5.1.3 The third power dimension: Shaping thoughts and defining truths 
The third power dimension concerns shaping the thoughts and defining the truths of the actor 
upon whom this power is exercised. This power is the least visible of the four in question, yet 
in effect it is a very productive mode of governing: If the actors have internalized the 
appropriate values to guide their behavior, no oversight or control is needed.  
From the empirical evidence extracted from the interviews with the respective CSOs 
and the CRC members I will seek to provide answers to Türkelli and Vandenhole’s suggested 
impact factors of whether CSOs act individually or jointly, investigating whether CSOs 






Through the alternative reports the CSOs provide the CRC with information of their 
truth regarding the situation for children’s rights in a country. In their reports the CSOs 
identify main concerns and supplement these with appropriate measures in the 
recommendations that they propose. The findings presented below demonstrate that the CSOs 
often interact with each other to highlight certain child rights concerns by including the 
respective issue in their respective reports. As the three statements below show, through 
collaborating on certain issues, the CSOs will obtain a greater impact on the CRC’s 
concluding observations: 
Yes, usually we collaborate, but there is no official Ombudsman-member in [FFB]. They are 
on our mailing list, and we collaborate with them, however, we do not agree on everything 
(FFB 2017; brackets added).  
 
I am of the impression that much is overlapping in our report and [in the report of the 
Ombudsman for Children]. And that is the point because then we will achieve greater impact 
[on the concluding observations] (FFB 2017; brackets added).  
 
Yes, we are constantly in dialogue with the other actors. We have good communication with 
[FFB] which is quite useful. We cooperate in the sense that we exchange what we are covering 
and FFB what they are covering. This is both important and useful (The Norwegian 
Ombudsman for Children 2017; brackets added). Parenthesis added. 
 
As the statements above indicate, although not formal members of each other’s organizations, 
the Norwegian CSOs are quite actively involved in the others’ work and have an insight into 
what issues that each alternative report is addressing. Furthermore, the statements suggest that 
the collaboration is used as a strategic mechanism to influence the CRC because it is believed 
to obtain a greater impact on the concluding observations. 
 However, despite the findings indicating how collaboration is a means to favor the 
CSOs’ main concerns, it is nonetheless important to highlight that collaboration need not only 
be a strategic mechanism to influence, it can also be a result of the mere word-count limit set 
by the OHCHR: 
 
From the beginning, we have collaborated on the reporting where we have distributed some of 
the issues [amongst ourselves]. Because the word-count limit in the reports have been reduced 
we had not included much information about national minorities and Sami children [during 
the last reporting round]. The Ombudsman for Children had in fact included more information 
on this topic as well as children deprived of their liberty, we had not (FFB 2017; brackets 
added).  
 
We have also shared information on the clusters. [An example of this is that] the Ombudsman 
for Children included much information on mental health, which did not receive much 
attention in our report. So, when I know that the Ombudsman for Children will mention it in 






Now that the word count limit is reduced even more, we might think about distributing some of 
the [stakeholders’] concerns (The Norwegian Ombudsman for Children 2017; brackets 
added).  
 
The fact that the CSOs collaborate about their main concerns is evidence that the word-count 
limit restrains them from addressing all issues that they wish to include. Consequently, the 
CSOs also distribute certain issues amongst themselves. As is evident, when one CSO has 
addressed an issue, the other does not necessarily need to worry about it. 
 The Finnish NGO-coalition indicates that also the national CSOs in Finland have 
collaborated on the alternative report. However, the reason for collaboration has not 
necessarily been a means to influence: 
Of course, we cooperate [very] much. I think we probably talk about these things together, but 
I don’t know how much is reflected in the report (CUCW 2017; brackets added).  
 
Finally, the statement below demonstrates that when national CSOs address the same issues in 
their alternative reports, the CRC will perceive it as more credible while it makes it possible to 
verify whether the issue in fact is a real concern in the respective country: 
If several alternative reports say the same, then we emphasize that issue and their reports. 
However, if only one report mentions something that cannot be verified by the other reports, 
then we question the credibility of the raised issue (CRC1 2016).  
 
This goes to show that when several CSOs address the same concern, it is believed to be more 
truthful, indicating that the third power dimension is operative – a finding which will be 
further discussed in section 6.1.3. 
 
5.1.4 Communicative power: The deliberative-transformative ability 
What is foregrounded in the dynamics of communicative power is the quality of the argument 
rather than e.g. the status of the deliberator. The effect of this power comes to pass by means 
of mutually accepted norms by all actors involved. In the occurrence of this power the focus 
is on how arguments can change actors’ positions.  
 The findings presented below will provide evidence as to how the CSOs may 
influence the CRC and its concluding observations through conferences and seminars outside 
of the formal reporting process. The findings will also provide answers as to whether the 
suggested impact factor opportunities for informal meetings can be confirmed as materialized 
or not – answers that will be further discussed in the upcoming analysis. 
 The findings below indicate that when CSOs attend the same events as the CRC 
members, they may provide the latter with information and concerns, and in so doing, argue 





respondents representing the CSOs expressed that they had met with the CRC members 
outside of the reporting process and had had the opportunity to discuss the reporting processes 
and their main concerns with the CRC members: 
We know the [CRC] members quite well. The child rights field is quite small, so we have very 
good access to information regarding what is happening within the [CRC] and what the 
[CRC] is concerned with. Not long ago we had a […] course with a [CRC member] who told 
[us] what the [CRC] is concerned with, in particular. That is of course important to us (The 
Norwegian Ombudsman for Children 2017; brackets added).  
 
We cooperate in many international networks […] and the [CRC] members travel around the 
world, and we are able to meet them […]and of course we discuss with them (CUCW 2017; 
brackets added)  
 
We are very active members in the Euro Child Network, and [there we have been] able to 
discuss with [a CRC member]. Whenever we meet [one of the CRC members, this person] is 
always asking us ‘how are things in Finland at the moment? (CUCW 2017; brackets added).  
 
These three responses give an indication as to the size of the network: the child rights network 
is small, conequently it is inevitable that the CSOs and the CRC members meet at such 
events. Furthermore, another prevalent indication seen in the CSO representatives’ statements 
is the fact that they have invited the CRC members to their respective countries to talk to the 
children themselves and to other institutions concerned with children’s situation: 
 
Last time we used a method where we, instead of bringing children to Geneva which is a 
grownup setting, invited the rapporteur with responsibility for Norway to Norway. He was 
able to talk to children and visit some selected institutions for children (The Norwegian 
Ombudsman for Children 2017).  
 
[The rapporteur] came to Norway [last time…]. We immediately experienced impact [in the 
process and in the concluding observations] because we noticed that he brought with him the 
information that he had received from the children to the session with Audun Lysbakken [the 
State party’s representative]. I remember that he a couple of times commented on 
[Lysbakkens] follow-up questions [stating] that ‘I have been to Norway and I have heard 
children telling me that what you are saying now is not in accordance with the reality that the 
children live in’. It became a reference for him. (FFB 2017; brackets added).  
 
Two years ago, we invited some [CRC] members to Finland. [At the conference] we were able 
to […] ask [the CRC members’] opinions about our last reporting process, and we also 
discussed what we should do for the upcoming reporting round (CUCW 2017; brackets 
added).  
 
These statements further indicate that meeting with CRC members outside of the reporting 
process may lead to impact on the CRC’s work. As is evident from the Norwegian experience 
with the rapporteur visiting Norway, the CSOs in company with children and children’s 
institutions, have had the ability to argue and justify their concerns and their proposed means 





members that are known to the CSO, in the deliberative-transformative exchanges vice versa 
also seek out to information on the implementation of the Convetion in Finland and the 
national situation for children’s rights.  
 
5.2 Findings at the CRC level 
The findings presented in this section, now perspectivized at the analytical level the CRC 
level, are extracted from the same interviews as before, namely the interviews with the CSOs, 
the CRC, Child Rights Connect and the Secretariat. Here in addition, the empirical data 
material derived from the quantitative content analysis will be presented on the CRC level. 
The findings will be sought to address the first and twofold research question how and to what 
extent civil society organizations can influence the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
Furthermore, I will, as with the previous analytical level, make a first step in tying the 
empirical material to Türkelli and Vandenhole’s suggested impact factors, whose explanatory 
force in relation to the findings will be further discussed in the ensuing analysis chapter. The 
findings will be unfolded in light of the same power dimensions as at the CSO level. 
 
5.2.1 The first power dimension: Power to alter behavior 
As argued in section 3.1.2.1, the attempt to identify the first power dimension at the CRC 
level (i.e. in the pre-session proper) was believed to be a challenging task. Despite 
meticulously searching for the existence of it in my empirical data material, I was at this level 
unable to identify such power being exercised in order to benefit the impact factors of the 
CSOs on the CRC. While the empirical evidence available to me fell short of helping identify 
the first power dimension here, I am, however, not in a position to reject the existence of it 
entirely.  
 
5.2.2 The second power dimension: Agenda-setting power 
As outlined in section 3.1.3, the second power dimension is exercised when certain issues 
and/or actors never become part of the official political agenda, and are consequently 
hindered from reaching the decision-making arena. 
This section will focus on the empirical data material concerning how the CSOs may 
influence the CRC and its concluding observations while being present during the pre-session. 
The following sections are rooted in the suggested impact factor physical presence, with the 





investigation seeks to clarify as well in regard to the other impact factors suggested by 
Türkelli and Vandenhole. 
 
5.2.2.1 Gatekeeping 
For a CSOs to influence the CRC and its concluding observations on the CRC level, i.e. by 
attending the pre-session and addressing their child rights concerns with the CRC, the CSOs 
need to be physically present. As both Child Rights Connect’s guidelines and the empirical 
evidence suggests, not all CSOs can in fact be physically present. It is the CRC that officially 
invites the CSOs to the pre-session; however, uncertainties exit regarding who has the in-
practice responsibilities for inviting the CSOs. As is the case at the CSO level, the NGO Child 
Rights Connect and/or the Secretariat apparently also have a central role regarding the 
invitations of CSOs to Geneva. With reference to the theoretical aspect of this power 
dimension, all of this implies that the gatekeeper presumably has an agenda-setting role, as it 
controls which and how many CSOs are to be invited and to deliberate with the CRC in the 
pre-session. However, as demonstrated below, there is no profound clarity on who sends out 
the invitations: The guidelines say it is the CRC, yet, some respondents say it is the 
Secretariat. Others again claim it is Child Rights Connect, the CSOs themselves, or UNICEF. 
I have not been able to unravel or verify this apparent mystery; however, I consider the laying 
bare of this dissension a finding. In Table 5.2.2.1 I have, for no other reason than clarification, 
provided an overview of who the different respondents believe to be the “gatekeeper” to this 
process.  
 







 CRC Secretariat Child Rights 
Connect 
CSOs UNICEF 
CRC*   3 1 1 
Secretariat  1    
Child Rights 
Connect 
 1 1   
CSOs**  1    
*One of the interviewed CRC members did not respond to this question. 






The statements below identify Child Rights Connect as the gatekeeper to the pre-session. The 
statements are provided by 3 of the 6 interviewed CRC members. 
The [CSOs] have to go through Child Rights Connect to get admittance to Geneva. We have 
experienced that conflicts have risen when too many [CSOs] come and take control of the 
speaking time. After experiencing this, the respective [CSOs] contacted the Secretariat, which 
came up with a solution. So, it is not only Child Rights Connect, but in reality, they are the 
ones who invite the [CSOs] (CRC1 2016; brackets added).  
 
The [CSOs] consult with Child Rights Connect. In other words, the people organizing the visit 
[to Geneva] are from Child Rights Connect. However, we include whomever from the civil 
society (CRC2 2016; brackets added).  
 
“[The gatekeeper] is Child Rights Connect” (CRC3 2016; brackets added).  
 
These three statements do not question which actor possesses the gatekeeper-role. All 
respondents mention Child Rights Connect in clear text. Although the first statement also 
implicates the Secretariat, it nevertheless expresses no uncertainty as regards the in-practice 
gatekeeper.   
As indicated in Table 5.2.2.1 above, one of the CRC members did not respond to this 
question, presumably due to not knowing the answer (although this remains a mere 
speculation on my side). However, the two remaining CRC members that were interviewed 
did not place the gatekeeping-responsibility with Child Rights Connect. Their responses were 
nonetheless incoherent. This may underline the opaqueness of the reporting process, or of 
intergovernmental processes in general. Not all actors have a complete overview of the 
different roles in the reporting process: 
Usually UNICEF […] organizes the participation, or through UNICEF (CRC4 2016; brackets 
added).  
 
Well they are not selected. They select themselves. They can participate on a voluntary basis 
to come to Geneva and meet here […] So you know it is not like we get a list and […] say ‘you 
can come, you cannot come’ […]. They [i.e. the CSOs] make the decisions [themselves] 
(CRC5 2016; brackets added).  
 
The last respondent suggests that the CSOs can invite themselves. In principle, this is correct, 
because, for CSOs to attend the pre-session, they must request so in an alternative report sent 
to Child Rights Connect. Although I do not wish to undermine this CRC member’s 
comprehension of the process, the additional statements above, as well as the following ones, 
demonstrate that a gatekeeper in fact exists.   
This next segment presents the positions taken by the two Child Rights Connect 





inconsistencies here as well. One of the respondents denied that Child Rights Connect has 
ever possessed this role. The other respondent provided a contra factual response to the first.  
No, we do not select, it is the Committee who selects, OK? When it says that the pre-session is 
a closed meeting, the [CRC] selects based on the alternative reports received […] Well it is 
actually the Secretariat that does it on behalf of the [CRC]. So, the [Secretariat] decides and 
selects, and then what we do is that we inform, so we are […] facilitating the communication. 
This is a very important point because we have, for a long time been confused with the CRC 
because of this […] (Child Rights Connect 2016; brackets added).  
 
People thought that we were monopolizing the gatekeeping for the pre-session, which is not 
true […] I really want to underline this […] The thing is that we are also a secretariat, so 
people get […] confused between us and the Secretariat of the [CRC]. Obviously, it is a big 
problem because we are an NGO […] we try to influence the process in the sense that we want 
to make sure that the right messages are there, but that’s not the way [...] we are [not] 
selecting people or excluding others, it’s their meeting and they decide who to invite (Child 
Rights Connect 2016; brackets added).  
 
As the Child Rights Connect respondent states, the reason why actors involved may believe 
the in-practice gatekeeper is Child Rights Connect, is the actual confusion between the CRC 
Secretariat and the NGO Child Rights Connect secretariat. Another obviously confusing 
factor is the abbreviation “CRC”. Often, both the Committee on the Rights of the Child and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child have the same abbreviation, namely, CRC. 
Furthermore, as Child Rights Connect’s abbreviation presumably also is CRC, it is possible 
that the two (or three) often are confused. 
However, the second respondent representing Child Rights Connect contradicts the 
statements provided by the foregoing respondent. In the second respondent’s statement, there 
is no denial as to who the gatekeeping procedure is conducted by:  
 
Initially, once we received information from the NGOs we submitted it to the Secretariat. We 
would [then] say ‘these people would like to come’ and usually there was no problem. Usually 
if people wanted to come, they would come. [However] there must be a formal report, so if 
you submit no information you cannot come. [Later,] Child Rights Connect started to do a bit 
too much in a way. I think it did some things, which really it should not, it is not its role […] 
like admin things in a way, [like] taking the invitation for example. It should be prepared by 
the Secretariat. But […] basically it worked really well […]. Since the reporting process 
started, it has always been the Secretariat, Child Rights Connect, and UNICEF putting the 
pre-session together and ensuring that the alternative information was received (Child Rights 
Connect 2016; brackets added).  
 
This excerpt suggests that it initially was the Secretariat who conducted the gatekeeping for 
the pre-session, yet that Child Rights Connect took over the responsibility for the invitations 
to the CSOs. This respondent representing Child Rights Connect further indicates that the 





The development of roles and changes in responsibilities can be an explanation as to why all 
the interviewed actors present diverging opinions regarding the in-practice gatekeeper.  
Furthermore, and adding to the confusion, the representative for the Secretariat stated 
that the official gatekeeper is the Secretariat. However, the respondent also implicated Child 
Rights Connect in the process, again indicating that the NGO has a role in the process of 
selecting the CSOs for the pre-session: 
I think that [Child Rights Connect] is involved. I do not know how formal the involvement is, 
but they are involved. They often ask us [whom] we tend to invite […]. There are certain 
criteria for inviting NGOs, but my impression is that, you know, most times NGOs qualify. 
[Child Rights Connect] being the umbrella organization, [it] makes sense that they would be 
involved. But you know, at the end of the day I think that the Secretariat decides (Secretariat 
2017; brackets added).  
 
The respondent representing the Secretariat suggests that the actor with the formal 
gatekeeper-role is the Secretariat, which also has the final decision-making power over the 
selection. In addition, the respondent implies the existence of criteria for inviting NGOs, 
although NGOs normally qualify to come to the pre-session. When asked to elaborate on what 
the criteria include, the respondent stated, “I cannot answer that question, I am not the right 
person to ask” (Secretariat 2016). 
One of the CSOs that were interviewed for this thesis responded that the CSO submits 
their alternative reports to Child Rights Connect, and that they – at least think that they – 
receive the invitation from the Secretariat. 
Yes […] we send [the alternative reports] to Child Rights Connect. I believe that they 
communicate it to the CRC. But I think we invite ourselves to Geneva? Or no, this I do not 
have enough information on, but I imagine that it is the Secretariat, but this is only a 
presumption (FFB 2017; brackets added).  
 
One of the Child Rights Connect respondents implied that the role of the organization had 
developed by taking responsibility for some tasks that usually were the tasks of the 
Secretariat. While the Norwegian reporting process started in 2009, it may be that it was the 
Secretariat who invited the Norwegian CSOs to attend the pre-session that year, and that the 
role of Child Rights Connect developed later.  
 
5.2.2.2 Allotted time for discussion 
A means identified in the empirical data material, by which the CSOs may influence the 
CRC’s work is how the CSOs that are physically attending the pre-session can exceed their 
allotted discussion time as it gives them more time to promote their child rights concerns, i.e. 





2.5 hours with presentations by the CSOs followed by a Q-and-A round (Child Rights 
Connect 2016a). Both CRC members, Child Rights Connect, and members of the respective 
CSOs were asked questions about these pre-session conditions. Only one CRC member 
problematized the allotted time for discussion. I interpret this to be an issue only for the 
CSOs, and that the CRC is not necessarily aware of the tension that can arise between the 
CSOs in the pre-session. Furthermore, only one CSO member mentioned problems regarding 
the allotted time for discussion, while this was the only respondent that had previously 
attended the pre-session.  
 
We have experienced that conflicts have risen when too many [CSOs] come and take control 
of the speaking time (CRC1 2016; brackets added).  
 
There have been some discussions between [CSOs]. Some have felt that the ombudsmen took 
control over how much time each of the other [CSOs] could talk during the pre-session. Some 
NGOs felt that the time given to them was too short (CRC1 2016; brackets added).  
 
The pre-session is quite hasty, and we give short introductions to our work. Officially it is the 
NHRI that has [the allotted time for discussion] Last time it became quite evident that it is not 
the NHRIs that have the main knowledge, it is the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children. It is 
quite complicated when a lot of actors are in the pre-session. Especially for [FFB] it has been 
hard to distribute the time to answer all questions because we have to give [the CRC] as much 
information as possible […] We have experienced that some organizations take up [the 
allotted speaking time], without them knowing what that does for the rest of us. There is 
tension when […] 10 people have to answer. The [CRC] asks a lot of questions without 
pointing to a specific organization (The Norwegian Ombudsman for Children 2017; brackets 
added).  
 
This may, as will be discussed further in the analysis chapter, point to the fact that some 
CSOs can exceed allotted time for discussion, and as a result the CSO may bring more 
information to the CRCs agenda from its respective stakeholders, whereby consequently 
certain issues are organized out from the pre-session. 
 
5.2.2.3 Redirection of questions in the pre-session 
A final aspect regarding agenda-setting at the CRC level is how CSOs might redirect or 
control the conversation during the pre-session. During the data collection process, it became 
evident that the CSOs have the possibility to redirect questions asked by the CRC in order for 
the CSO to discuss an issue that is more relevant to the latter. This might be both problematic 
for the issues that are left unaddressed, yet also valuable in the sense that it makes the 
discussion more effective. The evidence suggests that this is yet another means for the CSOs 
to influence the CRC and presumptively also the concluding observations. It has already been 





session, and consequently it harbors valuable information regarding how the pre-session is 
conducted as Child Rights Connect are allowed entrance into the pre-session. According to a 
representative for Child Rights Connect, redirection of question occurs with frequency:  
Let’s say the CRC says ‘I really want you to cover this issue’. Keep in mind that the CRC-
members have priorities, they have their personal interests as well. The [CSOs] may then say 
that ‘That is actually not a big issue in our country, it is not a major problem and it is not one 
of our main concerns and issues that needs to be addressed […]’. So, the CSOs give the CRC 
a reality check, and if they see that the CRC understands an issue, but is asking the wrong 
question, they can put them back on track (Child Rights Connect 2016; brackets added).  
 
This statement does not only indicate that the CSOs can redirect questions, but it also implies 
that the CSOs may control the course of the dialogue by either redirecting the question or 
asking what the CSOs perceive as the “right” questions. 
The Norwegian Ombudsman for Children indicates in the statement below that there 
exist possibilities to improve the dialogue in the pre-session by redirecting the questions that 
the CRC asks, because not all are relevant for each individual country. A reason for why the 
Norwegian representative has not used this mechanism, may be interpreted in line with 
cultural norms:  
Norwegian people are sometimes too polite. The dialogue [in the pre-session] is 
delimited to three hours where [the CRC] asks a bunch of questions. Some of the 
members have the same four questions that they always ask, despite them being 
relevant or not. It has happened that we want to be good and answer everything, 
instead of just skipping something and say that we do not want to spend time on it 
because it is not important for children in Norway. This is a potential for improvement 
because we have a real potential to influence, and we should be more cynical, and let 
them know that we only spend time on what we believe to be the most important issues 
for children in Norway, because we know what that is (the Norwegian Ombudsman 
for Children 2017; brackets added).  
 
Although the statement does not imply that the redirection of questions in fact exists in 
practice, it nevertheless suggests that there often are conflicts of interests between the CRC 
members’ questions and the CSOs’ interests. 
 
5.2.3 The third dimension of power: Shaping thoughts and defining truths 
This section and the power dimension it presents have to do with how an actor can influence 
another actor’s understanding of the truth. Here, the main objective is therefore to provide an 
outline for how CSOs can influence the CRC’s perception of the truth and the concluding 
observations, by defining the truth for children’s situation and by functioning as a beacon of 
credibility and trustworthy information. The first sub-section presents the findings from 





analysis, which is in line with yet with a comprehensive material which goes beyond the 
exploratory exercise conducted by Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012). This will provide answers 
to the first research question’s problem of to what extent CSOs may influence the CRC and its 
concluding observations. This will then be followed by the findings derived from interviews 
with the CSOs, the CRC and Child Rights Connect. 
 
5.2.3.1 Jargon and sentence structure 
The first step in seeking to establish evidence for CSO influence on the CRC level through a 
specific jargon and sentence structure is by revealing whether the CSOs utilize them as a 
strategic means to influence the CRC and its concluding observations. The findings 
demonstrate unanimously that it is used by the CSOs to influence:  
We have a strategy when it comes to facilitating the CRC to acquire our formulation of the 
recommendations. This is a strategy that we have used for a long time. The point is to give 
them the words that they need (FFB 2017).  
 
We are trying to [compose the alternative reports with] issue, the background, and then the 
recommendation. It is different from the last time, but that is the kind of format we are aiming 
to do now. Let’s see how it works. [We are] definitely going to [write] these direct 
recommendations, [which] we did not include last time (CUCW 2017; brackets added).  
 
Yes, the phrasing of the recommendation is a strategy, because we are dependent on the 
[CRC] to understand what we are talking about […] it is a jargon that is used in the reporting 
process, and it would be meaningless not to use it. I would say it is based on the 
professionalization of the process (The Norwegian Ombudsman for Children 2017; brackets 
added).  
 
During Finland’s previous reporting round, CUCW did not employ a specific phrasing of the 
recommendations; however, as is stated, this will now continue to be the norm for their 
alternative report. Furthermore, the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children indicates that the 
wording of the sentences is a strategic mechanism that is used to clarify what the organization 
intends to address. This suggests that the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children tries to make 
sure that its definition of the truth is clear and unambiguous.  
 Reverberating with the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children’s response, FFB further 
indicates that the way in which the concerns and recommendations are phrased, is quite 
important as the organization has experienced that the CRC has misinterpreted a concern 
which was delivered to the Norwegian State party:  
Sometimes the [CRC] does not always understand the recommendations. We have an example 
of this regarding the establishment of the Child Welfare Act which was included last time. 
[The CRC] misinterpreted our recommendation and thought that children could not report 





Norwegian State party, the State party reacted and said, ‘Of course they can!’. This goes to 
show the importance of how we present a concern (FFB 2016; brackets added).  
 
As the respondent suggests, how the message to the CRC is presented is important for how 
the CRC interprets the issue at stake.  
Having thus established an intention to influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations it is important to investigate to what extent the CSOs in fact have had an impact 
on them. The presentation of the findings to this effect unfolds comparatively by way of three 
successive country studies, namely Norway 2009, Finland 2010, and Spain 2010. I wish to 
remind the reader to interpret these findings with caution since the findings necessarily cannot 
yield insight into the dialogue behind closed doors in the respective pre-sessions, nor into the 
CRC’s forming of opinion while writing the concluding observations.  
 
Country study 1: Norway 2009 
The following is a comparison of the alternative reports submitted by FFB, NCHR and the 
Norwegian Ombudsman for Children, and the CRC’s concluding observations. 
 
Table 5.2.3.1 CSO recommendations in the concluding observations (Norway 2009) 
Norway 2009 CSO reports compared to CRC’s concluding observations26 





Type of similarity 







% Frq % Frq % Frq % 
FFB 63  34 54% 29 46% 10 30% 13 38% 11 32% 
NCHR 44 17 39% 27 61%  11 65% 4 23% 2 12% 
The Norwegian 
Ombudsman for Children  
94 47 50% 47 50% 25 53% 16 34% 6 13% 
 
It is evident that the Norwegian CSOs’ alternative reports submitted in the reporting round in 
2009 consists of a variety in the number of recommendations (N) submitted by the individual 
CSOs, where the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children had the highest number, and NCHR 
the lowest. This can be explained by the role of the CSOs: Where the Ombudsman’s mandate 
                                                
 
 
26 Supplementary Report 2009 – To Norway’s fourth Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(FFB), Supplementary Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (Norwegian Ombudsman for 
Children), Supplementary report 2009 to Norway’s fourth report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(NCHR) and Consideration of reports submitted by State parties under article 44 of the Convention, Concluding 





is to report to the CRC, the NCHR, on the other hand, is also occupied with work concerning 
also other UN Treaty bodies and human rights issues.  
Secondly, it is evident that a high amount of recommendations by the CSOs were not 
addressed by the CRC in the concluding observations. An explanation for the high amount of 
no similarities may be found in the word-count limit for the concluding observations, as this 
limit is considerably lower than that of the alternative reports.  
Irrespective of the amount of submitted recommendations, the percentage of similarity 
between the alternative reports by the three CSOs and the CRC’s concluding observations is 
39% or more. Seen in the perspective of the amount of submitted recommendations, the 
NCHR has both the lowest N and the fewest “similarity hits”. As the findings show, in the 
final concluding observations for Norway 2009, no single CSO is clearly dominating the 
impact on the concluding observations, as the similarity between the remarks is distributed 
among the three CSOs. Both NCHR and the Children’s Ombudsman come up with more 
contextual similarities than semantic similarities, which again are higher than the syntactic 
similarities. FFB, on the other hand come up with the most semantic similarities, followed by 
syntactic similarities. FFB has the lowest number of contextual similarities. 
 Finally, the findings demonstrate that The Norwegian Ombudsman for Children is 
most often represented in in the category contextual similarity, where the lexical-item identity 
is low. Below is an example of such a contextual similarity. 
 
Example 1: Contextual similarity 
The State party should develop good structures 
and directives for working on children's and 
young people's participation and at governmental 
level, including alternative forms of hearings, 





The Committee recommends that the State party continue and 
strengthen efforts to fully implement article 12 of the Convention 
and promote due respect for the views of the child at any age in 
administrative and judicial proceedings, including child custody 
hearings, immigration cases, and in society at large (CRC 2009). 
 
Moreover, as Table 5.2.3.1 suggests, the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children also has the 
most semantic similarities, an example of which is demonstrated below. The example shows 
that while there is lexical identity between only two consecutive items (“visiting 
arrangements”) in the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children’s report and the CRC’s 
recommendation, still the recommendation consists of a semantically similar rephrasing of the 
passages “arrangements for contact with a parent in prison” and “visiting arrangements for 
children”: The example shows that only two lexical items follow each other, however, the 
recommendation consists of a rephrasing of the passages “parents in prison” and “visiting 






Example 2: Semantic similarity 
The State party should implement improved 
arrangements for contact with a parent in prison, 
including mandatory basic requirements for all 
prisons on visiting arrangements for children, 





The Committee also recommends that [...] prison authorities 
facilitate the visiting arrangements of a child with his or her 
imprisoned parent (CRC 2009). 
 
 
In the data set, FFB is represented with the highest number of syntactic similarities, whereas 
NCHR scores the lowest in both the semantic and syntactic categories. Below I share a 
demonstration of how similarities have been identified by way of using Corpuscle, this in 
order to facilitate the understanding of how they can be established. The similarities in 
question here are further elaborated underneath figure 5.2.3.2. The search in Corpuscle in this 
case gave three “hits”. However, I paid due attention only to the last two sentences (deriving 
from FFB Supp. and CRC Concl) since these are recommendations (the first sentence is not).  
 
Figure 5.2.3.1 Corpuscle: Syntactic similarity, Norway 2009 (FFB) 
 
 
The example in question here demonstrates the identification of identical lexical items in 
consecutive order. Furthermore, the example shows how “grant […] authority to” and “stop 
distribution of” in the alternative report have been changed respectively into their synonyms 
“mandate” […] to” and “prevent […] to reveal” in the concluding observations. Moreover, 
there are similar passages at the end of each of the recommendations: “information which 
violates [the child’s/children’s] right to privacy”: 
 
Example 3: Syntactic similarity 
The State party should grant the Norwegian 
Data Inspectorate authority to, through 
legislation, stop distribution of information 
about children which violates the child's right 




The Committee recommends the State party to mandate the 
Norwegian Data inspectorate to prevent parents and others to 
reveal information about children which violates children's 








Country study 2: Finland 2010 
Table 5.2.3.2 CSO recommendations in the concluding observations (Finland 2010) 
Finland 2010 CSO reports compared to CRC’s concluding observations27 





Type of similarity 







% Frq % Frq % Frq % 
CUCW 69 29 42% 40 58% 16 55% 9 31% 4 14% 
The Finnish Ombudsman 
for Children 
84 29 35% 55 65% 16 55% 2 7% 11 38% 
 
As was the case for the Norwegian reporting round, also Finland 2010 demonstrates a high 
amount of no similarities. While the Finnish Ombudsman for Children has the highest number 
of recommendations (N), the data set for the Finnish reporting round demonstrates that the 
Ombudsman for Children has the lowest percentage of similarities. This observation may 
raise the question of whether quasi-governmental institutions have lesser impact on the 
concluding observations due to the CRC members’ perception of them. The question of 
organization structure is a topic that will be discussed in an upcoming section.  
Looking at the types of similarities, both CSOs come up with the same numerical 
input and percentage of contextual similarities. However, while the CUCW follows the trend 
demonstrated in the Norwegian case for both the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children and 
NCHR – showing a decrease in both numerical input and percentage from contextual to 
syntactic similarities – the Finnish Ombudsman for Children has more syntactic similarities 
than semantic. The example below demonstrates yet another set of recommendations of the 
type contextual similarity, where the lexical-item identity is low.  
 
Example 1: Contextual similarity 
 
The family benefits of families with multiple 




The Committee calls upon the State to reinforce its efforts to 
provide support to economically disadvantaged families, 
including children of young families, single parents and families 
with many children (CRC 2011).  
 
                                                
 
 
27 NGO report, Supplementary Report to Finland’s Fourth Periodic Report on the Implementation of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child for the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CUCW), Report to the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Supplementary report to Finland’s 4th Periodic Report (The Finnish 
Ombudsman for Children) and Consideration of reports submitted by State parties under article 44 of the 





Furthermore, presented below is an example of a recommendation from the CUCW report, 
which is a concern in the CRC report. The example illustrates semantic similarity in that 
while there is lexical identity between only two items following each other in the two texts, 
yet the more extensively formulated CRC-concern consists of a semantically similar 
rephrasing of the content in CUCW’s recommendation. Take note of the change from 
“working life and family” to “work and family life”.  
 
Example 2: Semantic similarity 
The parents of small children, and particularly 
single parents, should be offered more options for 





The Committee is concerned that municipalities are not required 
to provide such activities, making it difficult for parents to 
balance work and family life (CRC 2011).  
 
 
There has not been a single case where a recommendation is reproduced with the exact 
wording. Nonetheless, the example below, an example from the category syntactic similarity, 
illustrates two recommendations that are close to identical.  Such similarities will be discussed 
further in the upcoming analysis.  
 
Example 3: Syntactic similarity  
The Finnish government should ensure 
permanent and sufficient funding for phone 
and Internet helplines for children and 




The Committee recommends that the State party ensure 
permanent and sufficient funding for phone and Internet 
helplines for children (CRC 2011). 
 
 
Country study 3: Spain 2010 
Table 5.2.3.3 CSO recommendations in the concluding observations (Spain 2010) 
Spain 2010 CSO report compared to CRC’s concluding observations28 







Type of similarity 







% Frq % Frq % Frq % 
PI 154 33 21% 121 79% 18 55% 8 24% 7 21% 
 
During Spain’s 2010 reporting round, PI was the only national CSO that submitted an 
alternative report to the CRC, hence no comparisons on a national level can be conducted. 
                                                
 
 
28	  Complementary Report to the III and IV Report on the Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
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However, as witnessed in comparable instances in the foregoing cases, also PI has a high 
percentage of no similarity, actually, the Spanish case distinguishes itself from the Norwegian 
and the Finnish cases, as it has the highest percentage of no similarity with 79%, compared to 
the highest numbers for Norway’s and Finland’s reporting rounds, 61% and 65%, 
respectively.  
Furthermore, and in unison with the CSOs’ reports during Norway 2009 and Finland 
2010, also PI follows the trend, demonstrated by the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children, 
NCHR, and CUCW, in that both the numerical input and the percentage decrease from 
contextual to syntactic similarity. Moreover, PI comes up with more contextual similarities 
than semantic and syntactic combined, like its comparable peers in Norway 2009 (save FFB) 
and Finland 2010.  
Below is yet another example of the category syntactic similarity, now extracted from 
the case of Spain 2010. Here we can witness how a certain number of identical lexical items, 
one with a CRC inversion, in both texts consecutively lead up to the tandem PI and CRC 
recommendation of “the best interest of the child”. This syntactic similarity “hit” is 
nonetheless a result of the wording in article 3 of the Convention concerning the best interest 
of the child. Moreover, both recommendations address “individual analyses of 
unaccompanied minors/child”, making the recommendations contextually alike. Furthermore, 
while not in consecutive order, there are certain identical lexical items, including “guarantee”, 
“analysis”, and “individual”: 
 
Example 1: Syntactic similarity 
Guarantee in first instance, once identified as 
unaccompanied foreign minors, that an 
individual analysis with the personal 
circumstances of each child is made, 
determining in this analysis the best interest of 
the child in order to take the most adequate 




The Committee recommends that the State party [...] guarantee, 
following the identification, an analysis of the unaccompanied 
child's individual circumstances, bearing in mind the best 




Below is also another example of how the category syntactic similarity from the case Spain 
2010 was identified in Corpuscle. As seen, the search gave four “hits”, however the two 
recommendations in focus are sentence number three (NGO Compl. 2010) and four (CRC 








Figure 5.2.3.3 Corpuscle: Syntactic similarity, Spain 2010 (PI) 
 
An interesting aspect regarding this specific example is that it is much longer than the 
previously exemplified similar recommendations. The same example is presented in its 
entirety below. The passages of texts are quite similar with their more than three lexical items 
following each other. In addition, it turns out that the CRC recommendation has included both 
synonyms and paraphrasing of PI’s recommendation.  
 
Example 2: Syntactic similarity 
We recommend the creation of a National 
Plan against childhood poverty that establishes 
a coherent framework in which we can identify 
priorities actions to fight against exclusion, 
included, should be specific and measurable 
objectives, with clear indicators, with 
timeframes, and with the necessary economic 
and financial support. This plan should be 
capable of effectively coordinating actions on a 
national, autonomous and municipal level 
including specialized areas (especially 
economy, health, social policy and education), 









The Committee recommends [...] the creation of a national 
plan to combat child poverty, which establishes a coherent 
framework identifying priority actions against the exclusion 
of children, with specific measurable objectives, clear 
indicators, deadlines and sufficient economic and financial 
support. The plan must provide for the effective coordination 
of actions at the local, national and regional levels, and in 
different areas (in particular, the economy, health care, 
housing, social policy and education) that are specifically 
responsible for children, and must include the necessary 
participation of girls and boys (CRC 2010). 
 
 
5.2.3.2 Organizational structure 
The following presentation of the findings of the final aspect with regards to the third power 
dimension will seek to reveal whether the organizational structure of a CSO can influence the 
CRC’s concluding observations, or as Türkelli and Vandenhole suggest, to answer the 
question of whether CSOs act individually or jointly will have an impact on the CRC. The 
joint alternative reports from an NGO-coalition constitute a model that Child Rights Connect 
developed for national NGOs to report to the CRC (Child Rights Connect 2014). CSOs are 
quite aware that the organizational structure might influence the CRCs perception of the 
alternative reports, and thus influence the concluding observations. The interviewed 
representatives from the NGO-coalitions indicate that their organizations cover a broader 





A main goal in working as coalition in writing the alternative report is to achieve a greater 
impact. We cover more. (FFB 2017). 
 
[Our member] organizations feel that it is very informing and that it is [an] influential way to 
do this reporting process (CUCW 2017; brackets added).  
 
According to the statements provided by the CRC-members, the findings demonstrate some 
dissenting opinions regarding the coalition structure: Two CRC members state that the 
organizational structure does not influence their perception of the alternative reports or the 
organization’s credibility:  
No, no. We give it equal weight. We can perhaps dialogue more in-depth with an NGO that 
files an individual report, rather than a coalition of NGOs who, you know, they might be 10 
NGOs and they file a combined report (CRC5 2016). 
 
[…] Both yes and no. I believe that the [CRC] pays attention to the issues presented in the 
alternative reports, and not so much who sends them […] at least that is what I do (CRC6 
2016; Brackets added).  
 
However, the majority of the interviewed CRC members (4/6) expressed that a coalition has 
an effect on how the they perceive the information in the alternative reports. As indicated in 
the examples below, the joint alternative reports are seen as practical reading material and 
facilitate the discussion during the pre-session:  
[…] it is very practical for us to receive reports from coalitions [...] then we do not have to 
relate to different reports (CRC1 2016; brackets added).  
 
Oh, [they are] very important. We can only invite this many people, and we do not have much 
time to discuss. The coalitions facilitate that (CRC3 2016; brackets added).  
 
The NGO-coalitions were also mentioned as more relevant compared to an individual NGO 
as they cover a broader field. Moreover, they are perceived as more credible due to their 
expertise and their broadened scope. However, important to point out, as the following 
statements both indicate, is that the CRC is obliged to read and consider all material 
submitted by CSOs, and does not reject the importance of other CSOs reporting to the CRC. 
Furthermore, as expressed in the second statement below, the interviewed member holds that 
the CRC cannot generalize, and that it always depends on the CSO.  
The internal scope of the coalition is more effective regarding having a strong voice with the 
[CRC]. To the extent that there is a coalition in the respective country, we prefer national 
coalitions compared to an individual NGO […] they are more relevant for us. However, we 
consider all alternative reports, but national coalitions make more comprehensive reports. All 
their members agree upon the priorities in the reports, which is very special. But, at the end of 






[…] it depends on [the] NGO [coalition]. A coalition for me is more credible. In a coalition, 
you have experts […] with different backgrounds […] And [their] widespread […] broaden all 
aspects (CRC4 2016; brackets added).  
 
The statements presented above suggest that information from coalitions is preferable, thus 
indicating that the organizational structure might have an impact on some of the CRC-
members’ perception of the reports’ reliability, credibility, and coverage, and stated is also 
that they are perceived as time-efficient.  
 An obvious fact, even seen in this thesis’ cases, is that the CRC receives reports not 
only from NGO-coalitions, but also from Ombudsmen, NHRIs, and children. One of the 
interviewed CRC members mentioned specifically the importance of (independent) NHRIs 
and children’s reports. Another member also underlined the children’s reports: 
The reports from the NHRIs are very important if they are independent. The children’s report 
is also very important  (CRC2 2016).  
 
[…] Children’s reports [are] quite interesting as the descriptions of how they feel and think, 
and what they want us to do are so direct” (CRC1 2016; brackets added).  
 
One of the representatives from Child Rights Connect, on the other hand, expressed concern 
with regard to the role of Ombudsmen: 
It was always […] tricky with the so-called ombudsmen […] we might be [wearier] of their 
independence […] In cases like that the [CRC] can still meet with them or hear from them but 
they might […] do a separate [...] meeting, so that [NGOs] feel that they can speak freely, 
because if they feel like the person is not completely independent they might not want to speak 
freely (Child Rights Connect 2016; Brackets added).  
 
This may indicate that the Ombudsmen have less impact on the concluding observations than 
other organizations – an issue that has been brought up as regards to what extent each CSO 
can influence the concluding observations. This will be discussed in the upcoming analysis.  
 
5.2.4 Communicative power: Informal meetings 
The occurrence of the communicative power dimension in the empirical data material is 
rooted in the same principles as the occurrence of it at the CSO level. Namely, that actors 
involved in a mutually accepted deliberative setting act rationally and justify their actions and 
methods for achieving their goals.  
At both levels, there exist possibilities to interact with the CRC members, where the 
CSOs may talk and present information to them in an informal forum that presumably gives 
the CSOs a way to influence the concluding observations. It is apparent that CSOs actively 





of the interviewed CSO representatives has previously attended the pre-session. The 
representative focuses specifically on possibilities to talk to the CRC members during the 
lunch breaks, in between the meetings (during breaks), as well as to provide the CRC 
members with handwritten notes.  
You always eat lunch with three to four [members] but we also use the breaks in between 
meetings. In addition, we also try to write something to the [CRC] (The Norwegian 
Ombudsman for Children 2017; brackets added).  
 
Moreover, the statement below suggests that the CRC members voluntarily take part in such 
informal meetings as they wish to receive information from the CSOs. 
I have experienced that CSOs have not been able to participate in the pre-session, and asked 
if I could talk to them for 15 minutes outside [the formal process]. And I have accepted this 
because the [information] that they provided is important. So yes, we actually talk with 
[CSOs] outside [the formal process], it is an informal meeting, but at the same time also 
formal, because there are interpreters. But [we] also meet for coffee in the cantina and 
discuss what [the CSOs] want (CRC1 2016; brackets added).  
 
These informal meetings might, to some, be problematic since they are not rooted in the 
formal institutionalized process. However, on the other hand, the CRC may only spend 2.5 
hours with the CSOs, thus the informal meetings may be a requisite due to the short time 
limit. In the findings stemming from interviews with the CRC members it has become evident 
that the time is an issue throughout the reporting process. Five of the six interviewed CRC 
members, including the representative from the Secretariat stated that the scheduled time for 
their meetings in Geneva is too short and that the work might be affected by it. I demonstrate 
this unanimity with one of the CRC respondents’ answers:  
 
We never have enough time […] but I think we all recognize that the system cannot allow us to 
debate all the issues and investigate in detail for six months. It is just not possible, but the 
short answer is that we never have enough time (CRC5 2016; brackets added).  
 
While concerned about the limited time they as a committee have for the work of monitoring 
the State parties, the CRC members all the same seem to acknowledge that it is not possible 
for them to prolong the reporting process.  
 
5.3 Findings at the Supra-national level  
The following presentations of the findings are anchored in the empiricism outlined above, 
however, they are supplemented with additional information provided from relevant (and also 
previously utilized) websites and guidelines. The outline below unfolds along the 





role in the reporting process, and hence is concerned with the thesis’ second research 
question.  
 
5.3.1 Access to deliberation 
The first normative point of reference provided to analyze the legitimacy of the CSOs’ role on 
the supra-national level is whether there exists institutionalized access for the CSOs within 
the process. Against this background, I have extracted information regarding the possibilities 
for CSOs to send alternative reports, and gain access to the deliberative settings in the pre-
session in Geneva.  
 
5.3.1.1 Possibilities for sending alternative reports 
As previously mentioned, according to the OHCHR’s website, all non-governmental actors 
such as NGOs, NHRIs, Ombudsmen, and children are entitled to send written information to 
the Committee (OHCHR 2016a). Furthermore, Child Rights Connect defines “alternative 
report” as: 
A country-specific report, about children’s rights as defined under the Convention and 
its Optional protocols, submitted by an individual, a group or an organization, which is 
independent from the government, to the CRC (CRC Reporting 2017).  
 
This points to two criteria for submitting an alternative report, namely that the CSO must be a 
non-governmental actor and that the report must revolve around children’s rights. 
Furthermore, there is nothing that points to CSOs being restrained from submitting 
reports: “We accept reports from every one that wants to report” (CRC2 2016). 
The statement below is not as firm as the response above regarding any overriding 
criteria. Nevertheless, the respondent expresses that if there were an overriding criterion, it 
had to be the Convention: 
 
I [do not] think [that] there is one overriding criterion [for participation]. If there is one it is 
the [Convention]. It has to be all about the [Convention]. I mean we are a children’s 
committee, we are not the human rights council (CRC5 2016; brackets added).  
 
This indicates that the role of the CSOs – as eligible providers of a country-specific report – is 
institutionalized in the process. The only two clear criteria that one may derive from the 
descriptions on the websites and the two responses, is that the CSOs that submit reports must 
be (1) a non-governmental organization, and (2) working with issues concerning the 
Convention. Not all respondents answered this question during the interviews, and the 





have no idea” (CRC4 2016). In my analysis I must therefore consider that there is some 
uncertainty regarding whether there exists any other overriding criterion; however, the 
findings presented do not suggest this.   
 
5.3.1.2 Institutionalized participation in the pre-session 
Secondly, there is the institutionalized access to participate in the pre-session. As 
problematized in section 5.2.2.1, there is uncertainty regarding, firstly, if there exists a 
gatekeeper, secondly, who that is, and, finally, what the criteria for participating in the pre-
session are. Despite these uncertainties, the findings nevertheless show that among the CRC 
members, there is a lack of information regarding this specific inclusion and exclusion 
procedure, suggesting that maybe the CRC members indeed are not the de facto, or in-practice 
gatekeepers to the pre-session. This is in fact contrary to what the OHCHR and Child Rights 
Connect’s guidelines explain. An example that might underline that it is not the CRC who is 
the gatekeeper is clearly demonstrated in the response:  
 
[…] so you know it is not like we get a list and […] say ‘you can come, you cannot come […]. 
They [i.e. the CSOs] make the decisions [themselves] (CRC5 2016; brackets added).  
 
As has already been documented above, one of the suggested gatekeepers is Child Rights 
Connect, and one of its representatives expressed, as previously put forth, that Child Rights 
Connect has been given responsibilities for tasks that earlier had been the Secretariat’s – one 
of these new responsibilities being the invitation of the CSOs (see section 5.2.2.1 for context). 
As we have already seen suggested by a CRC member above: “I have experienced that 
CSOs have not been able to participate in the pre-session, and asked if I could talk to them 
for 15 minutes outside [the formal process]” (CRC1 2016; brackets added). This statement 
indicates that not all CSOs have access to the deliberations during the pre-session. Although 
the empirical data material cannot further support any overriding criteria for invitations to the 
pre-session, the findings presented nevertheless point to uncertainties especially regarding 
access, which demonstrates a lack of transparency surrounding the process. This will be 
further discussed in the analysis. 
 
5.3.2 Transparency and access to information 
The findings such as information retrieved from descriptions of the process from OHCHR’s 
and Child Rights Connect’s websites demonstrates that the process is open in such a way that 





document which, after having been submitted to the CRC, is posted on the OHCHR’s 
website. Furthermore, based on the provided description of the reporting process in the 
chapter 2.0, the CSOs have access throughout the process. They may even appear at sit-ins 
during the sessions with the State parties, as the session is a public meeting, although none 
other than the State parties and the CRC may speak there (Child Rights Connect 2016a). As 
the CSOs may both read the state report and participate during the session (though silently), 
they have full access to the same information as the State parties.  
 The State parties, on the other hand, cannot participate during the pre-session, as the 
CSOs may in the session, which indicates that the State party does not have the same 
information flow as the CSOs. However, after the pre-session is terminated, the State party 
concerned receives an update, as previously mentioned, called the List of Issues (LOI) which 
includes issues that request for updates on new laws, policies, institutions etc. as well as 
specific statistics and data (Child Rights Connect 2016a). Although not containing a 
comprehensive overview of the issues having been discussed during the pre-session, the LOI 
may nevertheless give the State party an indication of what topics have been on the discussion 
table. On the one hand, the LOI may function as a transparency mechanism where the State 
parties get some insight into what has been discussed during the pre-session. On the other 
hand, however, the description of the LOI arrangement indicates that the State parties do in 
fact not have access to the same information as the CSOs. This will be further problematized 
and discussed in an upcoming section.  
 
5.3.3 Responsiveness to stakeholders 
I will not dive deep into the responsiveness of adjustment, as section 5.2.3.1 covers the data 
material concerning the aspect of adjustment. However, what I will point out is that the 
findings demonstrate that the CSOs possess a power to influence the CRC and its concluding 
observations as their recommendations are often reproduced as concluding observations. 
Although Nanz and Steffek (2005) argue that CSOs almost never have the power to adjust the 
agenda in international organizations, the findings, nevertheless, indicate that CSOs in fact 
can influence the CRC’s concluding observations, as the lowest impact percentage is 21% 









As operationalized in section 3.2.1.4, the normative point of reference for inclusion concerns 
whether there exists any form of arrangements, i.e. economic resources to support 
disadvantaged stakeholders. Regarding appropriate arrangements for such stakeholders and 
the CSOs representing them, I have, through the course of the data collection process, been 
able to establish that Child Rights Connect provide financial support to organizations situated 
in countries with limited capacities, as one of the interview respondents made clear: 
 
We used to support them financially […] we would have some money to support NGOs from 
the global south or from countries that had limited capacities. I think we paid some people 
from certain European countries, especially from central and eastern Europe, where they just 
would not have the money to come to Switzerland, because they didn’t have support from the 
big international organizations. We would pay for one or two people, usually for people who 
are from a coalition. We would have a real national focus (Child Rights Connect 2016). 
 
If they came from countries like Spain or Norway we would not do all the financial and visa 
stuff, but we would still do the briefings and the advisory stuff (Child Rights Connect 2016).  
 
These statements indicate that there at least used to exist arrangements to support 
disadvantaged stakeholders. Furthermore, they indicate that the countries my thesis is 
concerned with (save perhaps Finland, though most likely this goes for Finland, too) would 
not receive resources. This is in line with the responses that the Norwegian CSOs provided, 
which said that they did not receive any support. CUCW also stated that the organization did 
not receive any support for the process: “No, we don’t get [funding], we self-fund it” (CUCW 
2017; brackets added). 
Surprisingly, the data material, then, indicates that Child Rights Connect provides 
economic resources to disadvantaged organizations, while none of the CRC members 
mentioned that the OHCHR, the CRC or the Secretariat provide such arrangements.  
I have now presented the data material for this thesis, and I have sought to make a first 
step in tying these to the theoretical underpinnings. The following analysis will discuss these 
findings in light of the research questions, the assumptions, and the theoretical framework. 
 
6.0 Analysis  
This chapter will connect the empiricism with the chosen theoretical framework, both of 
which have been presented in the foregoing chapters. Together the empirical evidence and the 
theoretical framework will help answer the raised research questions: How and to what extent 





reporting process legitimate? As declared, the aim of this thesis is twofold: the main 
objective of the analysis is the discussion how CSOs can influence the CRC and its 
concluding observations, and to what extent they can do so. The subordinate, yet 
complementary, objective is the critical analysis of the CSOs’ role in the process.  
To answer the first research question, I will employ the four power dimensions that 
will function as analytical tools to explain and understand the CSOs’ role in relation to the 
CRC reporting process and their means to influence the CRC and its concluding observations. 
Habermas’ deliberative democratic theory will be employed to discuss and analyze the second 
research questions. This discussion will amount to a critical analysis of the CSOs’ role and 
influence in the process. Based on Engelstad’s (2010) power paradigm, I will provide a 
concluding summary of my analysis of power relations at the CSO and the CRC level, based 
on my findings and supported by theoretical considerations.  
The qualitative interviews and the quantitative content analysis led to the findings that 
I have presented in the previous chapter. Now I will discuss and utilize the findings to answer 
the raised research questions. Through the discussion, I will also seek to confirm or invalidate 
Türkelli and Vandenhole’s (2012) suggested impact factors. I acknowledge that the empirical 
evidence might not have captured all possible power dimensions present during the reporting 
process. Nevertheless, the findings and the discussion as follows derive from a meticulous 
and thorough data collection process. The discussion unfolds along the three previously 
outlined analytical levels, namely the CSO level, the CRC level and the supra-national level.  
There are few findings that I can compare mine to. The closest study on this topic is 
the article written by Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012) focusing on NGO impact throughout 
the CRC’s work. Although their explorative exercise utilizes different categories, includes 
only NGOs, and employ different cases than the ones employed in this thesis, I will 
nonetheless refer to their article to complement some of the findings presented in chapter 5.0. 
 
6.1 CSO level: Grass root influence 
The first analytical level seeks to identify how the CSOs may influence the CRC and its 
concluding observations outside of the formal steps of the reporting process. Rooted in the 
theoretical framework and based on the empirical evidence extracted from the data-collection 
process, I have identified four different types of power relations that the CSOs hold and which 






6.1.1 Governing through guidelines  
CSOs may influence the CRC and its concluding observations by following comments offered 
by the Liaison Officers of Child Rights Connect. The Child Rights Connect Guidelines imply 
a better impact on the CRC. Following the comments and subsequently altering the alternative 
reports may improve the CSOs’ impact factor on the CRC’s work, i.e. the concluding 
observations. 
The NGO Child Rights Connect has had a long experience with the Convention, the 
CRC and the reporting process. Subsequently it has gained knowledge of how to conduct such 
a process, and thus, through experience, established formal guidelines for how to write an 
alternative report. The NGO seemingly holds some type of power as it is a junction between 
the national CSOs and the CRC. To apply Dahl’s theory to understand and explain where and 
how the power is being exercised and how the CSOs may influence the concluding 
observations by complying with Child Rights Connect’s power demands, one needs to 
identify the three previously presented underlying causes: First, that there is a conflict of 
interest, values or action between A (a Child Rights Connect Liaison Officer) and B (a staff 
member within a CSO). Secondly, that B (the staff member) complies with A’s (a Child 
Rights Connect Liaison Officer) wishes. Finally, that B (a staff member within a CSO) is 
fearful that he or she will be deprived of something that is more valued than what can be 
achieved by non-compliance. First, as the findings indicate, the conflict of interest can be 
rooted in both efficiency and subjectivity: If the CSOs do not follow the guidelines and 
consequently present an inefficient report, and/or if the report contains subjective 
interests/critique (or “personal rant” as the respondent called it), the Liaison Officer(s) can 
request alterations to the report. Based on the findings, it appears that Child Rights Connect 
wishes to establish a uniform format for the alternative reports through the guidelines. If the 
guidelines are not followed in certain aspects, a Liaison Officer will request alterations. One 
may take it that these changes can sometimes conflict with how a CSO wishes to present the 
alternative report, although I have not found empirical grounding for this.  
Secondly, it is the Liaison Officer(s) that process(es) the alternative reports, and who 
subsequently possess the power to alter or influence the CSOs’ way of writing them. It has 
not been clear who submits the alternative reports, thus I cannot pinpoint whom the power is 
being exercised over (i.e. actor B according to Dahl’s theory). However, it is likely that the 
persons(s) responsible for putting together the report and/or submitting the report to Child 





report are requested. If a CSO re-submits an alternative report, now in an amended form, to 
Child Rights Connect it implies an action that would otherwise not have occurred if the 
Liaison Officer had not requested any amendments.  
Finally, although not empirically proved, one may assume that a CSO complies with 
the Liaison Officers’ request as the CSO might be fearful of not achieving the intended or 
desired impact. As previously argued, the comments to the reports are believed to work in the 
CSOs’ favor as they may improve the chances for an impact on the CRC. This can suggest 
that the power dimension does not necessarily need to be zero-sum, although it changes 
another actors’ behavior.  
The Guidelines and the Liaison Officer(s) govern(s) not only the practices of how to 
write the alternative report, but also what to include and exclude, though the latter will of 
course be rooted in the Convention. Enforcing preferable norms that suggest how the CSOs 
should report, and asking them to change the report if the guidelines have not been followed, 
are direct forms of governing behavior. Evidenced in my presented findings, I cannot 
empirically demonstrate a situation where a staff member within a CSO has altered the 
alternative report as per Child Rights Connect’s request. This is because I have not been able 
to uncover whose behavior has been altered by the Liaison Officer(s) comments, nor have I 
obtained a first and a second draft of the alternative reports to empirically illustrate the 
alteration. Nonetheless, the issue was highlighted during an interview with a Child Rights 
Connect representative, in addition to being mentioned in their Guidelines. Therefore, I 
assume that it is common practice, and consequently I include this power dimension.  To sum 
up with the use of Engelstad’s (2010) model: 
 
Relation:  CSOs submit alternative reports to Child Rights Connect. A liaison Officer goes 
through it.  
Intention: A liaison Officer wants the reports to be efficient and to exclude subjectivity 
Action: A liaison Officer requests amendments to the alternative report 
Result: A CSO-representative changes the report. This is believed to result in greater impact. 
 
To tie this analysis to the raised research questions, CSOs may influence the CRC and its 
concluding observations by following Child Rights Connect’s suggestions and comments 
while they will obtain greater impact in so doing. This, in turn, may indicate that the power, 
although direct, is not necessarily zero-sum. However, it is the staff members of Child Rights 
Connect that hold the power to alter the CSOs’ staff members’ behavior, but the action is 
believed to strengthen the CSOs’ impact factor. In conclusion, as demonstrated by way of 





by Türkelli and Vandenhole, will have an influence on the CRC’s work – subjectivity is not 
perceived as quality. However, it is important to underline that the “quality” of the 
information in the alternative reports is defined by the NGO Child Rights Connect.   
 
6.1.2 NGO-coalitions – cut from the same cloth?  
The work with the alternative reports in both FFB and CUCW is conducted the same way: by 
setting up working groups that work with different set of clusters stipulated by the 
Convention, and out of which the group is selected that lies closest the member organizations’ 
focus area. During this work, the members within each working group are expected to 
propose recommendations for inclusion in the alternative report. Naturally, when members 
are working within their respective fields of expertize, and simultaneously try to submit 
recommendations for inclusions on the agenda, conflict of interests and values are likely to 
arise, as they would in any agenda-setting process. This is because the coalition members 
presumably have different stakeholders (children) and different interests. The existence of a 
conflict of interest is best illustrated by the statement: “the problem lies in the situation where 
half of our group disagrees with an issue or how it is put forth” (FFB 2017).  As this power 
dimension is likely to occur when a strong culture is created, it is also likely to occur within 
the agenda-setting processes for the NGO-coalitions reporting to the CRC. 
The smaller member organizations in FFB are often concerned with thematic issues 
that are much more confined than is the focus of larger organizations. With reference to my 
theoretical framework, the smaller member organizations are often focused on routine issues. 
Their interests are consequently not always in line with FFB’s stipulated criteria for key 
issues, which are threefold: a recommendation (or the key issue) should a) concern many 
children or have considerable consequences for the children concerned, b) be viewed as 
conflicting with the Convention, and c) be on a UN-level. If the smaller organizations often 
present routine issues as opposed to key issues, this might open up the possibility for larger 
member organizations to ignore the smaller ones’ recommendations by disfavoring them and 
by arguing that the topic of the recommendation is too narrow. When barriers such as the 
presented threefold criteria are reinforced in order to concentrate or limit the scope of the 
political process, one may assume, in line with the principles of the agenda-setting power, that 
the issues of a smaller organization can “be organized out” by the larger ones. As is illustrated 
in FFB’s response: “[when] an organization […] contribute[s] with an issue that 95% of FFB 





not believe it conflicts with the [Convention]” (FFB 2017), hence routine issues which are too 
narrow in their scope are organized out. 
However, small organizations are often more active than the larger ones. Even though 
a recommendation proposed by a small organization is not relevant for a large number of 
children, nor a grave concern for the few it concerns, there exist possibilities in which the 
smaller organizations nonetheless can affect the agenda: When the other members are 
disengaged in the process, this might leave room for moderation: “when [larger organizations] 
didn’t contribute, we were moderate [sic] and included topics from small organizations under 
general clusters to make it a concern for all children” (FFB 2016). The norms operative in 
for the agenda-setting and decision-making process as regards the alternative report are 
anchored in active participation. Hence, when the larger member organizations are less active 
in the process, this consequently leads to smaller organizations’ benefiting form it: “[The 
smaller member organizations will consequently] get more breakthroughs in our alternative 
report [...] which will benefit the children that they work for” (FFB 2017). Thus, the smaller 
member organizations may obtain agenda-setting power (above the ordinary) as a “default”.  
The decision-making power in FFB is distributed amongst all members. The decision-
making model is based on a consensus to ensure that (at least) 90% of the organizations can 
back the proposed recommendations. This is to secure that none of the larger member 
organizations can decide alone. However, even though the content of the alternative report is 
agreed upon by all members, my findings do nonetheless demonstrate that not all issues are 
included on the agenda, implying that some child rights issues are organized out or given less 
importance. Such routine issues have been exemplified in the findings and include 
recommendations regarding Sami children and health issues. The theory that I lean on here 
seeks to capture the absence of something, which in turn makes the analysis a challenging 
task, yet it is nevertheless possible to conclude that the agenda-setting power, is operative 
during the agenda-setting process of the NGO-coalition FFB.  
Although the CUCW’s process of writing the alternative report is similar to FFB’s, the 
decision-making power regarding what content to include in the alternative report is here not 
based on a consensus between the member organizations but rather, the power is concentrated 
on a few hands: “it is the [board members] that make the final decisions […]” (CUCW 2016). 
By having an institutionalized practice of collecting information in working groups and letting 
the CUCW board make the final decision, one has enforced, as Bachrach and Baratz (1970) 





in deciding what issues or recommendations to include in the alternative report. While in the 
last instance this task is left to the CUCW board, the latter possesses both the formal and the 
de facto agenda-setting and decision-making power. For a member organization or a public 
institution to succeed in getting child rights issues on the CUCW-agenda, it needs to get past 
the board members. Considering the agenda-setting principles, this emulates the “elitist” view 
on power, where the agenda-setting and decision-making power is found to be held by 
“privileged” groups.  
However, the theoretical approach is also concerned about issues that are suffocated 
before they gain access to the decision-making arena. Comparing the case of the CUCW to 
FFB’s agenda-setting and decision-making process, one may assume that, as with FFB, such 
issues are already organized out before ever gaining access to the decision-making arena, i.e. 
the CUCW board. While my findings have been unable to “capture the absence of 
something”, yet – as with any agenda-setting process – it is safe to assume that some issues do 
not gain access in the alternative reports, and are consequently not heard by the CRC. 
Furthermore, the word count ceiling to the report enforced by the OHCHR may play a 
contributing part in provoking or reinforcing barriers to the public airing of issues, a case in 
point to the obvious fact that no all issues can be included. Consequently, some issues are 
kept out of the alternative report. A possible explanation for why the decision-making power 
is in the hands of to the CUCW-board, is the sheer diversity of members. While CUCW 
consists of both organizations but also state institutions, its board may provide assurance that 
the state institutions’ and the civil society members’ concerns do not conflict with each other. 
However, these are mere assumptions that would require further investigation in another 
context. Based on Engelstad’s power paradigm, I here provide a concluding summary of my 
analysis: 
 
Relation:   Members of NGO-coalitions collaborate on writing the alternative reports 
Intention: Each member tries to include the interests of their stakeholders.  
Action:      Joining a working group and proposing child rights issues. 
Result:      Some child rights issues are included in the report, others are not. 
 
In conclusion, then, the respective members of both FFB and CUCW have different 
approaches to air child rights issues, concerns, and recommendations, which later might reach 
the CRC’s agenda. However, both agenda-setting and decision-making processes may be 
interpreted in regards with the principles of the agenda-setting power. Tying these findings to 





alternative report and how the content for the report is collected, is an important impact 
factor. What is seemingly considered quality of information in the alternative reports is 
determined by a set of criteria (i.e. FFB’s threefold criteria) which focuses on child rights 
issues that are of high enough importance and grave enough for the children they concern. 
Furthermore, the quality may also be controlled by the word-count limit posted by the 
OHCHR. As a matter of fact, the word-count limit may, not surprisingly, delimit the scope of 
the report, thus institutionalizing a barrier for the CSOs to overcome – a barrier which in turn 
may influence the agenda-setting processes for all CSOs. My collected empirical data 
suggests evidently that the decision-making power within FFB rests on a wider ground than 
CUCW. However, the CSOs that are members of an NGO-coalition can affect the concluding 
observations by joining working groups and by being active contributors to the process. 
Coalition members will most likely be able to influence the CRC’s work by promoting key 
issues as opposed to routine topics, i.e. narrow issues that are not in line with the pre-set 
criteria. The findings suggest that larger organizations gain more impact on the report than the 
smaller ones in FFB, although the smaller member-organizations may have the power to 
influence the agenda as a “default”, i.e. by being active.  
 
6.1.3 Collaboration –  a strategic mechanism to influence, or to overcome restraints? 
Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012) suggest that whether CSOs act individually or jointly is an 
impact factor believed to heighten the possibility to influence the CRC’s work. The CSOs that 
report to the CRC are aware of and know their “reporting partners”, i.e. the other CSOs that 
also report to the CRC. In addition, the CSOs are in constant contact, although they do not 
have a formal role in each other’s organizations, they share information with each other, they 
are on each other’s mailing-lists, and they work closely with the cluster-related issues in the 
alternative reports. A reason for collaborating with other CSOs is to obtain a greater impact 
on the child rights issues that are of a particular concern for the CSOs. The idea is that when 
an issue is mentioned by more than one CSO within a country, it is likely to obtain additional 
attention during the CRC’s assessments of the report. This suggests that when a national civil 
society mentions the same issues, it will be perceived as consensus regarding the given issue 
highlighted, and as a result it will seem more credible. The values inherent in the alternative 
reports may thus help form the mindset of the CRC members and the way they act, since it is 
likely they might internalize these values into their own perceiving of the situation for 
children’s rights in a respective country – all of which indicating that the CSOs hold (or are 





collaboration on issues, concerns and recommendations in the alternative reports, the CSOs 
might steer the apprehension and consequently the actions of the CRC members in a given 
direction since the CSOs can influence the CRC’s perception of the truth. This may occur 
even to the extent of having the CRC then raise issues with the State party, that might 
possibly also find their way into the concluding observations. Such scenarios will emulate – 
as Lukes (1974) will have it – with nothing short of the supreme exercise of power. The 
statement below confirms that when several reports mention the same issue, it seems more 
credible to the CRC members and fosters the likelihood of being emphasized:  
If several alternative reports say the same, then we emphasize that issue and the 
reports. (CRC1 2016).  
 
Moreover, the presence of “an intentional stance”, which Dowding (2006) states is a requisite 
for the use of this power approach, is possible to identify while FFB collaborates with the 
Norwegian Ombudsman for Children with an intention to influence the CRC. In other words, 
collaboration is used as a strategic mechanism to highlight in the alternative reports a specific 
child rights-issue that the CSOs are highly concerned about. Although not explicitly stated by 
the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children, it is safe to assume that strategic collaboration is 
used in the same way. After all, the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children views collaboration 
as an “important” and “useful” tool. CUCW, as with the other two organizations, underlines 
the significance of collaboration with other partners; however, the respondents were uncertain 
whether this was adequately reflected in their report. However, one can nonetheless assume 
that if CUCW reports the same issues to the CRC as another CSO, it will be perceived as 
more credible by the CRC members. In conclusion, the impact factor acting individually or 
jointly, suggested by Türkelli and Vandenhole, will have an impact on the CRC. When CSOs 
act jointly with partners in the field, they will obtain a greater breakthrough in the CRC’s 
work, including presumably also the concluding observations. When a national civil society 
appears intact and agrees upon important and grave child rights issues, it will seem more 
credible to the CRC members, since this enables them to verify the issues raised. The findings 
suggest how CSOs can obtain such a perception. To summarize the power relation expressed 
through collaboration:  
 
Relation: National CSOs collaborate on the thematic content in the alternative reports, which 
the CRC will later assess. 
Intention: Make the CRC emphasize the issue and address it with the State party in the 
session and the concluding observations. 





Result: The CRC perceives the issue as important and addresses it in the session and in the 
concluding observations 
 
Yet, another important aspect of the collaboration not discussed so far, and that might 
undermine my analysis and analytical argument above is the fact that the CSOs do not only 
collaborate to highlight important and grave concerns. As my findings demonstrate, the CSOs 
also collaborate in order to include all issues, which they wish to address in the alternative 
reports. Due to the word-count limitation enforced by the CRC and its apparatus, the CSOs 
cannot include all concerns and recommendations. A way to facilitate crossing this barrier has 
been to divide issues amongst the national CSOs in order to bring all important concerns and 
recommendations to the fore. While it occurs that the CSOs divide the issues amongst 
themselves the argument for a unison or consensus-based report highlighting the same 
important child rights-concerns, is undermined by this mere fact. Yet in spite of this, both 
ways may, as the FFB respondents imply, still exist simultaneously.   
 
6.1.4 Communicative lobbyism? 
Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012) propose that opportunities for informal meetings will have an 
impact factor on the concluding observations. My discussion below will tie the findings to the 
communicative-power dimension and will demonstrate how the proposed impact factor can 
be confirmed as having an effect.  
The child-rights network is compact and small. Within this network there are 
conferences, workshops, seminars and more, organized to share and discuss child-rights 
thematics, issues, and research – as in any other field. Such gatherings function as venues for 
both CSOs and the CRC members. It is evident that the CSOs make use of such arrangements 
to come into contact and discuss with the CRC members. During such meetings, they have the 
possibility to present the CRC members with child-rights issues in the respective countries, or 
discuss the reporting process. Furthermore, this opens up for opportunities to invite CRC 
members to in-country conferences or to meet with children or other organizations and 
institutions to demonstrate and discuss the situation for children’s rights, all of which may 
consequently have an impact on the respective country’s reporting process. 
 At the time the CRC members appearing in this study were interviewed, such 
“deliberative forums” were as yet unknown to me and did not strike me as significant for the 
CSOs while these forums were not part of the formal reporting process. Although the CRC 





the CSOs’ statements, one can, nonetheless, assume that such a communicative forum (where 
the CSOs and CRC members meet “off the grid” and discuss child-rights issues) is based on 
mutual communicative norms voluntarily accepted by all parties. This assumption is credible 
because CSOs (and at that: from different organizations and countries) would not be likely to 
express contentment, as they did, at having the possibility to meet and discuss with the CRC 
members outside the formal reporting process, had the CRC members no consented to do so.  
Having established that such meetings are rooted in mutual norms that both parties 
voluntarily have accepted, the next step will be to seek to identify the deliberative 
transformative ability, in other words: to identify whether decisions or actions are based on 
the force of the argument, rather than the status of the speaker or the number of votes. Such a 
deliberative transformation can be evidenced in statements provided by the two Norwegian 
CSOs. The CRC rapporteur for the Norwegian reporting round in 2009 visited Norway to 
discuss the situation for children’s rights and prepare for the reporting round with various 
children’s institutions and including children themselves. Such informal encounters proved to 
have a positive impact on the CRC rapporteur, witnessed by both of the Norwegian CSOs as 
they experienced support for their concerns: “We immediately experienced breakthrough 
because we noticed that [the rapporteur] brought with him the information that he had 
received from the children to the session with Audun Lysbakken” (FFB 2016), the latter being 
the Norwegian State party counterpart, the Cabinet Minister in charge. 
During his visit to Norway, the CRC rapporteur gained knowledge of important and 
grave child-rights concerns. It is evident that the rapporteur’s arguments during the session 
with the Norwegian State party were rooted in the information received during the 
rapporteur’s visit.  Firstly, this entails that the informal visit had an impact on the CRC 
rapporteur. Secondly, and rooted in the principles of communicative power, this suggests that 
the arguments and information obtained during this visit have had the ability to deliberatively 
transform the apprehension of the situation of children’s rights in Norway. This in turn 
indicates that the arguments from the children and the institutions then attained the level of 
communicative rationality as the CSOs’ (and children’s) arguments were preferred over the 
State party’s.  
Furthermore, the empiricism available to me points in a similar direction regarding 
CUCW. The CUCW also stated that their staff members have a close relation with the CRC 
(see section 5.1.4), where a CRC member often seeks out CUCW at conferences to ask about 





CSO members and asking for their concerns regarding children’s rights, it does not only entail 
that the information provided by the CSOs is perceived as credible, but that the CSO’s 
concerns and arguments are perceived as rational, which in turn points to the fact that CSO 
members’ arguments bear a communicative transformative ability.  
Having no empirical evidence to support this claim, I argue that it is unrealistic to 
expect or demand that the CRC members do not meet with the CSOs during network-
conferences, seminars or meetings in their own capacity. The CRC members are, after all, 
experts within the field. In conclusion, my findings followed by my analysis have shown 
support for Türkelli and Vandenhole’s claim that opportunities for informal discussions (i.e. 
outside the formal steps of the reporting process) have a likely impact on the CRC’s work 
throughout the reporting process. The findings further suggest that that “communicative 
lobbyism” can have an impact on the CRC and the formal steps of the reporting process, as 
shown specifically in the country study of Norway. Furthermore, the first assumption can here 
be verified: CSOs can influence the CRC through means by which they exceed their formal 
role in the reporting process. To connect the discussed power dimension and the empirical 
evidence in a compendious manner: 
 
Relation: CSOs meet with CRC members at, or invite them to conferences etc.  
Intention: Address children’s rights issues, the reporting process, what the focus of the CRC 
is 
Action: Discuss with CRC members at such conferences, or invite them to the CSO’s 
countries. 
Result: Impacting the CRC and its work during the reporting process. 
 
Based on the analysis on the CSO level, I have here identified and discussed four means by 
which CSOs may influence the CRC and presumably also its concluding observations. To 
summarize the discussion on this analytical level, I have identified that CSOs are bearers of 
alternative information to the CRC (relation). The CSOs want the CRC to address the CSOs’ 
child rights concerns in its evaluation of the State parties’ compliance with the Convention 
(intention). Hence, the respective CSOs write alternative reports (in compliance Child Rights 
Connect’s guidelines), collaborate on certain issues, and discuss with CRC members during 
conferences and other events (action). The CRC addresses the issues with the State parties 








6.2 CRC level: Influence during the reporting process 
The concern at my analytical CRC level is to highlight and discuss how CSOs may influence 
the CRC during the formal steps of the reporting process. This discussion will provide 
answers to my first research question raised, which is twofold: It will answer both how and to 
what extent CSOs can influence the CRC. The discussion that follows will address six ways in 
which the CSOs can exercise their influence, and they will be analyzed in light of the chosen 
and previously operationalized theoretical framework. The analysis will, furthermore, seek to 
confirm or disprove whether the impact factors suggested by Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012), 
in fact are factors which can impact the CRC.  
As justified in section 3.1.2, the probability of finding the first power dimension at the 
CRC level has been low. Consequently, I have excluded the power dimension from this 
analytical level. Furthermore, the empirical evidence has not supported the existence of this 
power dimension, therefore, it will not be addressed here. However, I do nevertheless not 
reject its existence during the formal steps of the reporting process.   
 
6.2.1 The mysterious gatekeeper – outsourcing the selection process? 
Türkelli and Vandenhole (2012) state that presenting child rights issues by being physically 
present in the pre-session can have a greater impact on the CRC as opposed to non-
attendance. If this is the case, it is important to discuss the role of the gatekeeper (i.e. who 
invites the CSOs to Geneva). According to the OHCHR’s website there are no uncertainties 
regarding who the official gatekeeper to the pre-session is, namely the CRC.  However, as 
demonstrated, there are uncertainties of (or an unwillingness to share) who in fact is the in-
practice gatekeeper. Table 5.2.2.1 presents an overview over which actors were believed to be 
the gatekeeper, and it shows a centralized tendency on Child Rights Connect and the 
Secretariat. The explanation for the different answers given to me may be rooted in two 
aspects of the process: Firstly, in the fine line between public and confidential knowledge. 
The ambiguous answers may be a result of not knowing exactly what to share with me in my 
role as a researcher. And secondly, in the previously mentioned opaqueness of the reporting 
process. Apparently, not all of the actors have a complete overview of everyone involved in it.  
Despite the diverging responses, it is evident that the gatekeeper has the power to 
include, and consequently to exclude actors from the process. The gatekeeper thus holds a 
position that could help foster a political organizational structure that may block the 





setting power theory as a framework to explain and understand the gatekeeper’s work and 
what effect it may have on the CSOs likelihood to influence the CRC. In analyzing the 
gatekeeper-role by assessing the collected data material against the principles of agenda-
setting power theory, one has to furnish empirical proof of the existence of selection 
strategies. While I find that my collected data material testifies to what may be leaning toward 
the existence of selection strategies, yet it at the same time restrains me from concluding 
firmly as to who possesses the power to favor or disfavor interests (theory’s actor A), I select 
the following to analytically present all available knowledge: Firstly, we know that no 
observers are allowed into the pre-session (this I experienced myself as I was unable to enter 
inside the room of the pre-session). Secondly, we know that in order for a CSO to be invited, 
they must request so in the alternative report. Hence, organized out are the presence, opinions, 
concerns, opportunities and conditions of both non-CSOs (i.e. observers, State party 
representatives, etc.) and CSOs that have not contributed with an alternative report. This 
transpires by way of the enforcement of the gatekeeper’s institutional practice. With the 
gatekeeper rests the de facto and formal power to exclude issues, arguments, concerns and 
recommendations provided by a CSO before they even enter the agenda-setting (not to 
mention the decision-making arena), the pre-session. The basis for holding pre-sessions is to 
critically discuss child rights issues with civil society actors. Therefore, one may reasonably 
exclude the views of the State parties from these deliberations because the State parties have 
their own session with the CRC. However, most importantly, the State parties’ presence is 
prohibited to ensure that the CSOs who are reporting do not face reprisals for doing so. 
Furthermore, as the pre-session is a closed meeting, no observers or any other people without 
any intention to contribute in the discussions during the meeting are allowed access – their 
opinions, opportunities and conditions are consequently organized out. The pre-session is an 
interactive deliberative setting where all participants are expected to contribute with 
information and the word “observer” deviates from this mere principle. Finally, against the 
background of the delimited time the CRC members have to prepare for the reporting round 
for each country, it is arguably fair that only CSOs who have contributed with a report are 
permitted to access the pre-session.  
While the findings fail to identify any formal or informal selection strategy, it is 
evident that there exist CSOs that have not been able to attend the pre-session. However, 
Child Rights Connect’s Guidelines state that only a limited number of CSOs will be invited 





on by a CRC member: “I have experienced that CSOs have not been able to participate in the 
pre-session, and asked if I could talk to them for 15 minutes outside [the formal process]” 
(CRC1 2016) (see full context in section 5.2.4). This indicates that there are in fact certain 
CSOs’ views, opinions and concerns that are denied access in the pre-session. The power that 
the gatekeeper has entails the defining of key issues and consequently also routine ones. An 
assumption is that NGO-coalitions are perceived as providers of key issues whereas individual 
NGOs represent routine issues. This assumption is built upon the findings to be discussed in 
6.2.4 and 6.2.5.  
In conclusion, there exist institutional practices which limit the scope of the political 
process to the public airing of some CSOs’ child rights concerns. However, my findings have 
not been able to pinpoint precisely which criteria underlie the exclusion. A possible 
explanation for the existence of the gatekeeper, is not that the OHCHR, the CRC, Child 
Rights Connect, nor the Secretariat intentionally exclude issues that it/they are uncertain of 
winning. The reason for having a gatekeeper may be to keep the pre-session confidential 
between the CRC and the civil society to ensure that State actors, informants, journalists and 
others cannot access the deliberations, which in turn safeguards CSOs from facing any 
reprisals. The power relation present during the selection of CSOs can be summarized as 
followed: 
 
Relation: Child Rights Connect/the Secretariat invite(s) CSOs, who have written an 
alternative report and requested an invitation, to the pre-session 
Intention: Keep State party officials, observers etc. from participating in the pre-session. 
However, there may exist other intentions which the findings have failed to point out. 
Action: Child Rights Connect/the Secretariat send(s) out invitation to a selected group of 
CSOs. 
Result: Some CSOs are invited to the pre-session in Geneva, other CSOs and State party 
officials and observers are not: Thus, some issues are included on the agenda, others 
excluded. 
 
In sum, the findings indicate (in harmony with what is available knowledge on the OHCHR’s 
website) that CSOs may attend the pre-session by submitting an alternative report and 
requesting an invitation. As the upcoming discussions suggests – in line with Türkelli and 
Vandenhole’s assumption – physical presence has an impact on the CRC’s agenda. The 
findings could not point to any selection strategies which can organize CSOs out of the 
agenda-setting process (the pre-session), but the existence of a gatekeeper demonstrates an 





their concerns. As discussed here, and which will become even clearer below, CSOs may 
influence the CRC by being physically present at the pre-session.   
 
6.2.2 Stretching time 
Exceeding the allocated time for discussion is a mechanism CSOs can use to exercise 
influence over the CRC, it contributes to organizing certain issues on the agenda, and 
consequently others out if they speak beyond their allotted time. The data material shows that 
when CSOs exceed their allotted time it can have a negative effect on others as it conceivably 
blocks either their participation in the discussion or their child-rights issues. 
The formalized structure of the pre-session consists of an introduction by the CSOs 
followed by up to 50 questions asked by the CRC members regarding certain issues within 
their alternative reports and other child rights questions that the CRC members are 
particularly interested in (Child Rights Connects 2014). There is no given structure for how 
the CSOs are to answer the questions asked, nor is there a pre-set structure as to which of the 
CSOs shall answer. The second power dimension may contribute to explain and understand 
how CSOs can influence the CRC by exceeding the allotted timeframe. However, to do so 
one must identify the actor that has the power to do so, and whether there exist any conflicts 
of interests between the CSO participants in the pre-session. On the one hand, this analysis 
can be conducted on an individual level; one may assume that the conflict of interest is 
present when several CSO participants attempt to address their child rights concerns before 
the CRC within a limited timeframe. The most powerful actor gaining ground for his or her 
concerns will be the CSO representative that is the most talkative person, or who has the 
greater knowledge on an issue. If he or she exceeds the allotted time, it will in turn affect the 
other CSO representatives from bringing their child rights concerns to the fore. The “loose” 
discourse structure, may make leeway for certain people to talk, which contributes to the 
creation of barriers. Hindering others to talk during the pre-session is a means to activate the 
agenda-setting power in line with Bachrach and Baratz’ understanding of it: issues are 
consequently suffocated before they are even voiced. If this is done intentionally, the 
individual creating such barriers will likely perceive its concerns as key issues, and others’ as 
routine. However, this is not to say that the CSOs present during the pre-session are not 
concerned about the same issues at stake. If a powerful actor excludes an issue from the 
agenda, it does not necessarily mean that the issue is excluded intentionally because the 





powerful actor may do so because he or she is wishes to ensure that the CRC addresses his or 
her child rights concern. What is at stake is demonstrated well by this statement: “There is 
tension when […] 10 people have to answer. The [CRC] asks a lot of questions without 
pointing to a specific organization” (The Norwegian Ombudsman for Children 2017; 
brackets added). Such an organizational structure seems to create a “first come, first served” 
attitude in the entire deliberative setting of the pre-session. When the CRC members ask 
questions, some CSOs may try to answer quickly in order to present their issues or measures 
to the CRC.  
On the other hand, the phenomenon of exceeding allotted time may also be discussed 
on an organizational level: It is tantamount to politicizing it when the organizational structure 
blocks the participation of one CSO representative in letting another one exceed the allotted 
time for discussion. Apparently, and as the statement above indicates, there is no mechanism 
to secure the CSO representatives’ allotted time or their participation in the pre-session. This 
leaves a void that furnishes the CRC members – knowingly or unknowingly – with the 
opportunity to favor one group to the detriment of another. According to Schattshneider’s 
(1969) contribution to the theory, this demonstrates that organizational structures affect the 
possibilities and conditions for the actors participating in the process. Which in turn entails 
that physical presence in fact has an impact on the CRC, whereby CSOs may seek to obtain 
more “face” or “discussion” time with the CRC members by exceeding their allotted time for 
discussion. The findings hence suggest that Türkelli and Vandenhole’s (2012) assumption of 
physical presence being an impact factor can be confirmed. 
However, the scope of this thesis is not why the CSOs exceed their time as I have not 
had the possibility to extract empirical evidence that can be used in an explanatory manner. 
What may, nevertheless, be stressed is that exceeding the allotted time for discussion may 
favor certain CSOs and their issues, which consequently may let them influence the CRC 
members and conceivably also the concluding observations. This in turn indicates that 
physical presence or attendance will have a greater impact on the CRC as opposed to non-
attendance. In conclusion, the simplified power-relation model can summarize the discussion 
above:  
 
Relation:   CSOs and the CRC deliberate in the pre-session. 
Intention:  Promote the children’s rights issues emphasized in the CSOs’ alternative reports. 
        Making the CRC listen to the CSOs’ concerns and measures. 
Action:      Exceed the allocated time for discussion and quickly answer questions from the 





Result:      Certain CSOs may talk longer than others and consequently promote their views, 
       concerns and measures to the CRC. Other CSOs that are present will   
       as a result not have the same opportunity. Their concerns will hence be         
       organized out of the agenda-setting process.  
 
6.2.3 The real chairmen  
CSOs have an opportunity to “steer” the dialogue with the CRC towards its own interests. As 
this may be a mechanism to change the course of the dialogue, and a possibility for the CSOs 
to highlight their interests, one may reasonably turn to the agenda-setting power dimension to 
explain and understand it in light of my raised research question.  
 During the pre-session, the CRC members ask questions regarding the alternative 
reports and children’s rights in the respective country. Some of these questions are perceived 
as recursive and irrelevant by the CSOs. The CSOs may therefore turn to means that let the 
CRC members know that a question raised is not a main concern nor relevant (for the CSOs, 
that is), by redirecting the question, and thereby highlight another issue that is more relevant. 
Furthermore, this possible occurrence implies that a CSOs can “steer” the dialogue from issue 
A to issue B if the CSOs believe issue B to be more important and relevant for the situation for 
children’s rights than issue A. Moreover, as suggested, the CSOs may clear up any 
misunderstandings of an issue, and indicate that another angle should be brought to bear on 
the discussion: “if they see that the CRC understands an issue, but is asking the wrong 
question, they can put them back on track” (Child Rights Connect 2016). The agenda-setting 
mechanism which redirects the CRC members’ questions leave certain questions regarding 
children’s rights unanswered, while others are included as part of the discussion. This implies 
that CSOs possess the power to define key issues by suffocating responses to the CRC 
members’ “irrelevant” questions, which in turn are perceived as routine issues. Hence the 
CSOs contribute to blocking grievances which never become part of the official political 
agenda. If successful, this will lead to an issue never being brought up before the State party 
during the session. Consequently, it would neither become part of the CRC’s agenda. The 
opportunity to redirect the CRC’s questions is hence a barrier that may prevent some 
children’s rights issues from ever being discussed. As materialized practice, it serves the 
CSOs’ interests to keep certain issues and questions from coming to the fore during the pre-
session because answering the “irrelevant” questions is time consuming, and it gives the 
CSOs less time to talk about their own interests or what they believe to be important. 
Therefore, the conflict of interest can be identified in the felt irrelevancy of the CRC’s 





issues that they perceive as important. The conflict arises when the CRC raises irrelevant 
questions that are time-consuming, and prevents the CSOs from discussing their concerns. By 
redirecting the CRC questions, the interests brought forth by the CRC can thus be 
marginalized, as they are not recognized as important enough for the CSOs.   
Even though the Norwegian respondents do not implicate the possibility of redirecting 
the CRC’s question, one can nevertheless identify the conflict of interest while there is an 
evident discontent as regards the often-irrelevant questions that the CRC members ask:  
[…] some of the members have the same four questions that they always ask, 
irrespective of being relevant or not […] We want to be kind and provide an answer to 
everything instead of just skipping something and say that we do not want to spend 
time on it because it is not important for children in Norway […] We should be more 
cynical, and let them know that we only spend time on what we believe to be the most 
important issues for children in Norway, because we know what that is (The 
Norwegian Ombudsman for Children 2017).  
 
The statement does not reflect on the possibility to redirect the CRC’s questions. It 
nevertheless indicates that there is an issue regarding the questions that are asked and their 
relevance. Explanations as to why the Norwegian representatives have not redirected 
questions in the previous reporting rounds can be that it is not an integrated practice, that it 
was integrated after Norway’s previous reporting round in 2009, or – as the respondents’ 
explanation – because Norwegians are too polite. However, the opposite may also be the case, 
that it is the CRC members that have the power to define key issues and not the CSOs. Thus, 
the CRC members can also hinder child rights issues from ever being heard by – consciously 
or unconsciously – blocking certain issues from gaining access to the official political agenda. 
While the CRC members are experts within the child rights field, they may be focused on 
eliciting answers pertaining to particular topics and problems of professional interests, 
therefore highlighting these in their questions. However, the same conflict of interest can be 
identified: the CRC addresses issues that are perceived as irrelevant for the CSO members, 
consequently taking time from the CSOs to bring their interests to the fore. The implication 
that the CRC member also has the power to define key issues, suggests that the CRC can 
create or reinforce barriers to the airing of CSOs’ concerns.  
I have not been able to gather empirical data material that clearly supports either of the 
discussed claims. However, if redirecting a question is a measure to obtain a position of 
“steering” the dialogue with the CRC, it is fair to say the CSOs make use of it because they 
wish to discuss and spend time on matters they believe to be more important. An obvious 





would be to observe the dialogue in the pre-session itself. As I have discussed already, this 
remains an unavailable option in the reporting process. However, my purpose of discussing 
and analyzing the power aspects embedded in the extant practice of redirection as one of six 
ways the CSOs can influence the CRC at the CRC level, is to gain a maximum of available 
knowledge of, inform about and elucidate analytically how redirection of questions can be a 
measure to influence.  
By redirecting the CRC’s questions the CSOs can influence the CRC and possibly also 
the concluding observations by letting the CRC members know what issues are the most 
important (for the CSOs). To the extent the CSOs are successful in doing so, we can again 
confirm that Türkelli and Vandenhole’s supposed impact factor physical presence is an 
important one that may influence the CRC’s work. In conclusion, one may sum up the power 
relations for the here discussed influential opportunity as follows (rooted in the CSO 
perspective): 
 
Relation: CSOs and CRC discuss as interacting partners during the pre-session. 
Intention: Highlight certain child rights issues that are important to the CSOs and its 
stakeholders. 
Action: Divert, redirect or take the steering over “irrelevant” questions asked by the CRC. 
Result: CSOs can emphasize their interests and exclude “irrelevant” subjects. 
 
6.2.4 Phrasing and re-phrasing the truth? 
The findings suggest that inherent in the CSOs lies the power to influence the CRC by 
defining their very understanding of the situation for children’s rights in the country under 
assessment. The following discussion relates to Türkelli and Vandenhole’s exploratory 
exercise, which has confirmed that CSOs may influence the CRC by submitting alternative 
reports. This is well-rooted in their findings, and in their suggestion that “ready-to-use” 
recommendations are more likely to be prioritized and taken up in the concluding 
observations (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 51). 
 CSOs phrase the recommendations submitted in their alternative report in a specific 
manner to influence the CRC. Hence Dowding’s (2006) requisite for the third-dimensional 
power, an intentional stance, is identified, which avoids any over analyzing of the intentions 
and interests of the CSOs. This – according to Dowding – allows for the continued analysis of 
the third-dimensional power relation. An explanation for why CSOs write the 
recommendations in such a manner is to make the child rights issues in questions both explicit 





dependent on the [CRC] to understand what we are talking about”, which can explain why 
CSOs provide the CRC with the “right” words, or “the words they need” (FFB 2016), to, 
firstly, make them understand what is meant, and secondly, suggest their preferable measures. 
Thus, the idea of having precise and accurate phrasings of what the CSOs want the CRC to 
address, might actually facilitate the entire process. The values and concerns that are inherent 
in the alternative reports are represented as “truths” of what the situation for children’s rights 
in a given country is “in fact”. By putting forth explicit and unambiguous recommendation 
the CSOs, through the wording of the alternative reports, may influence and form the way the 
CRC members think and behave. As a result, the CRC may perceive it as the truth, and 
subsequently address it during the session and in the concluding observations. 
Moreover, the role of the civil-society actors in the process is to provide the CRC with 
information on the situation for children’s rights, based on the State party’s report. The 
alternative reports are to praise those of the State party’s initiatives which are improving child 
rights concerns, yet also to offer a critical view of the content in the State party’s report, and 
highlight issues that need improvement. When the CSOs intentionally phrase their 
recommendations in a manner that is “ready-to-use” and the CRC re-phrases these 
recommendations in its concluding observations (as seen in the findings under the category 
syntactic similarity), this demonstrates that the CSOs have the possibility to control, firstly, 
what the most pressing child rights issues in a country are, and secondly, how these issues are 
to be interpreted. Against the background of the three presented examples of syntactic 
similarity for CSOs from Norway, Finland and Spain, one may question whether the CRC 
have had knowledge of e.g. “the Norwegian Data Inspectorate” (see section 5.2.3.1). prior to 
the reporting process, or whether such information has been given to the CRC members 
written or orally. In addition to coming close to the phrasing of the original recommendation 
submitted by FFB constituting a syntactic similarity, it suggests that the CRC members have 
obtained knowledge of the Norwegian Data Inspectorate and its mandate during the process.  
One may pose the same question for the CUCW’s recommendation regarding “permanent and 
sufficient funding for phone and Internet helplines” and PI’s “the creation of a National Plan 
against childhood poverty”. Do the CRC members possess such detailed information about all 
the states that have ratified the Convention? Or do these examples demonstrate that the CSOs 
can influence the CRC members’ comprehension of what is “correct” or “the truth” by 
submitting alternative reports with “ready-to-use” recommendations? If the CSOs have – by 





for possessing the power to influence the CRC members’ perception of the situation for 
children’s rights. 
However, this in turn may lead to the CRC’s acceptance of biased decisions without 
questioning the content nor their intentions. A riveting example of this, is the previously 
mentioned statement of the FFB respondents which indicates that the information provided in 
their alternative report was misinterpreted by the CRC. This may suggest that the CSOs in 
fact are in control of defining the “truths” to the extent that the CRC members select to 
understand them as such (even though the members might literally misunderstand), and that 
the CRC members do not necessarily question the content or intention of the 
recommendations. The specific phrasing of the recommendation thus functions as an 
institutionalization of the truth regarding the situation for children’s rights. In other words, the 
CSOs – wittingly or unwittingly – may in some cases be said to even gain the literal power to 
“control” how the CRC’s interpretation of children’s rights is formed, as well as the same 
literal power to shape the CRC’s interpretations. This is not to say that the CRC members are 
not capable of drawing their own conclusions regarding pressing child rights issues. It may, 
however, indicate that the alternative reports are highly valued.  
The findings for the category syntactic and semantic similarity apparently demonstrate 
how the CSOs have been able to influence the perception of the CRC members. Furthermore, 
by re-phrasing the recommendations proposed by the CSOs, the CRC may ameliorate the 
pressing time issue, which five CRC members have expressed is problematic during the 
reporting process. Employing the CSOs’ recommendations in the CRC’s concluding 
observations may simplify the process of writing the recommendations and make sure that the 
recommendations are speaking to the issues that they are intended to address. If this is the 
case, then the CSOs are successful in influencing the way the CRC members perceive the 
children’s rights issues. 
 Türkelli and Vandenhole’s (2012) findings cannot be compared to mine as the starting 
points for the two analyses are different. Despite these empirically different starting points, 
categories and cases, I will carefully attempt to discuss them. My findings regarding 
similarities, where both concerns and recommendations are accounted for, demonstrates that 
21-54% of the CSOs’ recommendations were taken up as either a concern or a 
recommendation by the CRC in the respective concluding observations. Türkelli and 
Vandenhole’s study (2012) found that 60-70% tended to be taken up by the CRC. My more 





effect of the different categorical basis. Furthermore, my numbers demonstrate that 46-79% of 
the CSOs recommendations resulted in no similarities. Compared to Türkelli and 
Vandenhole’s findings of 30-40% unaddressed issues, again the picture is more diversified in 
my study. 
Despite the largely incomparable results, both the exploratory exercise conducted by 
Türkelli and Vandenhole, in addition to the more in-depth linguistic examination of the 
reports from the three reporting rounds conducted for this thesis, demonstrate that whether it 
be NGOs’ concerns or CSOs’ recommendation, the civil-society actors do have an impact on 
the CRC’s concluding observations. As the two scholars have confirmed, and which my 
findings also do, submitting alternative reports is a way for CSOs to influence the CRC and 
the concluding observations, hence supporting my second assumption that CSOs can manifest 
their impact on the concluding observations by submitting alternative repots. 
 Moreover, it is striking that the Spanish reporting round in 2010 received the lowest 
breakthrough across the cases and across the CSOs, supporting the raised assumption that 
CSOs from Norway and Finland have a greater impact on the CRC than the Spanish CSO. I 
wish to offer and discuss possible explanations for this, in line with the findings, and with the 
previously mentioned parameters which guided the selection of the three country cases: 
Firstly, Spanish PI was the only national CSO that contributed with an alternative report in the 
2010 reporting round. With reference to my discussion in section 6.1.3 regarding influence 
through collaboration, the NGO-coalition had no other organization to collaborate with when 
fostering the recommendations (i.e. it had no peer partner whose agreement of opinion might 
function as a bolstering and reinforcement of which specific issues to highlight in the 
alternative reports). Potentially, the lack of such could affect the CRC’s perception of the 
report’s verifiability and/or credibility. Secondly, the fact that only PI reported to the CRC in 
2010 can presumably be explained by the structure of Spain’s civil society and welfare 
systems: Franco’s death in 1975 and the variety of social reforms introduced by the socialist 
government from 1982 formed the basis of Spain’s development towards democracy (Tusell 
2011). In a European context, Spain is considered a young democracy. This might indicate 
that the structure of the civil society, pertaining to the “emerging civil society cluster” is – as 
the name indicates – less developed than the Norwegian and the Finnish, which have both 
been democratic states longer than Spain, and which pertain to the “Nordic and socio-
democrat civil society cluster”. While there are not as many CSOs working with and on 





more restricted. The implications of being a young democracy may also effect the welfare 
system and the particular cultural child rights perspectives. As the Spanish “sub-protective” 
welfare system of high socio-economic inequality and not “child centric” as the two Nordic 
countries are, it may suggest that the civil society and welfare focus lies on socio-economic 
rights rather than individual and child rights in particular. 
The content analysis foregrounded the extent to which CSOs may influence the CRC’s 
work and its concluding observations, although the results by no means are generalizable. As 
the findings from the analysis indicate, in all the concluding observations deriving from the 
three reporting rounds, the information taken up from the alternative reports is for the most 
part contextual similarities. As previously mentioned, this makes it extremely difficult to 
establish whether the findings are evidence of CSO impact, or of instances where the CSOs’ 
recommendations and the concerns and recommendations of the CRC coincide. However, the 
greater the similarity in the wording of a recommendation, the higher the potential probability 
for CSO impact. Cross reporting rounds combined, the categories semantic and syntactic 
similarities have registered fewer hits than the contextual. The CSOs with the highest 
numbers of syntactic similarities were the Finnish Ombudsman for Children and FFB. The 
starting point for the Ombudsman was 84 recommendations in total. The Ombudsman was 
registered with 11 syntactic similarities, which is equal to 38% of its alternative report. 
Furthermore, the NGO-coalition, FFB, started off with 63 recommendations in its alternative 
report, and was also registered with 11 syntactic similarities, which is equivalent to 32% of all 
its recommendations. These numbers are relatively high in comparison to the other CSOs’ 
recommendations registered in the same category, and one might ask whether this is 
problematic: Can one interpret these re-phrasings of the CSO recommendations in the 
concluding observations, while they may demonstrate the CSOs’ power to influence the 
concluding observations? Might it be considered to be unfortunate for or detrimental to the 
CSOs when the extent is demonstrated of the impact the CSOs have on the CRC, when in 
reality it is the CRC that has the mandate to evaluate the State party’s implementation of the 
Convention? Although I am delimited from drawing any substantial conclusion as to whether 
the semantic and the syntactic recommendations have been influenced by the CSOs’, it 
appears that this might be the case. Nevertheless, I wish to remind the reader that the 
objective of my study is not to compare in order to identify which concrete organization 
receives the highest impact, i.e. semantic and syntactic similarity, on the concluding 





and pragmatic angle to examine, in line with the research question, is how CSOs can impact 
the concluding observations, and to what extent – which is the main objective throughout this 
thesis.  
The conclusion to the analysis of phrasing and re-phrasing, and of what power 
dimension this problematic belongs to, ties back to the first research question: One may 
determine that the CSOs’ influence the concluding observations by employing a specific 
sentence formulation. Although the numbers differ between the reporting rounds, and 
between the CSOs, the findings demonstrate that 21-54% of the recommendations offered by 
the CSOs were taken up in the concluding observations, which is a direct result of the CSOs’ 
specific phrasing of the recommendations, and the CRC’s re-phrasings of them. Interestingly, 
the results deriving from this analysis contradicts Willetts’ (1996) and Nanz and Steffek’s 
(2005) assumptions that CSOs almost never have agenda-setting power (Nanz and Steffek 
2005: 376).  
 
Relation: CSOs are providers of critical comments to the states’ compliance with the 
Convention – a report which is delivered to the CRC. 
Intention: Influence the CRC’s perception by providing them with specifically 
phrased information. 
Action: Submitting an alternative report and phrasing the recommendation in a certain 
manner 
Result: Having an impact on the concluding observations (and for the CRC’s work in 
general). 
 
6.2.5 Reporting individually or jointly?  
Prior to my investigation in this master’s project, there existed a strong suggestion that an 
alternative report submitted by an NGO-coalition is more likely to have a greater impact than 
a separate NGO submission (Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012: 51). This is also suggested by 
Child Rights Connect all the while the organization only funds NGO-coalitions or NGOs to 
come to the pre-session in Geneva (Child Rights Connect 2013c). My findings complement 
this suggestion in indicating that NGO-coalitions are preferred, hence NGO-coalitions may 
have a higher impact factor than the other CSOs reporting to the CRC.  
 We have now established that 4 of the 18 CRC members perceive the information 
from the NGO-coalition as more relevant as well as less time-consuming, and hold it to 
provide a more broadly based coverage of child rights concerns (two of the interviewed CRC 
members did not distinguish between the coalitions and other actors). Hence it is not 
inconceivable that when the CRC members are exposed to information from an NGO-





have predetermined assumptions that the information the coalitions provide is more credible 
and relevant. In the assessment of the alternative reports or during the discussion in the pre-
session, such presumption may result in the CRC members foregrounding the information 
presented by an NGO-coalition. This can contribute to the understanding that systems of 
knowledge, i.e. the submissions of alternative reports – providing the CRC with information 
regarding children’s rights – in themselves are a manifestation of power. Fostering such 
predetermined assumptions regarding the role of NGO-coalitions suggests that the 
organizational structure functions as a “symbol” for credible and relevant information because 
the CRC know, or at least think they know, that all child rights concerns included in an 
alternative report is based on a consensus among the coalition members, that their report 
covers a wider ground, and that it can be more efficiently read. The way the NGO-coalition 
communicates the information in the alternative report, i.e. it being backed by member NGOs 
and other civil societal actors, entails that the coalition members are perceived as dominant 
actors within the child rights field. The specific views of NGO-coalitions can consequently be 
installed as beliefs by the CRC members. Thus, the NGO-coalition, a “symbol” of a credible 
and relevant CSO, can influence how the CRC members interpret the situation for children’s 
rights, giving such coalitions a possibility to define the “truth” regarding any given state’s 
implementation of the Convention. Reporting jointly as a coalition consequently furnishes the 
coalitions with a greater impact factor than e.g. Ombudsmen. This is well demonstrated by the 
findings derived from the content analysis: Based on the percentage of similarities, both the 
Norwegian and the Finnish NGO-coalitions had a greater impact on the concluding 
observations than the Ombudsmen. As seen, FFB obtained 54% similarities, whereas the 
Norwegian Ombudsman for Children had 50%. As was the case for the Finnish reporting 
round: CUCW reached a 42% similarities, while the Finnish Ombudsman for Children had 
35%. Furthermore, they can be explained by the CRC’s attitudes towards NGO-coalitions 
consisting of independent NGOs and Ombudsmen, quasi-governmental institutions. Against 
this background, the third dimension of power, the power to shape preferences and define 
truths, is present during the CRC reporting process. However, it is important to underline that 
all reports are read, as I clarified in a previous chapter. In addition, one cannot disregard the 
information provided by other actors and organizations such as children, NHRIs and the 
Ombudsmen, as they are vital to the process as well. In conclusion, the suggested impact 
factors proposed by Türkelli and Vandenhole, which my analysis sought to address, confirm 





will have an impact on the CRC’s work, and subsequently the concluding observations. As 
seen, NGO coalitions have had a greater impact factor regarding percentage of similarities 
based on the content analysis. However, my discussion has as well established the impact 
factor the CRC members’ attitudes does also influence how organizations (based on their 
organizational structures) are perceived. The discussion above has shown that CSOs that 
report jointly as an NGO coalition can obtain a greater breakthrough than other CSOs. 
However, this is not to say that other types of CSOs cannot influence the CRC. On the 
contrary, as demonstrated, other CSOs have also obtained a great impact on the CRC. The 
power relation analyzed above can be briefly summarized in the power model by Engelstad: 
 
Relation: NGOs submit an alternative report as an NGO-coalition to the CRC. 
Intention: Provide the CRC with information regarding children’s rights as a coalition. 
Action: Establish and report as a coalition. 
Result: NGO-coalitions are foregrounded as they presumably are more credible and thus 
obtain more attention.  
 
6.2.6 Informal affairs 
Informal meetings with the CRC members enable the CSOs to present and discuss the 
situation for children in a given country outside the formal steps of the reporting procedure. 
While the discussions in the pre-session is short, such meetings are common practice. Hence, 
they allow for the CSOs to elaborate on issues that have not been discussed during the pre-
session, presumably due to the delimited timeframe. However, such meetings may also exert 
influence on the course of the dialogue, in that the informal meetings provide a setting for 
asking the CRC members to address certain issues. The informal meetings take place during 
the breaks or in the cafeteria during lunch. As seen, such informal “meetings” can even 
materialize in the form of handwritten notes that are passed on to the CRC members. Even 
though such deliberative forums are not institutionalized as a formal step of the reporting 
process, it is nevertheless evident that this type of communicative interaction is anchored in 
mutually accepted norms, as both CSO representatives and a CRC members approve of such 
meetings. It is apparent that the CSOs can present information regarding the status for 
children’s rights in a country to the CRC members, presumably by the use of moral arguments 
in the rhetoric interaction. By doing so, the CSOs attempt to convince the CRC members 
(being part of the interaction) that their concerns and measures need to be addressed by the 
CRC. While this is the case, then the CSOs are inherently bearers of a form of communicative 





measures regarding children’s rights through arguments. The findings show that there in fact 
exist “windows of opportunity” to discuss children’s rights issues with the CRC members 
during the pre-session and try to influence them through such informal meetings, which 
support the first assumption, that CSOs can influence the CRC outside the formal steps of the 
reporting process. However, the findings have failed to identify any deliberative 
transformative ability, probably due to the nature of such meetings. Engelstad’s power model 
summarizes and anchors the findings, analysis and the theoretical framework in a simplified 
overview:  
 
Relation: CSO-representatives have informal meetings with CRC members during their stay 
      in Geneva.  
Intention: To influence the CRC members to address the important child rights issues and 
       concerns during the session and in the concluding observations. 
Action: Discuss with or pass notes to the CRC members during breaks or the lunch hour. 
Result: It gives the CSO representatives more time to discuss child rights issues with the CRC 
  members, which may result in more influence.  
 
While these informal meetings are not institutionalized in the reporting process, though 
seemingly anchored in mutually accepted norms, they can pose as a problem: As discussed at 
the CSO-level, the CSOs can interact with the CRC members outside of the reporting process, 
such as during conferences, seminars and workshop. However, evidently only the CSOs that 
are invited to the pre-session and have the possibility to travel to Geneva are among the ones 
who gain the opportunity influence the CRC members during such informal meetings at the 
CRC level. As I have established, only a limited number of CSOs from each country can be 
invited to the pre-session, hence only a limited number of CSOs will be able to discuss with 
the CRC members during such informal meetings, and to exert communicative power over 
them. In the conclusion of Türkelli and Vandenhole’s study (2012) they suggest that physical 
presence and opportunities for informal discussion may influence the degree of impact a CSO 
has on the CRC and presumably also the concluding observations. While impossible for me to 
trace whether such informal meetings have had an impact on e.g. the concluding observations 
(due to the nature of such meetings), one may nevertheless conclude that they are common 
practice during the pre-sessions, and one may further assume that they can impact on the 
CRC.  
 To summarize the analysis at the CRC level, I have established that CSOs attend the 
pre-session with the CRC in Geneva (relation), in order to discuss and promote child rights 





accomplished (prerequisite: presence) by speaking beyond allotted discussion time, 
redirecting the CRC’s questions, submitting alternative reports with ready-to-use 
recommendations, reporting jointly, and by meeting with CRC members in informal meetings 
(action). If the CSOs are successful, the CRC will address these issues to the State parties 
during the reporting process (result). After having analyzed the findings for the first and 
twofold research question, I now turn to the analysis of the legitimacy of the CSOs in the 
reporting process. 
 
6.3 Supra-national level: Inclusion if world citizens’ concerns? 
The following critical analysis will build on the above findings and the discussion of CSOs’ 
possibilities to influence the CRC’s concluding observations. It will contribute to explaining 
and understanding the legitimacy of the role and influence that the CSOs hold. The critical 
analysis will unfold around the deliberative normative points of reference for legitimacy 
presented in section 3.2.1. 
 
6.3.1 Access to deliberation 
As suggested, and considering the fact that all CSOs may submit written information to the 
CRC, and that the CRC reads and assesses all alternative reports (this is testified to in the 
responses from the CRC members), one may accept the view that their arguments in fact are 
included in the deliberative process. Access to the deliberative settings is institutionalized by 
the UN both in the form of submitting alternative reports and in the form of participation at 
the pre-session. However, the notion of equal physical access is in fact not institutionalized. 
There are some problematic aspects as regards the uncertainty of the gatekeeper’s possible 
selections strategies, while it at any rate remains an obstacle to gaining a full overview of the 
entire process concerning the CSOs role. Therefore, in order to make headway with the 
critical analysis of the CSOs’ role in the reporting process, additional information is needed 
about how the gatekeeper-process is conducted. Knowledge of whether the gatekeeping 
practice is conducted in-house or outside of the (formal) UN system (i.e. Child Rights 
Connect), should be made more transparent, hence further research is needed before any firm 








6.3.2 Transparency and access to information 
There is no information that the CRC receives from the State parties that is not published on 
the official OHCHR website, hence, the CSOs share the same information as the State parties. 
Regarding the CSOs the case is not entirely the same: CSOs and their respective reports can 
be held confidential, entailing that the State party under consideration might not have the 
possibility to read the CSOs’ alternative reports. Although kept confidential, one may 
nevertheless argue that the State parties – officially or not – are, or should at least be aware of 
policy areas that the CSOs comment on, since the liability for complying with the Convention 
remains solely the role of the State parties’. Furthermore, the LOI contains questions which 
the CRC and national CSOs have discussed, ensuring that the State parties in fact receive 
some information regarding the CSOs’ concern, yet they are not necessarily informed of who 
provides the CRC with such information. This demonstrates that the steps of the reporting 
process apparently ensure that neither the State parties nor the CSOs are blindsided with 
information that has not been known to them before meeting with the CRC. One can therefore 
conclude that all the actors involved in the formal process have access to the same 
information which the CRC later assesses. Although arguably not equal access to information, 
as the State parties do not receive the full reports nor the names of the CSOs that submit the 
alternative reports, there nevertheless exist mechanisms such as the LOIs that makes the 
process more transparent also for the State parties. 
 
6.3.3 Responsiveness to stakeholder concerns 
It is evident that CSOs have had some impact on the concluding observations. The 
responsiveness to stakeholders’ concerns has for the most part been included as contextual 
similarities, however, some raised issues have been included in their entirety (i.e. syntactic 
similarity). Hence, the findings show a strong evidence of adjustment, at least regarding the 
CRC and the concluding observations: Although some of the CSOs in the country studies had 
less total impact than other actors (i.e. especially PI and the Finnish Ombudsman for 
Children), the numbers nevertheless show impact which consequently entails adjustments of 
actors’ position in the concluding observations.  
 
6.3.4 Inclusion  
The democratic quality of the deliberative process relies on its capacity to include arguments 





when certain stakeholders are hindered from voicing their opinions due to resource and 
organizational disadvantages. However, to combat such issues during the reporting process, 
there exist appropriate arrangements including economic resources for disadvantaged CSOs. 
Such arrangements function as a mechanism to support the CSOs – as seen, especially the 
ones “from the global south” or from countries with limited capacities. One of the 
respondents suggested that the economic assistance would not apply to the countries in the 
country study. The normative criterion suggests that public organizations need to make 
appropriate arrangements for empowering the most disadvantaged stakeholders, however, 
apparently it is Child Rights Connect that supports the CSOs by both empowering them, 
providing such stakeholders with economic resources, not the UN. In other words, the public 
political organization – the UN – does not secure the inclusion of the disadvantaged 
stakeholders, that is apparently the job of Child Rights Connect. Despite the long history the 
NGO Child Rights Connect has with the CRC and the Convention, one can naturally view 
them as a part of the UN and the reporting process. However, Child Rights Connect is in fact 
not part of the UN system, which may raise some questions as to its power and influence over 
the reporting process, and later to what legitimacy the influence entails.  
 After having presented the theories, the methodical approaches to extract the empirical 
data material, and presented, and analyzed the findings against the theoretical framework, I 
will now conclude this study by summarizing the main findings while also discussing their 
limitations, and suggest what can further be explored in this research field. 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
The starting point of this study was to confirm or disprove Türkelli and Vandenhole’s (2012) 
suggested impact factors through which the CSOs can influence the CRC. These are CRC 
members’ attitudes, quality of information provided, physical presence, opportunities for 
informal discussion, and whether CSOs act individually or jointly. These impact factors led 
me to the formulation of my research questions: How and to what extent can civil society 
organizations influence the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and its concluding 
observations? Is the CSOs’ role in the reporting process legitimate? The CSOs investigated 
in this study have been selected based on both pragmatic and strategic factors, and they have 
been categorized into NGO-coalitions (FFB, CUCW and PI), Children’s Ombudsmen (from 





the CRC and the supra-national level, which have facilitated the comprehension of the CSOs’ 
impact on and involvement in the CRC in an otherwise opaque reporting process.  
Guided by the research questions and existing research in the field, I have developed 
three assumptions (see next paragraph), which have suggested some expectations as to what 
this study would find. These were tested through interviews with CRC members, 
representatives from the Secretariat and Child Rights Connect, and interviews conducted with 
three CSOs, namely FFB, the Norwegian Ombudsman for Children and CUCW.  
Furthermore, the assumptions were also tested through the quantitative content analysis of the 
alternative reports submitted by the six above-mentioned CSOs and of the three concluding 
observations submitted to Norway (2009), Finland (2010), and Spain (2010). The findings in 
relation to the first and twofold research questions (i.e. the thesis’ main objective) have been 
analyzed by the use of the four power dimensions, direct power, agenda-setting power, 
preference shaping, and communicative power – constituting the main focus of this thesis. 
Moreover, I have also analyzed the legitimacy of the CSOs role in the reporting process using 
Nanz and Steffek’s deliberative-normative criteria.  
My study has shown that most of the power dimensions are operative at two analytical 
levels, the CSO and the CRC level. The empirical data material further proves that CSOs can 
both exercise power to influence, but they may also be subject to power in order to have a 
greater impact on the CRC. Türkelli and Vandenhole’s suggested impact factors have all been 
confirmed to be means to influence the CRC. Moreover, the findings have also supported the 
three assumptions, namely that CSOs can influence the CRC outside of the formal steps of the 
reporting process, that they can manifest their impact on the concluding observations by 
submitting alternative reports, and, that CSOs from Norway and Finland have had a greater 
impact on the CRC than Spain.  
 
7.1 Answering the research questions 
Theoretically motivated, and in line with existing research, this study supports the notion that 
CSOs are political spaces with inherent political behavior (Keck and Sikking 1999; Willetts 
1996). CSOs are agenda-setters during monitoring processes such as the CRC reporting 
process. While CSOs are more commonly recognized for holding power to influence the 
political agenda in international governmental regimes (i.e. influencing public debates) 
(Willetts 1996), this study of the CRC’s interaction with CSOs has nevertheless identified that 





making body, the CRC. While supporting available knowledge of the means by which CSOs 
can influence UN Treaty bodies, this study has also identified new means in relation to the 
particular reporting process, and provided a measurement for the extent they can do so, i.e. by 
collaboration, exceeding allotted time for discussion, redirecting the CRC’s questions, and 
reporting jointly as an NGO-coalition. Moreover, I have verified Türkelli and Vandenhole’s 
(2012) explorative investigation, not least by the novel use of Corpuscle. 
 It is ultimately the CRC that has the formal decision-making power of what to include 
in the concluding observations. However, this thesis has shown how CSOs have the power to 
influence the CRC’s decisions also in line with Heywood’s definition “the ability to affect the 
content of decisions through external factors” (Heywood 2004: 122). In the data material, I 
have identified such literal external factors, i.e. means to influence the CRC outside the 
formal steps of the reporting process – these pertain to the first analytical level, the CSO level, 
and this supports the first raised assumption. CSOs can influence the CRC (1) by conforming 
to Child Rights Connect’s required amendments encouraging unison and objective reports, 
which in turn supports the suggested impact factor on “quality of information provided”. This 
demonstrates how Child Rights Connect regulates said quality. (2) CSOs can influence by 
addressing child rights issues concerning many children or amounting to grave problems for 
the children it concerns, addressing issues that breach with the Convention and that are on a 
UN level, and by being a large and/or active member of an NGO-coalition during the agenda-
setting of the alternative reports. This yet again supports and demonstrates the criteria 
determining the quality of CSO reports. (3) CSOs can influence by collaborating with other 
national CSOs on certain issues – which supports the suggested impact factor that acting 
jointly as a united national civil society will achieve more impact on the CRC, as the 
information is perceived as more credible. Finally, (4) CSOs can influence by meetings and 
discussions with CRC members during conferences and seminars, or by inviting them to meet 
with children and child institutions in their own countries.   
 The ability the CSOs have to affect through factors, during the reporting process has 
been analyzed at the CRC level. However, in order to do so, CSOs must be physically present 
during the pre-session: - which supports yet another suggested impact factor: presence. While 
this study has not identified the actor(s) that possess(es) the role to invite (include) and leave 
out (exclude) certain CSOs from the pre-session, it has nonetheless been established that 
physical presence arranges for CSOs to influence the CRC by exceeding their allotted 





Furthermore, CSOs can influence the CRC by submitting an alternative report, especially 
when using ready-to-use recommendations. This could be confirmed by identifying phrases 
originating from the recommendations in the alternative reports, in the CRC’s concluding 
observations. Moreover, CSOs can influence the CRC and expect greater breakthrough by 
establishing and reporting as an NGO-coalition, as coalitions are perceived as agents 
generating credible, relevant and time-efficient information – this supports yet another 
suggested impact factor: that of “acting jointly”. Finally, CSOs can influence the CRC in 
informal meetings or by the submission of handwritten notes during in-between breaks of the 
ongoing pre-session – which validates the suggested impact factor of “opportunities for 
informal discussion”.  
 My analysis of the available data material demonstrates that 21-54% of the 
recommendations presented by the six CSOs from Norway, Finland and Spain were taken up 
by the CRC in the three respective concluding observations, leaving 46-79% of the 
recommendations unaddressed. These findings support my second assumption, that CSOs can 
manifest their impact on the concluding observations by submitting alternative reports. 
Moreover, based on this analysis, the study has identified a prominent distinction between the 
Nordic CSOs and the Spanish CSO, the latter of which achieved the least impact on the CRC. 
This confirms my third assumption that CSOs from Norway and Finland can influence the 
CRC to a greater extent than Spain. As to how CSOs can influence, my conclusion has 
similarities with Türkelli and Vandenhole’s findings in their exploratory content analysis, yet 
there are, mutatis mutandis, also similar traits between my conclusion and the findings 
demonstrated in Kearny and Merrill’s study on Amicus briefs.  
 Finally, with reference to the identified influence that the CSOs have on the CRC, this 
study has pointed to four deliberative-normative criteria concerning the legitimacy of the 
inclusion of CSOs in the reporting process. Based on the evidence available to me, the CSOs 
role in reporting process can be considered legitimate. However, certain issues fall short of 
meeting the criteria to the full: While CSOs have an equal institutionalized access to the 
deliberative setting in submitting alternative reports, the CSOs do no, however, have the same 
and equal physical access. Furthermore, the CSOs representing disadvantaged stakeholders do 
not receive economic support by the UN, but by Child Rights Connect. The analysis has 
disclosed a need for further openness as to who controls the access to the physical deliberative 
setting, and for higher transparency regarding Child Rights Connect’s role in the process in 






7.2 Limitations to this study 
Some limitation should be pointed out. Firstly, regarding the methodological approach: 
Although I have justified the selected methods, there are methodological approaches that I 
could have used, but was delimited from using due to time and resource restrictions as well as 
confidentiality policies. A fruitful alternative approach to explore the raised research 
questions would be a (comparative) case study following one or more reporting processes in 
their entirety. Yet another valuable approach would be to observe the actual pre-session, 
which could provide in-depth information on how such meetings unfold, i.e. the deliberative 
setting proper, seeking to critically analyze the CSOs’ way to influence through discursive 
practices, exceeding those identified in this study.  
Furthermore, while I have been able to compare the findings stemming from the 
respective national CSOs, it cannot go unmentioned that the rejection to participate in 
interview from both the Finnish Ombudsman for Children and Spanish PI has made the 
comparison somewhat incomplete. While acknowledging that these respective CSOs were not 
available to participate in my project, their inclusion might have provided me with materials 
that this thesis has not been able to address.  
 A clearly relevant factor for CSOs to influence the CRC, yet one deliberately not 
researched in this study, is media. While media attention has been mentioned by several 
scholars, I have left it out due to the massive increase in empirical materials it would have 
entailed and to time and space limits for this study. Yet I strongly support further 
investigation in this respect. However, while Keck and Sikkink (1999) suggest that media 
attention is a means by which CSOs can influence international governmental regimes, the 
findings from my material did not point to media as a way to influence the CRC, yet I cannot 
reject it as a possibility.  
 A final possible limitation to my study is investigator bias – researcher bias during the 
processes of planning and conducting a study. Personal beliefs, experiences and perceptions 
may unconsciously provide bias towards studying a phenomenon from a certain perspective 
or drawing certain conclusions. While unaware of any bias in planning and conducting my 
study, my work has regularly been commented upon by PGI, my research group and its 
professors, PhD candidates and master’s students at the University of Bergen. To my best 





research questions in presenting an academic study that both builds on existing and 
contributes with new knowledge in the field.  
 
7.3 Generalization 
This study’s objective has not been to extract knowledge that is statistically generalizable for 
all CSOs participating in the reporting process, but to provide an in-depth insight into the 
CRC’s interaction with CSOs as a phenomenon. As mentioned, this study does not have a 
large set of independent variables, and is therefore not relevant for generalization. However, 
the theoretically based selection of the independent variables may provide certain 
assumptions. As seen, the CSOs from Norway and Finland show similar traits regarding the 
extent of influence, while the Spanish CSO differ from these. Hence, one may assume that 
CSOs from countries with similar permanence of democracy, the same cluster of third sector 
and welfare systems can show similar traits as to influence. Moreover, the theoretical 
framework used to analyze the empirical data has supported results from similar studies, 
however, it has also explored new paths of CSO behavior and influence. While the 
phenomenon under investigation has not been widely studied, I cannot claim that the 
theoretical framework provides the “best” explanation of CSO influence (George and Bennett 
2005: 117). However, I will argue that the employment of the theoretical framework has 
contributed to identifying new knowledge. Finally, while the findings support that of other 
studies, one may further assume that CSOs by the same means can influence other UN 
decision-making bodies, but this claim needs to be further examined.   
 
7.4 What may be further explored? 
It will be of interest in further studies to examine critically whether CSOs are legitimate 
vehicles of information in international governmental regimes. Questions such as why and 
which CSOs should be entitled to represent citizens’ (or children’s) concerns are of the utmost 
importance in that respect. Moreover, further research on the representativeness of CSOs, and 
whether they are interest groups concerned with only the voices of a few people should be 
conducted, since such critical questions are crucial for the further understanding of how CSOs 
work. Lastly, and due to the fact that also children can submit reports to the CRC, it will be of 
interest to analyze how their reports are written, and the extent to which their reports can 
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Interview guide for members of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
 
Part 1 Background Questions  
 
1.   How long have you functioned as a Committee member? 
2.   When were you elected Committee member? 
3.   What is your academic background/discipline? And what is your relevant work 
experience? 
4.   Besides functioning as a Committee member, what is your occupation? 
5.   How often do all 18 Committee members convene? 
6.   How many times a year do you work with the Committee’s reporting process? 
7.   During your time as a committee member, how often would you estimate that you 
worked with the reporting process? 
8.   How many days do you spend in the Pre-session working group? 
9.   How many days do you spend questioning the state parties? 
10.  In your estimate, do you consider the amount of time at your disposal in the 
Committee sufficient to do a thorough job? 
11.  Would you prefer the reporting process to last longer? In what way? Why? 
12.  Would you prefer some parts of the reporting process to last longer? If yes: for what 
part of the process would you like to have more time? 
 
Part 2 NGO’s role in the reporting process 
1.   Are the supplementary reports – the NGO contribution to the process – vital for the 
evaluation of member states’ compliance with the Convention on the Right of the 
Child? 
2.   Do you consider the NGO supplementary reports to be vital for the Committee’s 
work? 
3.   Can any national NGO report to the Committee? 
a.   Is there a process for which the NGOs must enter to be able to contribute to the 
Committee’s reporting process? 
b.   What are the formal procedures that the national NGOs must finalize before 
contributing to the reporting process? 
c.   Do the national NGOs have to go be confirmed by the Child Rights Connect to 
be able to contribute with supplementary reports? 
4.   How often does the Committee invite NGOs to the Pre-sessional Working Group? 
a.   Do national NGOs always attend/participate? 
b.   Does the Committee always invite national NGOs? 
c.   Are all NGOs allowed to join the reporting process? 
d.   Do both international and national NGOs attend the meeting? 
e.   Do you only invite NGOs that work with children’s right to contribute with a 
supplementary report? 
f.   Are there any NGOs (or other actors) that are excluded from the reporting 
process? 
g.   Do you/Does the Committee contribute more attention to joint supplementary 






h.   Do you know if there is a selection process within a country when it comes to 
what NGOs can participate? 
5.   Does the Committee rely on recommended questions to the state party from the 
supplementary reports? 
6.   If you were to estimate, how many of the recommended questions from the 
supplementary NGO reports do you use when talking to the state parties? 
 
Part 3 The Committee’s reliance on NGOs 
1.   Do you adopt a critical perspective when reading the supplementary reports? 
a.   How often? 
b.   Why do you adopt a critical perspective? 
c.   Do you or does the Committee adopt a critical perspective on a particular type 
of supplementary report? 
2.   Does the Committee have a lot of confidence in the NGOs that participate in the 
reporting process? 
a.   Are there particular NGOs or NGO reports that you have more confidence in 
than others? 
3.   Do you ever fact check the supplementary reports (e.g.) consult with other 
experts/researchers? 
a.   How do you fact check the material? 
b.   Who do you contact? 
4.   Have you/Has the Committee ever doubted the material in the supplementary reports? 
a.   Can you elaborate on what types of facts you/the Committee have/has 
doubted? Is there a trend? 
5.   If the content in the supplementary reports seems incorrect/irregular, has the 
Committee ever contacted a third party like an independent experts/researches to 
check the facts? 
 
 
Part 4. Concept of justification: justification of information  
1.   Does the Committee perceive the concerns that are written in the supplementary NGO 
reports as unbiased, rational, and well reasoned? 
2.   Do you perceive the concerns written in the supplementary NGO reports as unbiased, 
rational and well reasoned? 
3.   In the Pre-sessional working group, is it mandatory for an NGO to elaborate its 
concerns, or justify its concern when presenting it before the Committee? 
4.   If the NGOs present questions that they recommend the Committee to ask the state 
party, do you ask them to justify the question that they present? 
5.   Does the Committee assert a criterion/ have a clear criteria for a “well reasoned 
concern”? 
6.   Would you say that the concern in the supplementary reports from FFB was well 
reasoned? 
7.   (If representatives from both NGOs were invited to the Pre-session): How did you 
assess the critique that was raised during the deliberation in the Pre-session with 
Barneombudet/FFB? 
8.   Do you recall whether the concerns during Norway’s previous reporting process 
(2009) rooted in specific examples? 
9.   While presenting their concerns towards the state’s compliance with the Convention, 






Part 4.1 Consensus based concern: did the NGOs express the same concerns? 
1.   Was there a consensus-based critique in the supplementary NGO reports? 
2.   Do you or have you experienced that disagreements surface in the supplementary 
NGO reports submitted by different interest parties? 
a.   If yes: How often does this happen? 
b.   If yes: How do you/How does the Committee interpret the information that 
comes out of the different NGOs’ disagreement? 
3.   Have you experienced that there is disagreement between NGOs during the Pre-
sessional working group? 
a.   How do you handle it? 
 
Part 4.2 Consensus based decision-making: are the Committee’s decisions based on a 
consensus? 
1.   Was there a consensus-based decision-making process during the Pre-sessional 
working group? 
2.   Are all of the Committee’s decisions based on a consensus? 
3.   Have you experienced disagreements between the committee members while 
deliberating? 
a.   If yes: is this common? 
b.   If yes: How do you resolve these disagreements (e.g. voting?) 
 
Part 5 Concluding observations 
1.   When deciding upon the concerns in the concluding observations (and while writing 
them), do you look to the deliberation in the Pre-sessional working group and the 
supplementary NGO reports? 
a.   Why? 
2.   If you were to estimate, how much of the concerns that are represented in the 
supplementary reports, are published in the concluding observations? 
3.   Have you experienced, in your time serving as a committee member, disagreements 
between the committee members on parts within the Concluding observation? 
a.   How is this solved? 
4.   Some scholars have criticized the Committee and its Concluding observation for 
dealing with relations it does not have analytic basis to criticize. Do you agree with 
this critique? (nevnes i Søvigs utredning f.eks.) 
5.   The Committee has also been criticized for going too far in making social policy 
issues conventional and judicial problems. What thoughts do you have regarding this 
critique? (må omformuleres – kritikken er hvert fall at Komiteen går for langt i 
samf.pol spørsmål og gjør dem konvensjonsrettslige). 
 
Part 6 Conclusions 
1)   If you were in position to improve something regarding the reporting process and the 
evaluation of the state members, what would you improve? 
2)   Are there any other comments you wish to add before we finish the interview? 
 










Interview guide for CSOs 
 
About the organization 
 
1)   What is your profession? 
2)   How do you collect the information for the alternative/supplementary reports? 
3)   Does your organization have collaborators in all of the country’s 
provinces/constituencies?  
4)   Does the organization you work for have contact with or relation to the organization 
“Child Rights Connect”? 
 
Pre-session in Geneva 
5)   Were representatives from the organization you work at present in Geneva during the 
pre-session for the previous reporting round? 
6)   If there were, how was the dialog with the Committee? Could the representatives 
speak freely or did the Committee steer the dialogue by asking questions? 
7)   If representatives attended the pre-session, were they in contact with “Child Rights 
Connect” before or after the pre-session? 
 
CSOs and economic resources 
With respect to the scope of my project, the economic-aspect is not of a particular interest. I 
do, however, ask these questions to see if there are any significant differences between the 
thesis’ different cases. 
8)   During X’s reporting round starting in X, did the organization (where you work) 
receive any economic assistance from the Government for working on the alternative 
reports? 
9)   During X’s reporting round starting in X, did the organization (where you work) 
receive economic assistance from “Child Rights Connect”? 
 
CSO-working methods and the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
10)   Does the organization (where you work) have a specific strategy, working-method or 
a pre-decided structure for working with and writing the alternative reports?  
11)   How does the organization (where you work) go about writing the “concerns” and 
“recommendation” in the alternative reports? 
12)   What strategies would you say that the organization (where you work) use in order to 
influence the Committee? E.g. do you experience that you may influence the 
Committee and its concluding observations only during the pre-session (the formal 
meetings), or also in informal forums, e.g. during the lunch break in Geneva etc.? 
13)   Do you experience that there are other strategies (outside of the formal meetings) that 
the organization (where you work) can utilize in order to influence the Committee. 
E.g. in the media etc? 
 
Opportunities and obstacles for civil society organization in general 
14)  What are the obstacles of being a civil society actor? Are there any restrictions? If yes, 
which restrictions? 
15)  What are the opportunities of being a civil society actor? Which possibilities does the 
organization (where you work) have to influence the implementation of the 





16)   If you were in a position where you could change something with regard to the CRC-
reporting process, what would it be?  
17)   Any comments you would like to add? 
 
 
Interview guide for Child Rights Connect 
 
Interview guide: Child Rights Connect 
 
Part 1 Background Questions 
1.   How long have you worked with Child Rights Connect? 
2.   What has been your motivation to work with and for Child Rights Connect? 
3.   How were you recruited to Child Rights Connect? 
4.   What is your academic background/discipline? And what is your relevant work 
experience? 
 
Part 2 How CRC Mobilizes National NGOs 
1.   What is the primary work of CRC? 
2.   How do you work with national NGOs? 
3.   How and in what way do you mobilize national NGOs? 
a.   How do you reach/contact them? 
b.   How do you get information on NGOs that work with child rights? 
i.   Do you go through the state party? 
ii.   Do you work closely with international NGOs/Do international NGOs 
play a vital role in reaching national NGOs? 
iii.   Do you contact independent “facilitators” that help you to get an 
overview of national NGOs in a country? 
4.   If you could estimate, how many national NGOs do you normally mobilize in a 
country? 
a.   Is there a limit? 
 
Part 3 What National NGOs Are Mobilized? 
1.   What national NGOs can be mobilized? 
2.   Do you apply a specific strategy for election which NGOs to mobilize/facilitate 
through the Committee’s reporting procedure? 
3.   What strategy for mobilizing national NGOs does the CRC use? 
4.   Is the primary focus of the CRC to mobilize international NGOs? 
5.   Is there a selection process of which national NGOs to mobilize? 
6.   Are joint NGOs or network NGOs easier to mobilize/contact than others? 
7.   What is the CRCs policy when it comes to national NGOs that operate under the 
administration of national departments but has the function of an NGO? 
 
Part 4 NGOs’ Working Strategy 
1.   How do NGOs prepare for the Committee’s reporting procedure? 
2.   How do you assist national NGOs to prepare for the Committee’s reporting 
procedure? 
a.   Do you give more assistance to some national NGOs than to others? 
b.   Do you perceive the assistance as vital for the NGOs to report in the 





c.   Do you believe that the national NGOs perceive the assistance as vital for their 
contribution to the Committee’s reporting procedure? 
3.   How long does it take for the CRC to assist national NGOs? 
4.   (If you know) How long does it take for national NGOs to prepare the supplementary 
report? 
5.   Does the CRC recommend a working strategy for the national NGOs when providing 
information to the supplementary reports?  
a.   If yes: what is this working strategy? 
6.   (If you know) What is the general working strategy for national NGOs when gathering 
information to the supplementary reports? 
7.   Since the Committee’s reporting procedure is quite lengthy, do you know if the 
national NGOs constantly work to gather information to use in the supplementary 
reports? 
 
Part 5 National NGO participation in the Committee’s reporting procedure 
How can national NGOs participate in the Committee’s reporting procedure? 
a.   What formal procedure do national have to finalize before being able to 
contribute to the reporting process? 
2.   Can national NGOs participate with out contacting the CRC? Is this a regular practice 
or do they have to go through the CRC? 
3.   Do you know if the Committee accepts supplementary reports from national NGOs 
that have not been in contact with the CRC? 
4.   How can national NGOs be invited to the Pre-session?  
a.   After talking to the Committee members as well as other interviewees it is 
evident that the Child Rights Conenct invites the NGOs on behalf of the 
Committee. How do you select?  
 
Part 6 Conclusions 
1)   How do you perceive the work of the national NGOs? 
2)   If you were to change anything regarding the work that NGOs do, what would this be? 
3)   Are there any other comments you wish to include? 
 


























Inquiry regarding participation in the research project 
 
 
«How and to what extent can civil society organizations (CSOs) influence the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child’s (CRC) Concluding Observations? Is this potential influence 
legitimate?» 
 
Background and objective 
The purpose of this research project is to take a closer look at how the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child relates to civil society organizations (CSOs) (including non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), Ombudsmen/-persons and NHRIs) in its mandatory reporting and 
evaluation process of the member state’s compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. During the data collection process, the student will employ a combination of interviews 
of committee members as well as CSO staff, and content analysis of the supplementary 
reports and the concluding observations from two specific reporting rounds: Finland 2008, 
Norway 2009 and Spain 2010. 
 
What does it mean to be a participant in the research project? 
The fundamental features of this research project is to uncover how the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child works and what relation it has to the CSOs that participate in its reporting 
procedure. Furthermore, the research project will attempt reveal how the CSOs work in 
relation to the reporting procedure and how they gather information to their supplementary 
reports. 
 
If the respondent allows it, I will collect my data during the interview by using a voice 
recorder. However, if the respondent does not approve of the voice recorder, the interview 
will be conducted with out it. 
 
Protection of personal data 
My research project has been reported to, evaluated and approved by the Norwegian Centre 







All personal data will be treated confidentially. Student Hilde Svrljuga Sætre and supervisor 
Marit Skivenes, are the only people that will have access to the personal data. The master 
project will, according to plan, be handed in 01.06.2017. The data collected through 
interviews will be deleted after the result of the master’s thesis has been published.  
 
The respondent might be indirectly recognizable by information regarding their occupation. If 
the respondent does not want to be indirectly recognizable, this will of course be respected.  
 
I want to keep my anonymity and do not want to be indirectly recognizable  
 
However, the participants will be given the opportunity to read through their own information 
and approve it before it is published. 
 
Voluntary participation 
Participation in this research project is voluntary. The participant can at any moment 
withdraw from the project. The information given by the participant will then be deleted 
immediately. 
 
If you have any inquiries, or if you need any further information regarding the research 






Hilde Svrljuga Sætre 
Telephone: +47 905 11 896 
Email: hsa096@student.uib.no 
Alternate email: Hilde.Setre@nsd.no 
 








Consent regarding participation 
 





(Signed by participant, date) 
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